PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY IN ARABIC AND PERSIAN

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

This study grew out of the Woodward lecture which the author delivered before the Oriental Society of Yale University on January 13th 1962. It purports to give an outline of the manner in which philosophical terminology was created in Arabic and Persian. In that respect it breaks fresh ground though it is by no means a comprehensive review of the field. Much remains to be done along that line.

Although addressed primarily to the western reader, it is hoped that the discussion will prove instructive to Arabs and Persians bent upon the development of their respective languages. They have before them the task of forging an instrument sufficiently precise and at the same time adaptable to express the intricacies of modern thought. This attempt at analysis raises far more problems than might appear at first sight. For them no solutions have been suggested, no principles have been laid down. Yet by noting the measure of success and the points of failure in the past something could be learnt for the future.

S.M.A.

Süleymaniye Library. Istanbul. May. 1963.

INTRODUCTION

The creation of philosophical language and terminology was an important development in the history of Arabic. A review of the manner in which it took shape can be of guidance to those who are committed to its modernization. And the measure of success accomplished in that field helps to demonstrate its resources as well as limitations.

The study of Islamic philosophy which dates in the West from the eighteenth century, gained increasing attention towards the middle of the nineteenth. Modern scholarship had taken it up where the men of the Middle Ages had left it. At present in both the Orient and the Occident it is the subject of intensive research. Despite the monumental work of Assemani on the Syriac texts [1], the early tendency was to write general histories. In the quest after the genesis of European thought and its development, Western authors were led back to the Scholastics and Christian philosophy in medieval times. It was soon found that these were much indebted to Latin translations of Arabic books and commentaries on the works of Plato and Aristotle. They reflected at the same time the Neoplatonic synthesis elaborately constructed in the Hellenistic age. Gradually the importance of the original texts was realised. A number of scholars [2] took to editing some of them. Finally they were compelled to go still farther back and seek the direct translations from Greek and Syriac into Arabic; since the treatises of the various Arab, Turkish and Persian philosophers were all based upon them.

Among the first to undertake such tasks was Zenker with his edition of the Arabic translation of the Aristotelian *Categories* [3]. He was followed some forty years later by Margoliouth who edited the Arabic version of the *Poetics* [4]. Yet neither of them noted the importance of the terms as such, and their correspondence with

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[1] Cf. *Bibliotheca orientalis Clementino-Vaticana.* Roma. Vol. I. (1719) deals with Orthodox authors. Vol. 2. (1721) deals with Monophysite authors. Vol. 3. (1725) and (1728) deal with the Nestorian authors.

[2] Cf. the works of Schmolders, Dieterici, Bronnle, Mehren, Forget, etc.

[3] *Categoriae cum versione Arabica...* Lipsiae. 1846.

[4] *Analecta Orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteliam.* Londini. 1887.

the Greek equivalents. No glossary was deemed necessary to their respective editions. On the other hand Hoffman who in the intervening period published the Syriac translation of the *De Interpretatione* [1] added a short list of the terms to the Syriac text. Not long after Asin Palacios [2] attempted a recording of Arabic philosophical and theological terminology. And Max Simon in his edition of the Arabic translation of Galen *On Anatomy* [3] added a glossary in Greek and German. But here a dangerous precedent was set. Inasmuch as the original Greek texts of Galen's book are not extant, the editor chose a purely *a priori* method of finding the equivalents. Pollak, however, in his edition of the Arabic translation of the *De Interpretatione* had both texts before him [4]. He was thus in a position to add an authentic glossary in Greek, Syriac, Arabic, Hebrew and German though unfortunately it is not complete. Gonzales Palencia in his edition of the work of Abū Ṣalt al-Dānī (460-529. A.H.) on logic [5] followed the *a priori* method of Simon and attempted a correspondence between the Arabic and Greek terms, getting himself thereby into error. And Asin Palacios in his edition of the first volume of an introduction to logic [6] by Ibn Ṭumlūs (d. 620/1223) dropped everything of the kind.

At about this time terminology was being stressed and studied in another field. Massignon began publishing his doctorate thesis on Ḥallāj. In his edition of *al-Ṭawāsīn* [7] he gave a short list. And after his main work on the life and teachings of Ḥallāj [8] he undertook as a complimentary thesis a detailed listing of mystic terminology in general [9]. Then Nicholson added a glossary to an edition of al-Sarrāj [10]. Yet Tkatsch who devoted almost a lifetime to his edition of the *Poetics* in Arabic [11] with a highly instructive introduction, did not concern himself much with the terms. And those

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[1] *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristotelis.* Berlin. 1886.
[2] *Bosquejo de un diccionario tecnico de Filosofia y Teologia musulmanas.* *Revista de Aragon.* 5. 1903.
[3] *Sieben Bucher Anatomie des Galen.* 2 Vol. Leipzig. 1906.
[4] *Die Hermeneutik in der arabischen Ubersetzung...* Leipzig. 1913.
[5] *Kitāb Taqwīm al-Dhihn.* Madrid. 1915.
[6] *Al-Madkhal...* Vol. I. Madrid. 1916.
[7] Al-Hallāj. *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn.* Paris. 1913.
[8] *La Passion d'Al...Hallaj.* Paris. 1914-21.
[9] *Essai sur les Origines du Lexique technique de la Mystique musulmane.* Paris. 1914-1922.
[10] *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ.* London. 1914.
[11] *Die arabischen Ubersetzung der Poetik...* Wien und Leipzig. Vol. I. 1928.

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who after his death edited the second volume of his work, over-looked the matter completely [1]. Bouyges in his edition of the commentary of Averroes on the *Categories* [2] gave a good list of the technical terms. Unfortunately they are not exhaustive and do not bear direct references to the Greek text. Mlle Goichon following the example of Massignon devoted the second part of her doctorate thesis to a useful study of the philosophical terminology of Avicenna [3]. But when in a subsequent work [4] she undertook to supply the Greek equivalents, the *a priori* method was carried to the extreme. With no other authority save the *Index* of Bonitz, she indulged in a series of guesses with results that are sometimes far from happy. She did, however, discuss in an elementary way the origin of philosophical terminology in Arabic in the course of her London lectures on Avicenna [5]. Nor did Bergstrasser who published notable works on the translators in general and Ḥunain in particular devote much attention to terminology [6]. In our rendering of the *Poetics* into Persian [7] there is a long list of the technical terms with their equivalents in Arabic, English, French and Greek, giving direct references to the text of Aristotle. Yet that is by no means complete. The list which Georr added to his edition of the Syriac and Arabic translations of the *Categories* [8] is not exhaustive either. Perhaps the most comprehensive glossary so far attempted is that which Ḥaddād has given to his edition of the three different translations of the *Sophistics* found in the Paris manuscript [9]. To an early Arabic translation of a work by Galen [10] the editor has wisely refrained from adding a glossary, since the original Greek text is not available. In the first volume of the *Plato Arabus* series [11] there are Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek indices of great interest; but naturally with no direct references to the *Timaeus* of Plato except where the correspondence seems unquestionable. In the second

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[1] Ed. Gudeman and Seif. Vol. 2. Wien and Leipzig. 1932.

[2] *Talkhīç Kitāb al-Maqūlāt.* Beyrouth. 1938.

[3] *Lexique de la Langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina.* Paris. 1938.

[4] *Vocabulaire Comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sina.* Paris. 1939.

[5] *La Philosophie d'Avicenne...* Paris. 1944. pp. 55-87.

[6] Cf. *Hunayn...und seine Schule.* Leiden. 1913.

[7] *Dar Bāreye Hunar Shiʿr.* London. 1948.

[8] *Les Catégories d'Aristote...* Beyrouth. 1948.

[9] Père Cyril Haddad. *Thèse presentée a la Sorbonne.* Paris. 1952.

[10] *Galen on Medical Experience.* ed. R. Walzer. Oxford. 1944.

[11] *Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis.* ed. Kraus and Walzer. Londini. 1951.

volume [1] though useful notes are added there is no glossary for obvious reasons. And in the third [2] the editor has given an *a priori* list of the possible Greek equivalents with no claim to strict correspondence. Dr. M. C. Lyons of Pembroke College Cambridge has prepared an edition of the Arabic translation of the commentary of Themistius on the *De Anima* [3] with an excellent glossary as an appendix.

The early translators of Baghdad supposedly had lexicons of philosophical terms to help them in their work. There is definite information that this was true in the case of medical and pharmaceutical terminology [4]. But practically nothing has survived as far as philosophy is concerned [5]. Nor did any of them add separate glossaries to their Arabic versions. This applies equally to the translations of As'ad al-Yānawī (d. 1143/1731) which have received little attention from scholars. A native of Janina, he was proficient in Turkish, Persian, Arabic, Latin and classical Greek [6]. Modern Greek he apparently spoke fluently. The libraries of Istanbul contain numerous works by him in manuscript [7]. Some of these are actually in his own handwriting [8]. A Naqshbandī himself, he has a lengthy commentary on the *Shifā* of Avicenna [9]; and a few treatises of his own. He was chiefly interested in Aristotle. And he translated directly from the Greek into Arabic large sections of the *Organon* [10] and the *Physics* [11]. The renderings, however, are faithful only in parts. This is because he made use at the same time of a commentary which he had found useful. "I began translating it", he says of the *Physics*, "exactly according to the original, and to

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[1] *Alfarabius. De Platonis Philosophiae.* ed. Rosenthal and Walzer. Londini. 1953.

[2] *Alfarabius. Compendium Legum Platonis.* ed. Gabrieli. Londini. 1952.

[3] *Doctorate Dissert.* Cambridge University Library.

[4] Cf. *Kitāb al-Ṣaidanah* of Bērūnī. The libraries of Istanbul have more than one such lexicon awaiting an enterprising editor.

[5] A curious volume at Aya Sofya (No. 4749) contains among other things a short glossary of the terms of logic in Arabic and Greek derived from some Stoic work. Unfortunately it is in some three folios. only.

[6] For further information about him Cf. M. Tahir. *Osmanli Muelefleri.* Vol. I. pp. 234-235.

[7] Cf. Nuruosmaniye, Hasan Hüsnü Paşa, Aya Sofya, Université, Halit Efendi, Manisa, and various others.

[8] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 1939.

[9] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 1936.

[10] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 2489 and 2568.

[11] Cf. Ragip Paşa. No. 824 and 825.

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comment upon it within the translation of the commentary of the learned Yuanis Photius, the Greek". In other words the text of Aristotle, his own commentary and that of Photius are combined together. The same thing is said of his Arabic version of the *Organon*. It is interesting to note that he appears well acquainted with Latin Scholastic commentators of the Aristotelian corpus, quoting Thomas Aquinas frequently, and claiming to have read Averroes only in a Latin translation because the original Arabic books were not available to him. Furthermore in his introduction to Logic he produces materials which are of interest to students of the post-classical period. The dispute as to whether logic was a science or not is discussed at length. There are three schools of thought, he says. The first maintain that "the logic which is taught" (i.e. the theoretical principles) cannot be considered a science in any sense. It is simply an instrument for and a method of studying it. Applied logic on the other hand is a science; but no different from any other because it is dependent on the science with which it is combined. When applied to mathematical materials "rendering them thereby verifiable", it becomes mathematical logic. And when incorporated with the natural sciences, it becomes the logic of the natural sciences. Thus every discipline has its own specific logic. We are told that this was the view of the early commentators of Aristotle. The second school believed that logic was an art and no more. While the third insisted that it was a science. In the opinion of Yānawī the Latin philosophers (including Thomas Aquinas) upheld the view of the third school.

Aside from a few cases the terminology employed in these translations is derived from the *Shifā* of Avicenna, and has therefore nothing notable to offer. The manner of transcribing Greek proper nouns, however, is frequently different. He departs from the traditional system. The *taw*, for instance, is transcribed with a simple *tā'*, instead of the *ṭah* which his predecessors had used from the earliest days. There is no reason to believe that the renderings of Yānawī attracted much attention outside of Turkey. Yet he deserves to be remembered along with those early translators who helped to present Greek learning in Arabic.

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CHAPTER ONE

When Arabic philosophical writings first appeared the language had already undergone considerable development. Classical Arabic had been different from the spoken tongue from the earliest days. Among its oldest specimens are Jāhilliyah poetry composed in a literary *koiné* understood but not spoken by the respective tribes [1]. Although the authenticity of these poems has been challenged [2] on the basis that they "could never have been written before the appearance of the Qur'ān [3]", it may be assumed that a good part is genuine. The expressions are naturally of a concrete and local character depicting nomadic life. There is a marked lack of abstract terms except for such notions as love, honour, bravery, generosity and the like. Yet the vocabulary already betrays the presence of foreign words [4]. This was the result of infiltration and due to contact with neighbouring peoples [5]. North of them were the Arameans. It has been observed that "almost all the concepts related to civilization are expressed in Arabic by Aramean words [6]". In the Yemen Persian garrisons had been stationed for long [7]. At about the same time words of Greek origin started to percolate into Arabic, though to a decidedly less extent. The trilingual inscriptions of Syriac, Greek and Aramaic at Zabad, and a bilingual one of Greek and Arabic at Ḥarrān [8] are evidences of the languages prevalent in the region. The local dialect of Palmyra was intermixed with Greek. Public acts were set up in both Aramaic and Greek. The Nabateans who were Arabic in speech and Aramaic in writing, assumedly spoke Greek also [9]. And later at the court of the Ghassānids Arabic and Greek-speaking merchants using the trade routes that passed through the kingdom associated freely.

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[1] Cf. H. Fleisch. *Introd. a l'Étude des Langues Semitiques.* Paris. 1947.

[2] First by Margoliouth and then by Ṭāhā Ḥusain.

[3] Ṭāhā Ḥusain. *Fī al-Adab al-Jāhilīy.* p. 63.

[4] Cf. S. Fraenkel. *Die aramaischen Fremdworter in arabischen.* 1886.

[6] Brockelmann. *Précis de Linguistique semitique.* Trad. francaise. Marcais et Cohen. Paris. 1910.

[6] *ibid.* p. 38.

[7] Cf. *Murūj*... Baghdad. Vol. 2. p. 14.

[8] Cf. Fleisch. *op. cit.* pp. 96-97.

[9] Cf. Hitti. *Syria.* pp. 384-399.

Arab sources frequently refer to the cultural influences which reached them through Ḥirah [1]. Notwithstanding these channels, the general opinion is that what Greek words entered Arabic in the early days were mostly by way of Aramaic and Syriac.

Of pre-Islamic classical prose not much is known. It has been supposed [2] that the origin goes back to public exhortations and speeches at inter-tribal gatherings. The first and greatest work of classical prose is and will remain the Qur'ān. Its intrinsic merits with an unquestioned status as the language of religious revelation, make it the supreme model and the source of profound influence on Arabic literature. The foreign words found in it aroused bitter controversy among Muslim philologists [3]. The numerous treatises on the subject some of which are still in manuscript form [4] prove that it continued to be a live issue. But the sober-minded rightly reached the conclusion that these terms had entered the language from pre-Islamic times and were already assimilated. A modern study [5] devoted to a careful scrutiny of the vocabulary states that "the Greek words in the Qur'ān seem nevertheless with few exceptions to have come into Arabic through Syriac" [6]. Thus at the beginning of the Islamic era classical Arabic literature consisted of the highly parochial Jāhiliyyah poetry in addition to the textual verses of the Qur'ān. But the social and political order which followed soon after, helped the development of language and literature in various fields. The exigencies of the religious life produced Qur'anic commentaries and devotional writings. The number of non-Arab Muslims who did not always speak or write Arabic correctly created the necessity for the establishment of grammar. The garrison-towns of Baṣrah and Kūfah became twin centres of the science [7]. Lexicography was carefully undertaken. And the cultivation of literary gifts and polished language (mostly under the influence of Iranian authors) produced the art of rhetoric (*al-balāghah*) [8]. This well-sustained urge enriched Arabic immensely.

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[1] Cf. Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī. *Ṭabaqāt al-Umam*. Cairo. p. 57.

[2] Cf. Marçais. *Les Origines de la Prose litteraire arabe. Revue Africaine.* 1927.

[3] Cf. Suyūṭī. *Al-Muzhir*. Vol. I. pp. 226-294.

[4] Istanbul libraries have many of them.

[5] Cf. Jeffery. *The Foreign Vocabulary of the Qur'ān*. Baroda. 1938. p. 18.

[6] Cf. *Fihrist*. ed. Flugel. p. 33.

[7] Cf. Al-Anbārī. *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*. ed. Weil. Leiden. 1913.

[8] Cf. *Fihrist*. p. 115.

Fresh forces introduced important changes in style as well as vocabulary. Prose took forms as yet unknown in the language. Three different genres may be distinguished in this respect.

1. Religious prose

This covers all forms connected with the religious life. Its Arabic is in comparison more pure. Nor has it altered much throughout the centuries. Among its best specimens are mystical writings. Under the same heading may be placed the speeches and declarations of the early leaders with their racial and religious appeal. Although these deal with matters of conquest and rule, they have more in common with religious prose than with other varieties [1].

2. Secular prose

This form first appeared in the late Umayyad period. It was created by Muslims of foreign extraction and chiefly Iranians. The style was to a large extent inspired by and modelled after Sassānian literature. It differed from the religious not only in aim and object but in the manner of expression also. Its use of terms entirely unknown or rarely employed in the former genre was extremely resourceful. This secular prose could be conveniently divided into three varieties:

a. *Epistolary*

From the Umayyad period onwards the administration of the newly-conquered empire necessitated the organization of secretarial offices known as *dīwān* (a word of Persian origin). The occupants were called *kātibs* which some have thought it to come from a non-Arabic root [2]. These *kātibs* formed a small but exclusive and powerful class. Men of rare accomplishment in their days, they combined Islamic knowledge with foreign learning and culture. This was because they were often of non-Arab extraction who in places like Iran and Syria had to deal with people of a high cultural standing. The work had a permanent effect upon themselves as well as upon those they were serving [3]. In a letter addressed to his fellow-scribes 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [4] who was among the earliest and

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[1] Cf. *Jamharat Rasā'il al-'Arab...* ed. A. Z. Ṣafwat. Vol. I. Cairo. 1937-1938.

[2] Cf. *Fihrist.* p. 242; Krenkow. art. *Kātib.* Ency. of Islam. Old ed.

[3] Cf. Qalqashandī. *Ṣubḥ al-A'sha.* Vol. I. pp. 103, 188.

[4] Kātib of Marwan II. Killed in 132/750.

most renowned reminds his colleagues that they are placed "in the most exalted of posts". They should consequently be "men of *adab* and manliness and knowledge [1]". He calls upon them to "emulate one another . . . in the varieties of *adab*; and study religion . . . then Arabic . . . then penmanship . . . and the recitation of poetry . . . and the accounts of the early days of the Arabs and Iranians and their sayings and their annals . . . [2]".

Arabic epistolary literature gradually merged with rhetoric and degenerated into bombast. But in its early form it was terse and vigorous. The sentences were short and direct; while the vocabulary came to include some of the happiest terms later incorporated into philosophical prose [3].

b. *Court-literature*

In regulating their association with the communities they now had to rule, and in seeking a model on which to organize their court, the Caliphs turned to the erstwhile Sassānians. Although they had conquered the empire rather easily, their opponents' system of government had deeply impressed them. The secretarial class of *kātibs* were therefore charged to supply the necessary guides by translating books specifying the duties of a monarch and the proper procedure at court [4]. Mas'ūdī claims to have personally seen a translation made for the Umayyad Hishām (together with other Persian works) of a history of the kings of Iran. They were known as *Siyar al-Furs*, or the Annals of the Iranians. The writings of Ibn Qutaibah abound in references to books on court-life prepared for the Caliphs. Jāḥiẓ strongly affirms that it was from the Iranians that they learnt the methods of administration [5].

c. *Belles-lettres*

Side by side with epistolary and court-literature were compositions of purely literary merit meant more to entertain than to instruct. Its chief exponent, if not the actual originator, was Ibn al-Muqaffa'. As a genre of *adab* we have the testimony of Jāḥiẓ that it grew directly out of Iranian literature. In style and voca-

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[1] *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā'*. ed. Kurd 'Alī. 3rd. ed. p. 222.

[2] *ibid.* p. 225.

[3] Cf. Al-Jahshiarī. *Kitāb al-Wuzarā'*... pp. 72-83.

[4] Cf. Mas'ūdī. *Al-Tanbīh*... pp. 66, 92-93.

[5] *Kitāb al-Tāj*... ed. A. Zakī. p. 23.

bulary it had much in common with the epistolary, though eventually it degenerated into verbiage in a similar manner. [1]

3. MUʿTAZELITE LITERATURE

The third variety may be called Muʿtazelite with a style and terminology which stand intermediate between the religious and the secular. The Muʿtazelites who were trained in theological language and literature employed certain philosophical terms also for their particular purpose. As a result their writings overlap, betraying the influence of both religious and secular works. Actually it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether a specific term originated in their circles or was merely adopted by them. A good example is the word *ʿaql* in the precise meaning of intellect [2]. Their works nevertheless constitute a definite genre easily distinguishable. Admittedly not many specimens of their writings have survived; and of these not all have been published [3]. Yet there is enough to establish a claim.

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[1] *Al-Bayān*... Vol. 3. p. II.

[2] Cf. Appendix. II.

[3] Cf. Khayyāt. *Kitāb al-Intiṣār.* ed. Nyberg and again by Nader; Ibn al-Murtaḍa. *Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah.* ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer. Wiesbaden. 1961; A letter of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī. MS. Köprülü. No. 1589. ed. H. Ritter. *Der Islam.* Vol. 21. 1933. Another letter of Ḥasan al-Baṣrī in a collection at Topkapi-sarayi. Revan Kuşku. No. 2030; and also Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad. *Kitāb Sharh al-Uṣūl al-Khamsa.* Topkapi-sarayi. Sultan Ahmet III. No. 1872.

CHAPTER TWO

The search after the genesis of Arabic philosophical prose and terminology leads ultimately to secular literature. There were good reasons why the Translators should choose it as their model in their attempt to put Greek works into Arabic.

1. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ aside, they were almost all of the Christian faith. A few came from the Sabeans of Ḥarrān. As members of the Aramean community they persistently maintained their traditions. And in addition, the confessional disputes which forced the Nestorians to establish their own educational institutions and drive eastward to Iran, helped to Persianize them to a good measure. Consequently theology, mysticism, or the religious speculation of the Muʿtazelites were none of their concern. Except in rare cases as in that of Yaḥya ibn ʿAdīy who earned his living for sometime as a copyist, there is no reason to believe that they had read any of it.

2. The patrons who ordered the translations were in most cases men of foreign extraction chiefly occupied with the secular life and thought of Baghdad. Good Muslims individually, the new learning had fired their imagination and aroused enthusiasm. To be sure the pace was set by the Caliph and some of his courtiers. But with one or two exceptions as with members of the Nowbakht family, theologians and mystics stood openly aloof and honestly hostile. The translation of a number of medical manuals were requested by Christian physicians and colleagues.

Internal evidence confirms these considerations. The simple and direct mode of expression; a neglect of the stylised construction of sentences; the almost total absence of *sajaʿ* or internal rhyme; and the change in tone from the evocative to the didactic and narrative, were characteristics of secular prose. Terminology offers a still more fertile field for comparisons. Here we find non-Qurʾanic words, first introduced by authors of epistolary literature and belles-lettres, gaining common usage among the Translators and becoming technical terms of philosophy. Or genuine Qurʾanic derivatives, but in different grammatical forms, are charged with meanings and connotations which they did not possess in the original.

A scrutiny of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd's vocabulary discloses a series of

terms which were later adopted in philosophical language. In his extant writings [1] we find:

1. Examples of non-Qur'anic words:

adab, ta'dīb, al-mu'addabūn, al-tajrubah, rawīyyah, simāt, jawhar, ghāyah, māddah, al-dhihn, gharīzah.

2. Examples of Qur'anic words, but in different forms and sense:

idrāk, irādah, al-ālah, al-infirād, fikr, maʿna, mutuhaiyyiz, mas'alah, al-maʿrifah, al-lafẓ.

In the works of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [2] we find:

1. Examples of non-Qur'anic words:

adab, ghāyah, gharā'iz, dhihn, nahw, rawīyyah.

2. Examples of Qur'anic words, but in different forms and sense:

idrāk, iʿtiqād, al-mukhtariʿ, al-mubtadiʿ, al-tafkīr, al-lubb, al-muqāranah, maʿrifah, al-tathabbut, maʿna, mawḍūʿ, taʿlīm, wajhun min wujūh al-ra'y, al-manṭiq.

3. Examples of words that became technical terms of Arabic and Persian logic:

tabkīt, al-mirā', al-munāẓarah, al-mujādalah, al-mumārīy, ḍarbun min ḍurūb al-ʿilm.

The vocabulary of *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* [3] shows Ibn al-Muqaffa's linguistic resourcefulness at its best. It is replete with happy phrases and expressions either entirely new or extremely rare in his days. Here the link connecting the language of the Translators with Arabic secular prose can be definitely established. Furthermore, in spite of the doubts raised by certain scholars [4] the fact that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had translated parts of the Aristotelian *Organon* or paraphrases of it presumably from Pahlawī into Arabic can no more be disputed. The *Fihrist* clearly states that "the Persians had in the early days translated some of the books on logic and medicine into the Persian language. These were translated into Arabic by ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and others [5]". Qifṭī adds that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ "was the first in the Islamic nation to occupy himself

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[1] Cf. *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā'*. ed. Kurd ʿAlī. pp. 173-210; 218-226.

[2] Cf. *Al-Adab al-Kabīr wa al-Adab al-Ṣaghīr*. Beirut. 1956.

[3] ed. Ṭāha Ḥusain and A. Azzām. Cairo. 1941.

[4] Cf. P. Kraus. *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. Rev. d. Stud. Orient.* 1933. p. 4 ff.

[5] p. 242.

with the translation of the books on logic for Abū Jaʿfar al-
Manṣūr ... he translated three of the Aristotelian books on logic ...
and it is said that he translated the *Eisagoge* ... [1]". He also says
that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had made compendia of the *Categories* and of
the *De Interpretatione* [2]. Ibn abī Uṣaibiʿah [3] repeats something to the
same effect with the remark that "his renderings in translation
were fluent, easy to seize". Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī [4] gives the statement
of the *Fihrist* almost verbatim. While Jāḥiẓ [5] definitely places Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ among the different translators of Aristotle.

As far as terminology is concerned by far the most valuable
work that has survived from the extensive corpus of this extra-
ordinary man is his treatise on Aristotelian logic. Of this two
manuscripts are known to exist. One is at the St. Joseph University
Library in Beirut [6], and the other in Mashhad in Persia [7]. Here we
wish to express our gratitude to the St. Joseph University for
allowing us to consult their copy on a number of occasions. The
manuscripts, however, pose serious problems. The Mashhad copy
is supposed to conclude thus: "Ended are the three books on logic
translated by Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Muqaffaʿ [8]". Yet the Beirut
copy which we have examined, and which (because fairly modern)
may well be a copy of the Mashhad manuscript, is not a literal
translation of the Aristotelian text. In certain passages Aristotle
is followed very closely. In others there are materials clearly
derived from elsewhere. There is a discussion, for instance, of *sūr*
representing the *Quantification of the Predicate* which is not of
Aristotelian origin. It may therefore be concluded that the manu-
scripts are the translation of a commentary on the *Eisagoge* of
Porphyry, the *Categories* of Aristotle, his *De Interpretatione* and
Analytics. Furthermore, because it is definitely stated to be a
translation, it could not be a commentary of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
himself. Who then could have been the original commentator or
compilor? And since the source-books all agree that the translation

[1] *Tārīkh al-Ḥukamāʾ*. ed. Lippert. p. 220.
[2] *ibid.* pp. 35, 36.
[3] *Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbāʾ*. ed. Müller. Vol. I. p. 308.
[4] *Ṭabaqāt al-Umam*. ed. Cheikho. p. 49.
[5] *Kitāb al-Ḥaiwan...* ed. Hārūn. Vol. I. p. 76.
[6] MS. No. 338.
[7] Cf. Urktāʾī. *Catalogue of the Āstāneh Library*. Mashhad.
[8] MS. is dated 1048. A.H. Cf. A. A. Fayyāḍ. art. in *Armaghān*. Vol. 24.
p. 130; M. M. Qazwīnī. *Bīst Maqālah*. ed. Iqbāl. Vol. 2. p. 188.

was made from the Persian which in this case means Pahlawī, can we venture to suppose that whether in whole or in part this was one of the compendia which Paulos Persa had prepared for the benefit of Chosroes I, the Sassānian king of Iran? The further complication that in both manuscripts the treatise is attributed to Muḥammad son of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ has been resolved by the explanation that the correct reading was Abū Muḥammad; and that copyists were in the habit of dropping the word *abū* meaning father [1].

The personal and literary connections of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ with ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd have been well known. They were close friends. By one account [2] the two were in the same house when the first was arrested to be put to death. A modern biographer [3] traces the origin of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd to the captives of Qādisiyyah. His position as the father of Arabic epistolary and literary style is commemorated in the oft-quoted remark that "epistolary literature (*al-kitābah*) began with ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and ended with Ibn al-ʿAmīd [4]". Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī is quoted [5] to the effect that "'ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib derived the models of epistolary literature ... from the Persian language; then turned it into the Arabic language". The *Fihrist* [6] supplies the added information that he was the brother-in-law and student of Sālem—a secretary of Hishām who had translated the pseudo-Aristotelian letters addressed to Alexander. Practically nothing more is known about Sālem; nor of the language from which he translated into Arabic. It should also be remembered that ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd was for sometime in Armenia as the envoy of Hishām. Hellenistic influence was just as strong in that country as in Syria. All this was well known to the Arabs. Jāḥiẓ has much to say on the subject [7]; though he never liked the *kuttāb* and wrote a whole volume against them [8]. Modern Arab authors have been more favourable in their comments [9].

But to go back to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, the libraries of Istanbul contain over ten manuscripts attributed to him. These are mostly

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[1] Cf. Qazwīnī. *op. cit.* p. 188.
[2] Cf. Jahshiārī. *op. cit.* p. 80.
[3] Cf. Kurd ʿAlī, in *Rev. d. Acad. de Damas.* 1929. p. 515.
[4] *ibid.* p. 519.
[5] *ibid.* p. 516.
[6] P. 117.
[7] Cf. *Al-Bayān*... pp. 42-43; 49-52; *Al-Bukhalāʾ*... Vol. 2. p. 40.
[8] *Fī Dhamm Akhlāq al-Kuttāb.* ed. Finkel. 1947.
[9] Cf. Z. Mubārak. *Al-Nathr al-Fannīy*...

copies of minor treatises which may not be all authentic. Some are quite different from those already published. One is even in Arabic poetry [1]. Unfortunately it is on the Greek solar months and what they represent. Of more importance is a treatise on ethics and politics which has been known to the western world through Brockelmann [2]. Separate copies of it with slightly altered titles may be found in Istanbul [3]. The more correct title seems to be *Risālat al-Akhlāq fī al-Siāsah* [4]. Although one manuscript heads the treatise with the statement that this is a very rare work of Ibn al-Muqaffa', there are quite a few copies available. When compared to his better known books this essay conforms in vocabulary. Terminology establishes authenticity. Style points out its affiliation with the language of the Translators. Most of the terms already noted in *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* occur here. And the style bears all the characteristics of secular prose which we have enumerated. It begins rather nostalgically with a reference to his forebears. "People before us", he says, "were superior in body, and with such bodies they had more abundant dreams . . . and in their lives they chose things of higher merit. The man of religion from among them was more accomplished . . . in knowledge and in practice . . . and the man of the world was similar in eloquence and virtue . . . with these they wrote books which we declared infidelities . . . the utmost learning of our savant in this age is to take from their [store of] knowledge; and the ultimate benefaction of our bounteous man is to follow the example of their conduct; and the best discussion that our *raconteur* can find is by looking into their books". The contents of this treatise leave little doubt that Ibn al-Muqaffa' had at least some knowledge of Aristotelian ethics. This means that his acquaintance with the works of the Stagirite extended beyond logic. Just in what form and to what extent and from what source this knowledge was derived there seems no way of determining until further information comes to light. But more intriguing is the fact that the treatise appears closely related to the letters alleged to have been exchanged between Alexander of Macedon and Aristotle. Again there are numerous copies of this correspon-

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[1] Cf. Aşir No. 440.

[2] Cf. *G.A.L.*

[3] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3690; Şehit Ali Paşa. No. 2772; üniversite No. 6377; Halit Efendi. No. 391.

[4] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3690.

dence (which of course is pseudo-Aristotelian) in the libraries of Istanbul [1]. Perhaps the best and the most complete manuscript of it is found at the Süleymaniye Library [2]. These letters which are not very numerous but fill a fair sized volume patiently await a competent editor. They appear to antidate most if not all the Arabic versions of Platonic and Aristotelian works executed at Baghdad by the regular Translators. They definitely belong to the early pre-Ḥunain period; and constitute an important link between the secular prose of the *kātibs* and Arabic philosophical language. Who the author of these letters was may be left for the classical scholar to determine since they were originally in Greek. Their translator into Arabic is of greater concern to us here. As already noted the *Fihrist* states that they were put into Arabic by Sālem. And yet in a manuscript copy of a Persian rendering of the correspondence [3] we find the following lines. "The letter of Alexander . . . to the great philosopher Aristotle which he wrote in Greek. And Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had translated this letter and the reply to it into Arabic; and Adīb [4] Mukhtār Zūzanī [5] translated it into Persian [6]". This is a startling bit of information. If true it means that Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ had translated more things than certain parts of the Aristotelian *Organon* or commentaries upon or compendia of it. And from what language could he have translated it? Surely he did not know Greek—at least there is no evidence of that at all. Nor is it said anywhere that he knew Syriac. The only possible supposition is that there was a Pahlawi version of the correspondence which Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ put into Arabic. But the authority of the *Fihrist* cannot be flouted so easily. When Ruska challenged its statement that Khālid ibn Yazīd was the first to order the translation of Greek books on alchemy into Arabic, he was completely at fault. Two manuscripts [7] (and there may be more) relate in full how he became interested in alchemy, the Greek monk with his name specified who was brought to him, and what he translated. Circumstantial evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the *Fihrist* account.

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[1]   There are one or two copies in almost everyone of the libraries.

[2]   Cf. Fatih. No. 5323.

[3]   Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3628. Folio 17-19.

[4]   This may not be a pronoun noun. It could mean the *littérateur*.

[5]   The Arabs pronounced it Zawzanī.

[6]   Cf. Folio 17-19.

[7]   Cf. Köprülü. No. 924, Fatih. No. 3227.

Further research is required to resolve the apparent discrepancy between the statement of the *Fihrist* as to the person who translated the letters into Arabic and the above-quoted assertion of Zūzanī. But who is this Zūzanī [1]. If the first two names are only titles, and he is the philologist and judge who wrote the *Kitāb al-Maṣādir*, then his testimony is worthy of consideration [2]. A Persian with a good knowledge of Arabic linguistics, he was well qualified to undertake translations of this kind.

Nor are factual evidences lacking to the effect that the Translators learnt their Arabic at the feet of secular and not religious teachers. The little that is known of Usṭāth specifies that he was a Christian monk who associated with Kindī and his circle. If indeed he became a Patriarch of Alexandria he would hardly be expected to have gone to Muslim theologians to learn the language. It is said that he was not very strong in Arabic. The translations which he made "for Kindī" were generally considered mediocre in style and vocabulary [3]. The same was true of Ibn Nā'imah whose versions were polished up by Kindī [4]. Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq of Ḥīrah (the most versatile of the whole group and the most prolific in works) "entered Baṣrah and kept the company of al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad until he was proficient in the Arabic language; and he brought the *Kitāb al-'Ain* to Baghdad [5]". Hence he learnt his Arabic from a notable representative of secular prose when teachers of religious language must have been available in large numbers. The source-books [6] state that Isḥāq was much stronger in Arabic than his father. Who his teacher was has not been recorded, but it is very unlikely that he came from among the theologians. Matta who was educated in a monastery remained attached to his Aramean community even more than some of the others. His disputation with Abū Sa'īd al-Sairāfī [7] betray his meagre knowledge of religious literature. The same may be said of most of the other translators.

[1] Cf. *Yāqūt's Dictionary of Learned Men*. Vol. VI. 6. p. 30; Brockelmann. G. A. L. Supp. I. 505.

[2] Cf. Fihrist-i Kitābkhāneye...Sipahsālār. ed. Shīrāzī. Vol. 2. pp. 282-285.

[3] Cf. *Fihrist*. p. 251; I. A. Uṣaibi'ah. Vol. I. p. 204.

[4] Cf. *Fihrist*. pp. 249-50; Qifṭī. pp. 37, 39; I. A. Uṣaibi'ah. Vol. I. p. 204.

[5] Qifṭī. p. 171.

[6] Cf. *Fihrist*; Qifṭī; I. A. Uṣaibi'ah.

[7] Cf. Tawḥīdī. *Al-Muqābasāt*. p. 68.

CHAPTER THREE

Philosophical prose and terminology may be said to begin with the Translators. But with the exception of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ this genre of writing did not originate with them, and the set of terms employed were not theirs save in special cases. When translating from Greek into Arabic whether directly or by way of Syriac they had a basis to build upon with an already established tradition. While linguistically they were influenced by Arabic secular prose, technically they took over the methods of their Aramean predecessors when translating from Greek into Syriac. To determine their intellectual background and assess their contributions the cultural climate of the period may well be recalled.

1. The Milieu

The awakening which began during al-Manṣūr's Caliphate and reached its height under al-Maʾmūn was a natural result of the racial intermingling that was such a marked feature of the ʿAbbāsid age. The association between Arabs, Arameans and Iranians was not always very happy; yet it proved surprisingly opportune and abundantly fruitful. The encouragement of successive Caliphs gave the movement force and legitimacy. A liberal outlook and a receptive attitude granted an opportunity to men of different races and religions to participate on equal terms. Discrimination was discouraged in learned circles although it may not have ceased to operate completely. The Translators came to enjoy at least some measure of social status. Their work was appreciated by a growing class of men. Literary gatherings brought them into contact with high state functionaries. It also introduced them to men of letters and kept them abreast of the work of fellow-translators. Travel took them to centres of learning in the Hellenistic world. From there they brought back the Greek manuscripts.

2. Patronage

Al-Manṣūr was lavish in rewards. Hārūn al-Rashīd "thoroughly understood the noble art of patronage". Al-Maʾmūn had the distinction of being personally and profoundly interested in the new learning, especially where philosophy was concerned. His financial

assistance allowed some to devote their full time to translation. Then came the courtiers with members of illustrious families—the Barmekids, the Nowbakhts, the Munajjims, the Zayyāts, and various others. It should be remembered in this connection that the nature of the work, and the specific authors chosen for the purpose were determined by the taste of the patrons. They were chiefly interested in medicine; philosophy and the natural sciences came next. If no translator occupied himself with Greek belles-lettres; if poetry, tragedy and comedy were almost completely neglected just as much as history, the cloice belonged to the patrons in practically every case. This factor should not be overlooked.

3. CULTURAL BACKGROUND

Since they were of Aramean origin the hybrid culture represented by the Syriac language was naturally strongest among the Translators. Their education had been at monasteries, whether Monophysite or Nestorian; or in schools attached to such institutions. As the Aramaic dialect of Edessa, Syriac had developed through direct contact with Greek which was also the language of the Church. Its grammar was fashioned after it, and vocabulary enriched by loan-words or literal translations from Greek [1]. This applied to literature as well. Although distinctly Christian, classical learning was introduced in large measures. Religious problems were argued in Greek terms and along philosophical lines. At the School of the Persians in Nisibis [2] (which was primarily a religious seminary) the students and teachers were mostly of Iranian origin. This, added to the fact that they lived in close proximity to Christian communities in Iran, made Persian influence inevitable. Priests and scholars trained at Edessa and Nisibis must have had a fair acquaintance with the Persian language. The form of Arabic education which the Translators had received, and the extent to which they were familiar with Arabic literature, varied in each case. It is impossible to generalize. But for reasons already stated we believe that the Translators were much more familiar with secular literature than with the works of theologians and mystics. If

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[1] Cf. Wright. *History of Syriac Literature*; Duval. *Histoire Politique, Religieuse et Litteraire d'Edesse*. Paris. 1892.

[2] Cf. Mar Barhadbsabba ʿArbāya. *Cause de la Fondation des Écoles*. Text and trans. Addai Scher. *Patrologia Orientalis*. IV. 4. Paris. 1908; Hayes. *L'École d'Édesse*. Paris. 1930.

Syriac was their mother tongue, and the influence of Greek and Persian only indirect, Arabic was the common speech of the people among whom they lived and worked, and the language into which they translated. It constituted therefore a vital element in their cultural make up.

Linguistic and literary influences aside, the method of translation and the conventions adopted in that form of exercise followed the Syriac renderings of Greek works, whether classical, scientific or religious. These were of an earlier date in most cases, and represented a regular tradition to which the Translators felt themselves somewhat bound. There were practical as well as sentimental reasons to make them follow the system of their predecessors in that field. Even Ḥunain who was the most competent and enterprising of them all thought it proper to abide by the same rules. The resulting effect on the Arabic versions was inescapable. It is sometimes possible to determine from the order of the words and the *tournure* of the sentences whether the translation was made directly from Greek or by way of Syriac.

Attempts at assessment in evaluating the work of individual translators are obviously not easy. There are many elements involved. Nor are the renderings all of the same standard. Isḥāq's translation of the *De Anima* appears different in language and terminology from some of his other works. The abundant number of transcriptions, for instance, are difficult to explain. As a general rule the pre-Ḥunain school show more courage and linguistic resourcefulness. Their originality lies in the terms which they coined or adopted. Ḥunain and his set present a more polished language [1]. Hardly a single new term can be attributed to them, but their prose is more fluent and clear. They were in a position to pick and choose equivalents without contributing any themselves. These remarks of course apply only to philosophical works. When the mathematical and medical translations (of which the Istanbul libraries have many manuscript copies) are edited we may have to modify our views. The post-Ḥunain school naturally benefited from the work of their predecessors. Although the renderings of Ḥunain, his son, and pupils were the most prized and

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[1] At Topkapi-sarayi (Sultan Ahmet III. No. 3362) there is an old manuscript copy of the Arabic translations of the *Organon*, with red rubrics and curious illustrations. Unfortunately it is not complete and probably not as old as that in Paris.

relied upon, the *Falāsifah* never felt completely confident of the work of any of the Translators. Kindī and Fārābī were so closely associated with some of them that they hesitated to cast doubt on the correctness of the translations. Avicenna, however, grumbles continuously. He is frankly suspicious. But because he did not know Greek or Syriac himself, he could not openly challenge the faithfulness of the Arabic renderings. The fact that Averroes in his commentary on the *Metaphysica* quotes from the versions of three separate translators, and sometimes of the selfsame passage, is ample proof of the dissatisfaction if not distrust of the *Falāsifah*. A good deal of it was because they did not realize the difficulties involved when putting Greek into Arabic.

CHAPTER FOUR

It did not take the Translators long to realize that in the creation of a philosophical idiom the Arabic language presented advantages as well as limitations. Some of the points had already been noted when putting Greek into Syriac. Aside from the specific terms coined by the Greek philosophers, the peculiarities of Indo-European morphology and syntax stood in marked contrast to those of Semitic tongues. In certain cases the sentences seemed to gain clarity and conciseness in the process of transposition. In others they failed to convey the precise meaning. Arabic which is supposed to be the nearest to the original mother tongue of the Semites, and which never had the close association of Syriac with Greek, appeared still more distant. Its ways and its means of expressing thought were different.

As a feature of a more advanced stage of culture, abstract terminology grows out of the concrete in all languages and to whatever group they may belong. Nor is it infrequently borrowed. I oan-words denoting abstract concepts actually have a habit of travelling far beyond their original confines. But among sister languages it is more easily assimilated. Furthermore some have a better way of forming them than others. It has been remarked that "much indeed remained to do before Latin could function as an instrument for the higher intellectual activities. Perhaps Cicero's greatest contribution to the Latin language came with his enforced retirement from politics when he devoted himself to the translation of Greek philosophical works. In so doing he largely created the vocabulary of abstract philosophical thinking ... By such prolonged experiment in the translation of Greek terms, Cicero introduced into Latin many new words ... and in so doing hammered out the fundamental vocabulary of abstract thought which has become the common possession of western European peoples [1]".

In forging a philosophical idiom of its own, Arabic was compelled to take on features which were never fully approved of by purists passionately devoted to their language and its avowed sanctity [2]. Because it was not the result of a natural growth as in

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[1] L. R. Palmer. *The Latin Language*. London. 1954. pp. 123-124.

[2] Cf. The dispute of Matta and al-Sairāfī. Tawḥīdī. *op. cit.*

the case of Greek, it suffered in addition from an artificiality which was difficult to overcome. With very few abstract terms to begin with, it had to grapple with conceptual and liguistic problems that were not always satisfactorily solved. The immense richness of vocabulary where concrete objects were concerned, had nothing to equal it in abstract terminology. The innumerable synonyms which linguists were fond of emphasizing [1] stood in direct contrast to terms of speculative thought. The late E. G. Browne has gone on record to the effect that "Arabic is on the whole well adapted for providing a suitable technical terminology [2]". To determine whether this statement requires qualification or not, a review of the resources and limitations of the tongue could be useful.

I. THE RESOURCES

The literary resources which the Translators could exploit in both prose and poetry have already been outlined. Grammar may be added to them; though this branch developed rather late in their literary history and the origin of its terms is not very clear. Greek grammar was also a late development. It was taken up by the Alexandrians mainly as an aid to the study and understanding of Homer. The rules of Arabic grammar were laid down and systematized on the basis of a correct reading of the Qur'ān. But opinions are divided regarding some of its classifications. Greek influence in that respect has yet to be more fully substantiated. Vocabulary lends itself better to specialized scrutiny. New terms were soon found necessary; and the Translators had to make the best use of the ways open to them.

a. They gave new meanings and connotations to some of the common words in the language, making them thereby technical terms of logic or philosophy. This method had been previously employed by Plato and various other Greek philosophers. It seemed perfectly proper and quite helpful. Ex. *iḍāfah, iḥālah, tabkīt, tamwīh,* etc.

b. There was direct borrowing of loan-word. from various languages. These were sometimes left in their original form, at other times suitably arabicised. *Mīmar* was taken from Syriac. The Persian *gowhar* became *jawhar,* and *māyeh* was turned into *māddah.*

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[1]   Cf. Z. Mubārak. *op. cit.* Vol. I. p. 64.

[2]   *Arabian Medicine.* Cambridge. 1921. p. 36.

c. The use of transcriptions from the Greek texts which they were translating was a method frequently forced upon them. There seemed no other way of getting out of the difficulty. In this manner *nómos* became *nāmūs, hýle* was transcribed as *hayūlah*, and *stocheion* ended up as *uṣṭuqus*. The reason for the strange discrepancy in transcription may be attributed to the fact that these were sometimes made by way of Syriac which had already introduced certain alterations in the form or the vocalisation of the word.

d. By far the largest number of terms, however, were coined out of the original roots of the language in conformity with the rules of grammatical morphology. This brings us to the problem of the resourcefulness and adaptability of Arabic to express abstract thought. Early authorities on Arabic linguistics did not agree on the primary root of words. We are told that "the Kūfians went [to say] that the infinitive was derived from the verb, and was an offshoot of it ... and that the Baṣrians went [to say] that the verb is derived from the infinitive and is an offshoot of it [1]". It is now of course generally accepted that like all other Semitic tongues, Arabic is based on a verbal root [2]. Consequently all words are formed from the primary verb, and in accordance with the paradigms established by the grammarians. This feature is in contrast to the nominal basis of Indo-European languages and their compound words. It has led to the observation that "la formation du mot 'nouveau' s'opère donc par involution en semitique, tandis qu'elle s'opère chez les Aryans par expansion [3]". In practice this peculiarity proves an advantage as well as a disadvantage. Words coined after the pattern of the paradigms have a homogeniety (*insijām*) and compactness which is usually lacking in the somewhat loose and inconsequential construction of compounds. Different states (active and passive), instruments and causes can be expressed without departing from the notion of the original verb. This gives them a peculiar expressiveness with a direct appeal especially effective in religious exhortations. Students of semantics and comparative philology may wish to expand further on this point. Some may be tempted to deduce that the respective methods of thought vary as between Aryans and Semites. They will find it,

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[1] Cf. Al-Anbārī. *Kitāb al-Inṣāf.* ed. Weil. p. 102.

[2] Cf. Cohen. *Le Système verbal semitique...* Paris. 1924.

[3] Massignon. *Reflexion sur la Structure Primitive de l'Analyse Grammaticale en Arabe. Arabica.* 1954. p. 3.

however, rather difficult to substantiate. But this method has its drawbacks also inasmuch as the number of paradigms is fixed and unchangeable. If all neologisms have to conform to them, the originator of a new thought or invention finds himself restricted and restrained. Language, or more correctly grammatical morphology, would be hampering self-expression. That is one reason why so many unconventional words are met with in the writings of non-conformist mystics with their ungoverned flights of ecstacy. This is particularly true among those of non-Arab extraction, and not least Ḥallāj. The unlimited freedom of Indo-European languages to form coumpounds (however awkward they may be) is an asset denied to them.

In trying to express a new thought or object, Arabic employs more than one method. As already noted, the most common is by extraction (*takhrīj*). There is also expression by implication (*taḍmīn*) as well as by metaphorical symbolisation (*majāz*) so often found in mystical works. All the three different methods have been used to great advantage and with remarkable ability. They are discussed at great length by authors interested in Arabic linguistics [1]. Neologisms are often divided into two main varieties: the arabicised (*muʿarrab*) and the begotten (*muwallad*) or coined. The first has been defined as "the introduction by the Arabs into their language of a foreign word in its [original] form or with modifications [2]". The second is stated to be "a term which has been used by the begetters (*al-muwalledūn*) that is other than the usage of the Arabs. It is in two subdivisions. In one subdivision they followed the rules of the language of the Arabs ... as in the terminology of the sciences and the arts ... and in another subdivision they deviated ... either by the use of a foreign word not arabicised by the Arabs, or by the modification of the term, or its connotation ... or by the placing of a term extemporaneously [3]". Nallino was inclined to divide the *muwallad* into (a) what was coined spontaneously among Arabs without the influence of a foreign tongue. And (b) those coined specifically under such influences [4].

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[1] Cf. Al-Anbārī. *Kitāb Asrār al-ʿArabiyyah*. MS. Esat Efendi. No. 3105; Ibn Fadl Allah. *Qaṣd al-Sabīl*... MS. Esat Efendi. No. 3254; Suyūṭī. *Baghyat al-Wuʿāt*...ed. Khanjī.

[2] Shaikh Ḥusain Wālī. *Compte Rendues de l'Acad. Royale de la Langue Arabe.* Vol. 1-2. 1934-1935. p. 348.

[3] *ibid.* pp. 346-348.

[4] *ibid.* p. 317 ff.

Attempts at determining the period in which the coining of new terms (*tawlīd* or *naḥt*) took place most, have produced somewhat similar results. According to one opinion it began after the second century of the Hijrah in the more populated areas. After the fourth century, "that is to say when the Arabic taste had been corrupted [1]", it extended out into the desert. Another opinion puts it more generally, claiming that it first started with the establishment of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate. And that the Arabic language reached its zenith in the third century. Thus both estimates cover the period of the Translators, at a time when Persian, Greek, Syriac and even Indian books were being put into Arabic as recorded in the *Fihrist*.

2. THE LIMITATIONS

Side by side with such resources as we have tried to enumerate here, there were serious limitations to cope with in the formation of an Arabic philosophical vocabulary.

a. The first and most intractable was the complete absence of the *copula*. Like all other Semitic tongues, and in marked contrast to the Indo-European group of languages, the auxiliary verb *'to be'* corresponding to the Greek *'to einai'* does not exist in Arabic. In common speech and composition the meaning may be left *sous-entendu*. In grammar the lack of a specific term to that effect is at best rather awkward. In logic the deficiency becomes a formidable obstacle. In the simple statement that if A is B, and B is C, then A is C, the reasoning has to be expressed by the pronoun *huwa* instead of the verb *is*. When metaphysics is reached the translator can easily find himself helpless. The precise concept of *being* as distinct from existence proves impossible to express. The *Falā-sifah* became conscious of this fact early in their work. Fārābī refers to this handicap at some length [2], pointing out the advantages of Greek and Persian in that respect. And so actually does Avicenna [3]. There had to be recourse to improvisations and approximations, none of which adequately served the purpose. The Translators had chosen the use of the verb *wajada* knowing full well that that denotes existence and not being. Fārābī observes [4] that

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[1] *ibid.*

[2] Cf. *Commentary on....De Interpretatione.* ed. Kutsch and Marrow. pp. 37, 42, 46, 103.

[3] Cf. *Al-Ishārāt.*

[4] *Al-Fārābī's Introd. Section on Logic.* ed. Dunlop. *Islamic Quarterly.* 1955.

though such verbs as *kāna, ṣāra, aṣbaḥa, amsa, ẓalla* and others of the same sense could be sometimes employed to convey the meaning, *wajada* was probably the most applicable. Yet he was aware that that was not the exact equivalent. The Translators seem to have made the point perfectly clear to those who like him did not know any Greek. The fact that they had used six different words in various forms to represent the copula and the meanings conveyed by it [1] was sufficient proof of the difficulties involved. They were *al-huwīyyah, al-aisīyyah, al-annīyyah, al-kainūnah, al-ithbāt,* and *al-wujūd* [2]. Of these three were specially coined for the purpose. The others were adapted to fit into the text. Not all the translators followed the same practice. The philosophers preferred some to others [3]. Arab purists were horrified. The term *aisa* which may have come from Syriac, and its abstraction in the form of *aisīyyah*, were set against *laisa* and *laisīyyah* as contraries [4]. These appeared no less objectionable, though many adopted them. Ibn Khālūyah wrote a book entitled *Kitāb al-Laisa fī Kalām al-ʿArab* [5]. There are in almost all of the libraries of Istanbul manuscript copies of a series of essays on philosophical subjects by a Turkish scholar and student of philosophy known as Ibn Kamāl Pāshā (d. 940. A.H.) [6]. Among them is one entitled *Risālat fī Maʿna al-Aisa wa al-Laisa* [7]. But there is no linguistic analysis of the terms, nor any discussion of their origin. The subject is treated philosophically in connection with the concept of creation *ex nihilo* and the Aristotelian thesis of the eternity of the world. Again some may be tempted to speculate as to whether the absence of the copula denotes any significant difference in the method of thought between Semites and Indo-Europeans. If such distinctions existed in the past, they have certainly disappeared as a result of western education. Yet Semitic languages are still unable to express the thought adequately.

b. The second serious obstacle was the inability to form compound words. This is characteristic of Indo-European languages highly developed in Greek, Sanskrit, Persian and various others. Of this problem also Fārābī makes mention in his commentary on

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[1] Cf. Appendix I.
[2] *ibid.*
[3] Cf. S. M. Afnan. *Elements of Islamic Philosophy.*
[4] Cf. Appendix. II.
[5] Cf. MS. Köprülü. No. 1582.
[6] Cf. *ʿUthmānī Muʾaleflarī.* Vol. I. p. 223.
[7] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3587; Lâleli. No. 3646; Fatih. 5390.

the *De Interpretatione* [1]. As already noted new terms in Arabic are coined according to specific patterns or paradigms laid down on the basis of the early classics and common usage. This surely makes them in many ways more meaningful, conveying the *significant* in a more precise manner; but they constitute a restriction on linguistic innovations. Although Suyūṭī likes to tell us that "Ibn Fāris says in his *Fiqh al-Lughah* . . . that the Arabs coin out of two words a single one [2]", actually this was contrary to the rules as well as nature of the language, except where it is done by involution. To be sure there were some rare attempts at constructing compounds against all protests. *Māhiyyah* was one of them. After a protracted fight with *māʾiyyah* it became a technical term of speculative thought [3]. Theologians and mystics felt compelled to adopt it. Yet it was not well received by purists. Incidentally it supplied comic poets anxious to ridicule the *Falāsifah* with something on which to pour their scorn. Aristophanes had brilliant colleagues among the libertines of Baghdad.

c. The third limitation is the inability to use prefixes and suffixes to convey shades of meaning or precisions of thought. These are different from the augments found in some of the paradigms. In Greek, Sanskrit [4] and Persian they prove very useful. This will be seen in discussing Persian philosophical vocabulary. A simple example is the lack of the privative *a* so convenient in the above-mentioned languages, and so awkward in Arabic with its use of *lā*, *ghair*, or *laisa* which actually make the word a compound. Not that Arabic cannot express the opposition of contraries. In fact it is very rich in that respect. It has prompted the observation that "l'Arabe n'est pas tant la langue du *ḍād* que la langue du *aḍḍād* [5]". This was a favourite subject with lexicographers and philologists, illustrated by such works as that of Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī [6] where words are divided into contrary couples. Abū Ḥātim al-Sajistānī wrote a whole volume which he called *Kitāb al-Aḍḍād* [7] or Book of Contraries. But to express the negation of a notion was not as easy as in Greek. For example:

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[1] Ed. Kutsch and Marrow. p. 51.

[2] Cf. *Al-Muzhir*. Vol. I. p. 482.   [3] Cf. Appendix. II.

[4] Cf. J. F. Staal, *Correlation between Language and Logic in Indian Thought*. B.S.O.A.S. 1960. pp. 109-122.

[5] Cf. Massignon. *op. cit.* p. 10.

[6] *Al-Furūq al-Lughawiyyah* . . . . Cairo. 1353. A.H.

[7] MS. copy at Reisulkuttāb Mustafa Efendi. No. 874.

ἀταξία	(Metaph. 1070 b 28)	*lā-tartīb* (Matta).
ἀναποδεικτικός	(A. Post. 90 b 29)	*lā-burhān* (Matta).
ἀθάνατον	(Top. 122 b 36)	*ghair-al-mā'it* (Dimashqī).
ἀνεξέλεγτος	(Soph. 176 b 24)	*ghair-mubakkat* (Yaḥya).
ἀχωριστόν	(D. An. 403 a 15)	*laisa-bimubāyanah* (Isḥāq).

d. The fourth difficulty was the almost total absence of abstractions in the language. Again this is characteristic. The limitation was remedied by the coining of a whole series of terms ending with the suffix *īyyah*, such as *wujūdīyyah*, *ghairīyyah*, etc. This form is extremely rare in early classical Arabic. Where it does occur as *al-zabānīyyah*, and *al-rahbānīyyah* in the Qur'ān, they are not abstractions in the strict sense of the term. In the verse in which it appears, *rahbānīyyah* stands for the practice of priesthood and not for the concept of it. Some scholars [1] have suggested that the form was copied from Syriac, which in turn adopted it from the Greek-*ia*, the common suffix denoting an abstraction. This may well be so, though the assertion requires further proof. The inclination towards the use of abstractions may come from another source also. It is quite likely to have been influenced by Pahlawī and Persian. The reason for this supposition is that we find abstractions far more frequently coined and used by Persian philosophers than those of Arab stock. They are first met with in the versions of the early translators like Usṭāth. These were versant in Greek and Syriac, and possibly copied it from one of the two languages. But among the *Falāsifah* Kindī uses abstractions sparingly with no apparent desire to coin new ones. Fārābī has more of them. Avicenna adds still more to those of his predecessors. And when we reach the works of late Persian philosophers such as Mullā Ṣadrā, we are struck by an amazing profusion of abstractions never seen elsewhere. This is not surprising when it is recalled that in Persian the mere addition of the suffix-*ī* makes a perfectly good abstraction out of almost any word in the language.

e. Whether in the terms already existing in the language, or in those newly coined for the purpose, there were dangerous sources of

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[1] Cf. Massignon and Kraus. *Formations des Noms abstraits en Arabe...* *Rev. d. Etudes Islamiques.* 1934. p. 507 ff.

confusion involved. A modern Egyptian scholar discussing the question remarks that "rich in synonyms and homonyms, Arabic can express an idea in various terms or various ideas in one term. But they are vague and equivocal and lack clarity and precision for a scientific vocabulary. This was felt by the Arab philosophers in their writings [1]". And a western scholar adds in agreement that "les termes fondamentaux de la culture arabe sont ambivalent [2]". Furthermore the necessity or convenience of using the same term in Qur'anic exegesis, Mu'tazelite literature, mystical writings and philosophical tractates with separate meanings in most cases has led many astray. A typical example is the word *huwiyyah* as used by theologians and mystics on the one hand, and by the *Falāsifah* on the other [3]. The same is true of the term *muḥdath* [4]. The *Ḥadīth* or Traditions presented problems of their own [5].

f. A significant feature which was not of the language but which cramped philosophical vocabulary in general and fossilized it almost permanently, was the lack of initiative on the part of the *Falāsifah* to coin special terms of their own. This prevented progress and the ability to express new thoughts and ideas. They owed most if not all of their old terms to the Translators, and had nothing to offer themselves. Some tried to render the established terms more precise; others coined a few abstractions under the influence of Greek and Persian which were never appreciated and seldom used by the purists. This was in marked contrast to the linguistic activity of the Greek philosophers. For "from Hesiod onwards . . . there is . . . the prolific formation of compounds . . . the early philosophers brought to literature new technical uses of words that in their simpler and more concrete sense must have been familiar in everyday speech . . . The medical writers naturally developed a technical terminology which was formed by the employment of compounds, new stem-formations or by the bestowal of a technical sense upon words whose general sense afterwards fell out of use . . . Plato exercised great influence upon the vocabulary of the language . . . Aristotle . . . his importance for the development

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[1] I. Madkur. *L'Organon d'Aristote dans le Monde Arabe.* p. 130.

[2] Massignon. *op. cit.* p. 6.

[3] Cf. Appendix. II.

[4] Cf. B. Lewin. *La Notion de Muhdat dans le Kalām et dans la Philosophie. Orientalia Suecana.* Vol. III. Uppsala. 1954.

[5] Cf. Shaikh Wālī. *op. cit.*

of the language was very much less. He did not create new meanings for terms as did Plato . . . He found his terminology ready at hand and he made little impress upon the language [1]". The shortcomings of the *Falāsifah* in this respect are not altogether surprising. They did not know Greek and hardly any Syriac. Consequently they had no recourse to the original texts. Nor did they feel they could improve upon the terminology of the Translators. Furthermore their primary object was to produce the synthesis to which they had addressed themselves. That left little scope for individual contributions except within the limits of the principal themes. Hence the reason why some are so reluctant to call them creative thinkers; and why their language usually appears stiff and stereotyped.

To the above-mentioned limitations many more of a minor nature could be added. There was the inability to employ the infinitive with an article in the place of a noun in exactly the same manner as in Greek and Persian. Again Farabi makes mention of that. Occasionally they found happy solutions for such inadequacies. The absence of the neuter in Arabic is usually matched with an equivalent adjective used as a noun. As for example:

| τό ἀΐδιον | (D. An. 413 b 27) | *al-azalīy* (Isḥāq). |
| τό ἀγαθόν | (Categ. II b 35) | *al-khair* (Isḥāq). |

Nor were the difficulties confined to terminology. Under the influence of the original Greek (or the Syriac version from which the translators sometimes worked) there was a persistent temptation to follow the same construction of the sentences. This was particularly marked when they attempted to be faithful to the text at all cost and at any sacrifice. In practice verbatim translations proved easier to execute—as they still do nowadays. It took generations for such peculiarities to disappear. In the writings of the early *Falāsifah* they are conspicuous by their frequency. Later they tend to be eliminated. Ghazālī has much less of it. In Averroes and Ibn Taimīyyah the sentences regain their genuine Arabic ring. The barbarisms which they called *waḥshīyyāt al-kalām* and which Avicenna refers to as *al-waḥshīyyāt al-gharībah* are dropped out as the language reasserts itself with force and authority.

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[1]   Atkinson. *The Greek Language.* pp. 223-271.

CHAPTER FIVE

We have undertaken so far a short historical review of philosophical terminology in Arabic. The linguistic genesis or parentage has been determined as far as possible. Its lexical and grammatical equation with the Greek texts has been traced. And finally its adoption and usage by the *Falāsifah* has been noted.

The subject may be viewed from still another angle. As distinct from the linguistic and grammatical aspects which entail history, there is the semantic side involving the meaningfulness of the terms employed in the process of communication, and their place in the development of thought. The former is primarily associated with the work of the Translators. The latter is of special importance in the study of the individual *Falāsifah* when an assessment of their contributions is attempted. Actually this deserves a separate inquiry and may be considered an independent topic by itself.

In a semantic appraisal of the language of the *Falāsifah* the temptation to apply the methods of the modern school of philosophy should be resisted. Formal logic in its traditional form may now be chiefly of historical interest. Russell's assertion that the "logic which trusts in language to any degree is likely to lead to the verbalism of a false metaphysics [1]", may be a sound statement. And Whitehead's remark that "philosophy redesigns language in the same way that in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned [2]", may command wide acceptance. But the writings of the *Falāsifah* were openly Aristotelian in substance. The influence of the different Hellenistic schools such as the Stoics and Neoplatonists did not alter the basic relation between logic and language which Aristotle had assumed. If anything the Stoics emphasized it still more. Consequently the criterions established in modern studies of the subject [3] are hardly applicable to the works of the *Falāsifah* written centuries ago.

The logic of the *Falāsifah* just like that of their Greek and

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[1] Cf. *The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead*. ed. Schilpp. 2nd. ed. p. 305.

[2] *ibid.* p. 304.

[3] Cf. *Essays on Logic and Language*. ed. A. Flew. Oxford. 1951. Second series. ed. A. Flew. Oxford. 1953; L. J. Cohen. *The Diversity of meaning*. London. 1962.

Hellenistic predecessors was a *subject-predicate* [1] logic. And their metaphysics was a *substance-accident* [2], and *universal-particular* [3] metaphysics. Hence the insights of modern schools of philosophy could hardly be expected of them. It has been maintained that for the employment of the subject-predicate principle in language and logic there is "a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error [4]". Perhaps for that reason it is easier to pick at their metaphysics than at their logic; though that may have been superceded also. In any case the methods of linguistic analysis as developed in modern times, and the form in which correct logical statements or philosophical questions need to be couched, cannot be applied to the works of the *Falāsifah* with justice. Language and thought have been progressively changing in the Occident for centuries. They have been stagnant in the Orient for almost the same period. "Philosophy must . . . involve the exercise of systematic restatement [5]"; not the tedious repetitions practiced in the East for so long.

What might be more rewarding is an inquiry into the correlation between language and thought of individual philosophers whether Arab, Turk or Persian. Ibn Khaldūn's assertion [6] that the two are entirely separate activities; and that language is only an acquired habitus (*malikah*) similar to an art or craft, represented the general opinion in the Islamic world. To-day, on the other hand, it is believed that intuition and expression are inseparable. Croce considered them identical. Ayer says "in any case in which the thought is a thought of anything, the process of thought is not distinct from the expression of it [7]". To accept therefore a philosophers's language and vocabulary as an index of his thought and of his method of reasoning appears perfectly justified.

The relation between grammar and logic is more controversial. A French author begins the preface of his book with the open declaration that "cet ouvrage a pour but de dénoncer l'erreur doctrinal la plus grave qui ait posé sur les destiné de la logique et de la philosophie, a savoir en un parallelism logico-grammati-

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[1] *Al-mawḍūᶜ wa al-maḥmūl.*
[2] *Al-jawhar wa al-ᶜaraḍ.*
[3] *Al-kulliyyāt wa al-juzʾiyyāt.*
[4] Whitehead. *op. cit.* p. 306.
[5] Gilbert Ryle. *op. cit.* p. 36.
[6] Cf. *Al-Muqaddimah.*
[7] A. J. Ayer. *Thinking and Meaning.* p. 25.

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cal [1]". This concerns the view sometimes held that Arabic syntax is much influenced by Aristotelian logic, and his *Categories* in particular. It is now conceded that the division of the parts of speech into *ism* (noun), *fi'l* (verb), and *ḥarf* (particle) as undertaken by the philologists [2] can be easily traced back to Greek sources. The original division was into *aṣl*, *far'*, *mubtada*, and *khabar* [3]. But there is not enough evidence to suppose that Arabic grammar is actually based on Greek logic, as some have claimed. In fact Aristotelian logic cannot be fully applied to other languages besides Greek. One scholar has gone as far as asserting that "if Aristotle had spoken Chinese or Dacotan, he would have had to adopt an entirely different logic or at any rate an entirely different theory of categories [4]".

However that may be, we return to the language and vocabulary of the *Falāsifah* as a means of determining originalty of thought. Of course they are not the only criterions. New ideas could possibly be expressed in traditional terminology as well, though it would be at great sacrifice. By a process of elimination the writings of Fārābī and Avicenna may be chosen for that purpose. Not enough of the works of Kindī have survived to justify an empirical judgement—and semantics is empirical. The vocabulary of Averroes offers nothing whatsoever that could be rightly called his own. Just as his commentaries do not reveal any new insights in our view, though some seem to think otherwise. And Ghazālī who was a profound and resourceful thinker is difficult to judge because he is inconsistent, employing the terminology of the *Falāsifah* at one time and those of the theologians at another. Even between Fārābī and Avicenna the comparison is unequal. We have most of the works of the latter [5], and certainly not enough of the former. Judging from what we have of him, Fārābī's vocabulary is derived entirely from the Translators. But a comparison between any of his works and the corresponding renderings from the Greek into Arabic shows occasional differences. Clearly this is a case of not only attempting to understand the texts which were often obscure and sometimes in-

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[1] C. Serrus. *Le Parallelisme Logico-Grammatical*. Paris. 1953.

[2] Cf. among others *Kitāb al-Īḍāh* of Abū 'Alī al-Fārisī. MS. Lâleli. No. 3170.

[3] Cf. Massignon. *op. cit.* p. 3 ff.

[4] Manthner quoted by Ullmann. *The Principles of Semantics*. p. 21.

[5] There are numerous short treatises by Avicenna as yet unpublished in the libraries of Istanbul. They supply some fresh details about his life if not on his philosophy.

comprehensible, but of thinking over the problems anew and in his own particular manner. We know that he did not always succeed to our satisfaction. Yet his language reveals the independent efforts of a thinker. His books have the merit of undertaking a restatement of the problems in clear and comprehensible Arabic. And that has always been a legitimate task for a philosopher. The fact that everyone of the principal *Falāsifah* undertook a special treatise on definitions called *Risālat al-Ḥudūd* is evidence of the need for precise language felt by them all. Unfortunately they copied one another in most definitions.

Yet whoever tries to translate Fārābī into a European language will find the work difficult if not impossible. Nor is the reason far to seek. The literal and almost mechanical translations from Greek or Syriac on which he worked frequently failed to disclose the careful reasoning of Aristotle or the philosopher whom he happened to be reading. The terms chosen or coined by the Greeks did not convey exactly the same ideas to him. The interpretations therefore which he placed upon them through his own process of thought turned out sometimes quite different. If indeed the "key-word of the problem of Metaphysics is interpretation [1]", no wonder that Fārābī is occasionally vague; why Avicenna had to read his commentary on the *Metaphysica* forty times before he could understand it; and why he defies those who attempt to translate him into a western idiom. Working on unhappy and sometimes definitely erroneous renderings of Platonic and Aristotelian texts, Fārābī figures out a notion of his own regarding their object and meaning. The modern scholar by a purely *a priori* method, and under the influence of his own reading of Plato and Aristotle, undertakes to transpose Fārābī into a European language without due˘regard to the intervening work of the Translators. The result is often far from satisfactory.

As an illustration more than one scholar has used the term 'holy war' when translating Fārābī or discussing his political views. Surely it needs some stretch of the imagination to attribute to Plato and Aristotle any interest in the holy war; or to the shy and retiring Fārābī (when only expounding the theories of the Greeks) any particular enthusiasm for such enterprises. The source of the

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[1] G. E. Moore quoted by Ogden and Richards. *The Meaning of Meaning.* London. 1936. p. 174.

error is the word *jihād* which the Translators used as the equivalent of the Greek *agón*. For example:

ὁ ἀγών	(Poet. 1450 b 18)	al-jihād (Matta).
ἀγωνιστικός	(Soph. 165 b II)	jihādīy Yaḥya, Ibn Zurʿah).
τό πολεμικός κινδύνος	(Top. 151 a 12)	mujāhidāt al-ḥurūb (Dimashqī).

Nor did this muddle of the Translators remain undetected. Jāḥiẓ has some scathing remarks in that connection. He does not spare his national literature either. When assessing the value of the different renderings, he says "the books of India have been translated ... and the Greek philosophies ... and the literature of the Persians ... if you translate the wisdom of the Arabs that magic which is in the rythm [of it] disappears, otherwise ... they would not find in the meanings anything which the Persians have not stated in their books ... indeed when was ... Ibn al-Baṭrīq, and Ibn Nāʿimah, and Abū Qurrah, and ..., and ..., and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ like Aristotle, and even Khālid [1] like Plato? [2]". He complains bitterly of "the agony of correcting the books [3]".

In view of the above considerations the logic propounded by the Arabs and Persians can be more easily equated with the Greek texts than their metaphysics. The terms were more definite even when literally translated whether through some happy equivalent or sheer improvisation. But such terms did not always convey to the *Falāsifah* exactly the same meanings. In metaphysics where the terminology is much more abstract it becomes extremely risky to equate the terms with the original Greek in spite of the apparent semblance. Furthermore they were as a rule unaware that certain terms were of Peripatetic origin, others came from the Stoics and still others from the Neoplatonists. They knew for instance that entelechy was a word coined by Aristotle, but that was only a rare case.

Avicenna's copious works permit us to study in greater detail the relation between language and thought among the *Falāsifah*. This is nowhere better found than in the *Shifā* which was obviously

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[1] This is an expected confirmation of the story of the *Fihrist* regarding Khālid ibn Yazīd's interest in Greek books.

[2] *Kitāb al-Ḥaiwān...*ed. A. M. Hārūn. Vol. I. pp. 75-76.

[3] *ibid.* p. 79.

written for students and philosophers, not for patrons and amateurs. Here he is more discursive and argumentative than in small tractates. Nor is it merely a commentary on the Aristotelian corpus as might appear at first sight. A comparison between the section on metaphysics and the commentary of Averroes on the *Metaphysica* is sufficient to establish his position as an independent thinker. He begins by taking exception to the very title of Aristotle's treatise. "The name of this science is of what is after nature . . . but what it deserves to be called . . . is the science of what is before nature [1]", he remarks. The whole of this section is a critical study of the problems posed by Aristotle. He repeatedly takes issue with the Stagirite as well as his successors. Conscious of the lack of the copula in Arabic and the difficulties involved, he points out that "the term existence is used . . . to denote various meanings [2]". In another passage he complains that "up to now this has not been made clear to me except by analogy [3]", which he does not consider conclusive. His predecessors are accused of arguing in a circle [4]. Then comes a general censure with the observation that "most philosophers learn logic but do not use it. At the end they revert to their natural versatility (*qariḥah*) [5]".

Avicenna constantly expresses dissatisfaction with the established terminology by which he could only mean that of the Translators. Although he rarely mentions Kindī by name, and rightly considered him more of a natural philosopher than a metaphysician, he had undoubtedly studied him carefully. A manuscript copy of Kindī's scientific treatises at Aya Sofya [6] is marked as having been one of the personal belongings of Avicenna. His designation of original creation by the term *ta'yīs* is obviously derived from his predecessor. The debt that he owed to Fārābī is conceded on more than one occasion. Yet he is not satisfied with the language of either of them. In thinking over the problems anew he is anxious to offer a restatement of his own. For that he would have wished to read the texts in their original form. Ignorance of Greek hampers him. There is reason to believe that others shared his lack of confidence

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[1] *Shifā*. MS. Cambridge University Library. No. Or. 1245. Fol. 8.
[2] *ibid*. Folio IIb.
[3] *ibid*.
[4] *ibid*. Fol. 13.
[5] *ibid*. Fol. 18 b.
[6] No. 4832.

in the versions produced by the Translators. He never felt certain that his understanding of Plato, Aristotle or the others [1] was strictly correct. It was probably through the help of Masīhī [2], the Christian physician and philosopher who died by his side in the desert, that he learnt something about the peculiarities of Greek grammar to which there are references in his books. That was hardly sufficient for his purposes. Nevertheless he could be outspoken in disagreement. "The time has come for us to withdraw ourself in order to contradict the views expressed regarding the Forms ... and the elements of the separate [entities], and the Universals, which are contrary to the principles that we have established ... even though we do not hope that any appreciable benefit may come from it ... philosophy in ancient times was what the Greeks occupied themselves with ... it was later intermixed with error and argumentation. ... and there were transpositions [3] from some to others which were not sound [4]". He likes to distinguish between 'the early teaching (*al-ta'līm al-awwal*)' by which he means the works of Plato and Aristotle, and the commentaries of Hellenistic authors including Stoic and Neoplatonic writings which he knew to be of later date. Some of these commentators are violently denounced. "Their words are full of hypocrisy and confusion [5]".

The language of the *Shifā* as a typical specimen of Avicennian writing could be studied (a) with reference to the vocabulary of the Translators, (b) with relation to the referents in his philosophical system, and (c) as symbolic of his individual manner of thought.

It was noted that though conscious of its defects Avicenna's terminology was inescapably based on that of the Translators. One peculiarity in this connection is his frequent use of two more or less synonymous terms together. Some have thought this a mark of originality and independence of thought. Actually they are the alternative terms of the one and same translator when translating different passages; or of different translators when putting the same treatise into Arabic. Sometimes they are derived from the translation

[1] Cf. *Mayāmīr li-Abruqlis al-Tarsūsī al-Yunānī* in a collection at Université Library No. 1458.
[2] There are numerous MS. copies of the works of Masīhī on both medical and philosophical topics in the libraries of Istanbul.
[3] *intiqālāt* could mean translations or quotations.
[4] *Shifā*. Cambridge MS. Fol. 107 b.
[5] *ibid*. Fol. 149 b.

of different works. The source could also be one of the numerous commentaries which when put into Arabic offered alternative terms. An illustration may be observed in Avicenna's discussion of the *Poetica* of Aristotle as found in the *Shifā* [1]. A number of terms occur there which do not correspond to those employed in Matta's version of the text [2]. This could be explained by the supposition that he had before him some translation besides that of Matta, or a rendering of a commentary like that of Themistius which we are told was in fact put into Arabic [3]. In any case the synonyms constitute yet another proof that he did not have complete confidence in the Arabic versions. Nor did he particularly approve of all the established terms. The practice was followed by Averroes in his commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus. Avicenna was in like manner aware of the linguistic limitations of Arabic in conveying the precise meaning of the text. "We do not have the terms for such notions", he says, "except these words. He who finds them inappropriate may use others [4]". This statement betrays his attitude towards the neologisms forced upon the translators and philosophers alike. To some he took strong exception, others he used reluctantly. Unlike Kindī, for instance, he did not coin verbal formations out of the pronoun *huwa*. The terms *laisa* and *laisiyyah*, or *aisa* and *aisiyyah* do not occur except rarely in his writings. He does not share Kindī's relish for these terms. His discriminating use of what he himself calls barbarisms denote that he was not particularly enthusiastic about them. What he feared was the feeling that the terminology of the translators may have failed to convey the exact meaning of the Greek texts. Like Fārābī he hardly ever uses *ṭīnah* as an equivalent of *hýle*, though Kindī had given currency to that word long before him. Curiously enough he did not attempt to introduce any Persian words into Arabic philosophical vocabulary. There are numerous features in his writings which we have called Persianisms, but no direct loan-words which the Translators had not already borrowed. When writing in Arabic he seems to have wished to remain faithful.

The referent in Avicenna's language was the grand synthesis

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[1] Cf. Margoliouth. *Analecta Orientalia...*

[2] Cf. the comparative tables in the Appendix to our translation of the *Poetica* into Persian.

[3] Cf. *Fihrist*.

[4] *Shifā*. Cambridge MS. Fol. 131.

to the construction of which he devoted himself from the very beginning. Its components included the interpretation of the Arabic renderings executed by the Translators together with the resulting attitude towards Greek philosophy and its Hellenistic commentators. Although his style never attained the polished perfection of a true Arab, its vocabulary reflects the highest and most mature stage to which the intellectual development of the *Falāsifah* ever reached. It left a permanent impress upon the language of his successors; not excluding the theologians and mystics who poured calumny over all that his name stood for [1]. The key-words to this philosophical system were 'the necessary being *(al-wājib al-wujūd)*', then 'the possible being *(al-mumkin al-wujūd)*', and then 'the impossible being *(al-mumtaniʿ al-wujūd)*'. This threefold division was not strictly speaking original, in the sense that they had already been adumbrated by Fārābī, and indirectly by Aristotle himself. To this principally logical distinction Avicenna gave an ontological significance which was upheld for centuries after him. It may be therefore rightly considered his own.

Symbolical of his manner of thought and expression Avicenna's language has its distinct peculiarities. A man of Iranian origin, brought up on Islamic teachings, well versed in Arabic from early youth,and deeply absorbed by Greek learning in both medicine and philosophy, his intellectual background was more varied if not vastly richer than that of Kindī and Fārābī. In contrast Kindī had been a pure Arab whose style and vocabulary had been determined by Muʿtazelite writings and the works of the Translators. He belonged to the formative age of Arabic secular literature which possessed all the necessary elements of vitality. But as far as we know he knew no other language. Fārābī was a Turk whose mother-tongue was of little help in his work. How much Persian he knew is a matter of pure conjecture. Greek and Syriac must be definitely ruled out—at least for any useful purposes. Because he came later and could therefore exploit the books of his predecessors, Avicenna had a decided advantage. To that must be added a fair familiarity with Iranian cultural values. There is no reason to believe that he knew Pahlawī. And post-Islamic Persian literature was still in its infancy in his days. But culture had survived conquest. It was being

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[1] Istanbul libraries have MS. copies of Avicenna's replies to some of these personal attacks.

revived at the court of the Sāmānids to which Avicenna owed allegiance. And he was a leading figure in the national and literary renaissance which they were trying to bring about by every means at their disposal. He certainly shared their determination in that respect. Finally we have the fact that as a personality he was more colourful and intellectually more versatile than either Kindī or Fārābī. The advantages and disadvantages which these conditioning elements entail are all reflected in his writings. Because he was not a pure Arab, his prose lacks the genuine ring of Arabic. It is Persian Arabic which non-Arabs can easily recognize, and which no Arab would want to imitate to-day. This is a characteristic which western scholars have not always noted. Kindī had already parted from the style of the theologians with its profusion of evocative terms; or that of the rhetoricians with its metaphors and internal rhyme (*saja'*) [1]. His sentences may now seem long. But they remain genuinely Arabic [2]. In his days Arabic philosophical prose was still in its early stages. He can therefore claim to have been among the pioneers in that field. The early translators were certainly indebted to him. Fārābī's language, on the other hand, may be considered less polished than that of Kindī, but more Arabic than that of Avicenna. Although of Turkish origin he seems to have learnt to think and write in Arabic to the exclusion of any other. Qiftī describes his books as "correct in expression [3]" which was a subtle way of saying that though a non-Arab he wrote correctly. His vocabulary shows hardly any peculiarities. He keeps to the terminology established by Ḥunain and his school. Occasionally he uses two words in the place of one. They represent different translations of the same Greek term. For instance he speaks of *al-ḥifẓ wa al-dhikr*, or *al-darbah wa al-irtiāḍ*. Western opinion has been divided on his style of writing. De Boer thought that he wrote "clearly and with a certain grace [4]". Carra de Vaux maintained that "his style is somewhat obscure [5]". In our view it is fairly clear and to the point, though it may not be as methodical in thought and expression as that of Avicenna. He indulges in aphorisms like many others in

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[1] Cf. specimens of bombastic *saja'* given in *Jamharat Rasā'il al-'Arab*... ed. A. Z. Ṣafwat. Vol. 4. p. 17, and falsely attributed to Kindī.

[2] Abū Rīda. *Rasā'il al-Kindī*... pp. 21-25 refutes the claim of Massignon that Kindī is vague and obscure.

[3] *Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā'*. p. 277.

[4] *The History of Philosophy in Islam*. p. 108.

[5] Art. Enclop. of Islam.

his days. Aphorisms were highly relished in Arabic literature. Nor did the Greeks dislike their *gnomai*. But they have nothing to recommend them in philosophical expositions. An inquiring mind has little use for such practices. In his works as in his life Fārābī did not possess the unquestioning self-confidence of Avicenna. This might have made him a better philosopher, yet not as effective in his influence on posterity.

By the time of Avicenna philosophical language had advanced to an appreciable extent. Its vocabulary had been permanently established. What he could offer in that field was very limited. He tried to make the terms more precise by means of definition [1]. Kindī and Fārābī had done the same thing before him but in a less comprehensive manner. This may not be a sign of originality. It denotes at least the necessity for clear thinking. A more characteristic mark is the ability to think in the abstract far more competently than Kindī or Fārābī. A symptom of that is the excessive number of abstractions which he coins himself. These may be attributed to the influence of his mother-tongue and as such be counted among the Persianisms which characterize his prose. But they are at the same time symbolical of his manner of thought. The fact that they were criticised by literary men and generally frowned upon by purists, in no way deterred him. Some gradually fell out of use. Others became permanently incorporated into philosophical terminology. The ideas may not be original. They are evidence of an improvement in the vehicle of thought. We find such words as *al-zamānīyyah, al-makānīyyah, al-ʿadadīyyah, al-shuʿūrīyyah, al-dhukūrīyyah, al-unūthīyyah*. Another point in this connection is his classification of certain Aristotelian terms into subdivisions which help to make the notion more precise. This was one way of distinguishing shades of meaning where the term appeared equivocal. Unless these be the work of Stoics and Neoplatonic commentators before him, they constitute a feature of Avicennian terminology. With grammar and syntax he wisely refrains from taking liberties. As a non-Arab he was conscious of his limitations.

The above observations concern terms of logic and metaphysics. With ethics the situation was somewhat different. Here an important distinction should be made. Ethics should not be confused

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[1] Cf. *Risālat al-Ḥudūd.*

with religious teachings. The first is governed by rational principles determining good and evil in human conduct. The second is based on conformity with religious injunctions and way of life. The basic concepts are entirely separate, though they soon got mixed up together. To the early theologians and philosophers the differences were real and considerable. Each had a terminology of its own. It was only later authors who began to use them interchangeably unaware or unconcerned with the original distinctions. Ethics claiming the greatest good of the greatest number as an object of inquiry grew out of Greek discussions on the subject. Guides to the religious way of life reflecting divine authority and promising reward and punishment stemmed from Holy Writ. Examples of ethical treatises may be found among the works of the *Falāsifah*. Specimens of the religious genre have always been numerous. We may cite the *Kitāb al-Akhlāq* of Abū al-Laith al-Samarqandī [1], and the *Sifr al-Sa'ādah* of Majd al-Dīn al-Shirāzī [2]. But as in the field of metaphysics a synthesis had been attempted in the domain of ethics also. It was then that the terminology of the two distinct disciplines got intermixed. Theologians found it appropriate to use some ethical terms. Philosophers considered it wise to borrow from religious language. By the time we reach an eminent author like Ghazālī the different set of terms are carefully and competently combined. Yet to trace back the origin of Arabic terms of ethics, we have to go to the early translators. For the Greek *éthos* there was a perfectly good Qur'anic word which they readily adopted. Thus:

ἤθους	(Metaph. 1025 a 12)	*akhlāq* (Ustāth).
τά ἤθη	(Rhet. 1389 a 3)	*akhlāq* (unknown).

But they were forced to use some non-Qur'anic forms of the word also. Thus:

ἠθικόν τόν λόγον	(Rhet.)	*al-kalām al-khulqīy* (unknown).
τά ἠθικά	(Metaph. 987 b I)	*akhlāqīyyāt* (Naẓīf).

Again for *agathós* there was a very suitable Qur'anic word. Thus:

τό ἀγαθόν	(Categ. II b 35)	*al-khair* (Isḥāq).
τά ἀγαθά	(Top. 117 a 15)	*al-khairāt* (Dimashqī).

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[1] Cf. MS. Aya Sofya. No. 2817.

[2] Cf. MS. Fatih. No. 2601.

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But they used alternatives also. Thus:

τό ἀγαθόν	(Metaph. 1028 a 15)	ṣāliḥ (Ustāth).
τό ἀγαθόν	(Rhet. 1362 a 21)	jawād (unknown).
τό ἀγαθόν	(Top. 107 a 5)	al-maḥmūd
		(Dimashqī).

And in Ibn Nā'imah's version of the so-called *Theology* of Aristotle which was polished up by Kindī we find the non-Qur'anic expression of *al-khair al-maḥd* as the equivalent of the *summum bonum* of which Avicenna speaks in Persian as *khair awwal*, and *khair kullī*, and *khair maḥd*.

Without wishing to exagerate the role of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, here also we have to go back to him and consider his *Treatise of Ethics and Politics* [1] to which reference has already been made. This is by no means a translation from Greek ethical texts. It therefore lacks the authenticity of direct translations. There is an element of religious teachings, though to a very limited extent. The main substance of the work could be probably traced back to one of those manuals of moral conduct and worldly wisdom known in Pahlawī literature as *Pand-nāmeh*. But there are certain Greek ideas as well, directly or indirectly derived from Aristotle. Of special interest in this connection is his terminology. We find interspersed in the text quite a few ethical terms which are either wholly non-Qur'anic or different in grammatical form. Whether these were actually coined by him cannot be determined with certainty. Yet they antidate the Arabic renderings of the regular translators. There is a reference to *ḍurūb al-akhlāq* by which he means the various facets of human character. He speaks of *ahl al-ʿaql wa al-sinn wa al-muruwwah*. This last word could also be read *al-marū'ah* in the absence of vocalisation to mean manliness. In either case it is a useful term of non-Qur'anic origin denoting a specific ethical value. He also has *ahl al-muruwwāt*. The word *jūd* which he frequently uses was adopted by the Translators thus:

τό ἀγαθόν	(Metaph. 1075 a 12)	al-jūd (Matta).
τό καλόν	(Metaph. 1013 a 24)	al-jūd (Ustāth).

Avicenna defines it in his *Taʿlīqāt* [2] as "the dispensing of the good without the expectation of a reward". More characteristic is the

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[1] Cf. MS. Esat Efendi. No. 3690.

[2] Cf. MS. Aya Sofya. No. 2389.

term *'afāf* and *'iffah*, the Qur'anic form of which was *al-ta'affuf* [1].
The Translators used *'iffah* for the almost untranslatable *sophro-syne* thus:

| ἡ σωφροσύνη | (Categ. 8 b 34) | *al-'iffah* (Isḥāq). |
| σωφρονός | (Top. 107 a 7) | *'afīf* (Dimashqī). |

though there was also

| μεγαλοψυχία | (Rhet. 1366 b 2) | *al-'iffah* (unknown). |

Then comes *al-tarawwud, al-mas'alah, al-qtcranā' wa al-wuzarā', al-wugr, al-arīb*, and *al-sakhā'*. Of these some are entirely non-Qur'anic; others only in form. *Sakhāwat nafs al-rajul* and *sawrat al-ḥiqd* are among the phrases met with. The Translators used *sakhā'* in the sense of liberality thus:

| ἡ ἐλευθερότης | (Rhet. 1366 b 2) | *al-sakhā'* (unknown). |

When and where the term actually originated is difficult to determine.

Not all the ethical treatises of Fārābī and Avicenna have been published. The Istanbul libraries contain quite a few. And those of their successors have not yet been carefully studied. But as far as terminology is concerned they have little that is new or notable to offer. They generally follow the terms found in the Arabic renderings of Aristotelian Ethics just as in the case of logic and metaphysics. The *Nichomachean Ethics* had been put into Arabic [2]. Perhaps more widely read and therefore of greater influence was Galen's commentary on the subject. An author whose name has long been associated with ethical essays is Miskawaih. His books offer a happy blending of Greek ethics, Iranian manuals of morals, Indian wisdom and Islamic teachings. The most representative is his *Jāvīdān Khirad* [3]. He also depended entirely on the Translators, and consequently adopted the established terminology.

A comprehensive study of the manner and form in which Greek technical terms were rendered in Arabic has to include the medical, mathematical, scientific and alchemical works which were translated. Of these highly interesting books which vary in size and

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[1] Cf. G. Flugel. *Concordantiae Corani Arabicae.* Lipsiae. 1842.
[2] Cf. A. J. Arberry. *The Nichomachean Ethics in Arabic.* B.S.O.A.S. Part. I. 1955.
[3] Ed. Badawī. Cf. MSS. Aya Sofya. No. 1747; Haci Selim Ağa in Uskudar. No. 748.

importance there are a whole series of manuscripts in the Istanbul libraries. Not until they are carefully edited and compared with the original Greek texts can any definite idea be formed with regard to their terminology. Because of the greater interest in logic and metaphysics they have been so far neglected. A few attempts have indeed been made in connection with medical and mathematical treatises, but much more remains to be done in this field.

The subject cannot be dismissed without reference to two other sources of terminology. Neither has much to offer yet they both belong to the relevant literature. The first is represented by the numerous pseudo-Platonic and pseudo-Aristotelian treatises manuscript copies of which may be found in the Istanbul libraries [1]. We have the testimony of a number of authors to the effect that some of these were extremely popular in their days, and therefore of widespread influence. This was probably true more among amateurs and literary men than with the better informed philosophers. Not because the *Falāsifah* were in every case aware that their attribution to Plato and Aristotle was doubtful; but due to the fact that their materials were either unimportant or contrary to the fundamental principles of Greek philosophy as they knew it. And when the language is scrutinized we find hardly any new terms in them which the Translators had not already utilised. The treatises are known to be of Hellenistic authorship, though the Greek text of most of them have been lost. Nor is the translator specified in every case. It may be assumed, however, that they were executed by the regular translators. For that reason they conform with the established terminology. In one or two the names of Ḥunain and Thābit ibn Qurrah are added as the persons who put the work into Arabic. Since an eminent physician and naturalist like Rāzī quotes from one of them [2], and traces of others may be found in the writings of noted authors, they cannot be wholly disregarded. But as sources of terminology they are of secondary interest. To them may be added translations of Hermetic literature of which there are numerous specimens at Istanbul; particularly those of Balīnūs, or

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[1] Cf. MSS. Esat Efendi. Nos. 124, 1804, 3774, 3688, 3690; Aya Sofya. Nos. 2455, 2457, 2460, 2819, 2820, 2822; Ragip Paşa. Nos. 1282; Köprülü. Nos. 1601, 1608; Süleymaniye. No. 872; Sultan Ahmet. No. 3207; Nuruosmaniye. Nos. 2598, 4924; Üniversite. Nos. 1458, 6377; Damat Ibrahim Paşa. No. 1150; Haci Beşir Ağa. No. 649; Manisa. Nos. 1171, 5842; etc. etc.

[2] Cf. MS. Fatih. 5412, 3644.

Apollonius of Tyana [1]. When it is noted that Ḥunain was the translator of some of these, we are not surprised to find that the terminology has nothing uncommon to offer. The case of *Kitāb Sirr al-Asrār* known to the Latins as *Secretum Secretorum* is different in that the translator was Yaḥya ibn al-Baṭrīq [2] who was among the earliest to put Greek books into Arabic. Yet there also the terms are not sufficiently different to be of any significance.

Mention may also be made of the *Kitāb al-'Ilal*, or Book of Causes, of Apollonius as found in Istanbul [3]; as well as the allegory of Salamān and Absāl under the title of *Qiṣṣat Salamān wa Absāl* [4]. The introduction to the latter states that these two personages "lived in the days of Hermanus, the king, son of Heraclius, the Sophist". It also confirms that the tale was translated by Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq from Greek into Arabic.

The terminology of medical, alchemical and mathematical works is of course a subject apart. But it might be emphasized that the Istanbul libraries are far richer on these matters than is generally supposed. Of Galen's medical books there are numerous specimens, and practically all put into Arabic by Ḥunain himself [5]. These include the compendia produced and taught in the medical school of Alexandria. Ḥunain had studied them there then translated them under the title of *Jawāmi' al-Iskandarānīyyīn li Kutub Jālīnūs* [6]. Aside from those which Meyerhof edited a good many treatises await a patient and competent editor. Alchemical works are fewer in number [7] and importance, but as far as terminology is concerned they are not any less interesting. This is because the terms are derived from Greek, Syriac, Arabic and Persian. Sometimes you find a strange medley of them all. Mathematical books are naturally more numerous and important than the alchemical [8].

[1] Cf. MS. Esat Efendi. No. 1987.

[2] Cf. MSS. Lâleli. No. 1610; Üniversite. No. 1015; Ragip Paşa. No. 1280; Hamidiye. No. 1463; Aya Sofya. No. 2890; Süleymaniye. No. 872; Esat Efendi. No. 3690.

[3] Cf. Köprülü. No. 873; also at Topkapi-sarayi.

[4] Cf. Atif Efendi. No. 2803.

[5] Cf. Aya Sofya. Nos. 3589-3600; Bursa. No. 1120; Manisa. Nos. 1772, 1779, 1814 Nuruosmaniye. 3504, 3580, 3581; Sultan Ahmet. 2131, 2146, 2083.

[6] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 3609; Yeni Cami. No. 1179; Manisa. No. 1709; again Aya Sofya. Nos. 3631, 3701.

[7] Cf. Fatih. Nos. 3227, 3435; Esat Efendi. 3823; Haci Beşir Ağa. 649.

[8] Cf. Fatih. 3414; Aya Sofya. Nos. 4830, 4832; Bursa. 1174; Manisa. 6983; Kayseri. 1230; Köprülü. Nos. 931, 932, 930; Süleymanye. 1037; Haci Selim Ağa. Uskudar. 743; Veliyuddin. 2321; Murat Molla. 1418.

Many of these are stated to have been translated by Thābit ibn Qurrah. The significance of their terminology lies in the fact that like philosophical terms they are literally translated from the Greek and became the established idiom of mathematics in both Arabic and New Persian.

Among literary men there were many writers whose style and language were influenced by the Arabic renderings of the Translators and the works of the *Falāsifah* who came after them. Jāḥiẓ was among the earliest to exhibit this feature. In Tawḥīdī it is even more marked. Because of that it should be noted that the Istanbul libraries contain manuscript copies of some as yet unedited treatises by him [1].

[1] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 3542.

CHAPTER SIX

When compared to the Arabic language and the history of its philosophical terminology Persian presents a lamentable picture indeed. The acknowledged richness of the first and the systematic manner in which it forged its technical vocabulary stand in marked contrast to the stunted state of the second and its hap-hazard formations. Yet no great knowledge of Persian is required to show that its potentialities far surpass those of Arabic.

The course which Persian philosophical terminology took was different from the very beginning. And in tracing it back to its original sources a distinction needs to be drawn between Pahlawī or Middle Persian and the New Persian which grew up after the Arab conquest. This is convenient although no hard and fast line divides the two periods. Furthermore because they represent states and stages of the same tongue, the linguistic problems which they pose are generally similar.

The specimens which have survived in Pahlawī lierature extend over a relatively long stretch of time from before the conquest to centuries after it [1]. Translation of Greek philosophical works in some form or other appears to have started early, though it is not easy to determine the exact date. Of late Achaemenian times there are no records in that respect. The conquests of Alexander and the rule of the Diadochi introduced numerous Greek words into the Iranian language of the time [2], but there is no reason to believe that any of the philosophical works were translated. Such activities may have begun in a tentative way under the Parthians whose interest in Greek tragedy and Hellenic culture in general is well authenticated. Things clear up a little when the reign of the Sās-sānian dynasty is reached. According to the *Fihrist* Greek works were translated into Pahlawī as early as the rule of Ardashīr [3]. Here we are met with a semi-historical figure by the name of Tansar described in the *Dēnkart* as *ahrov*, or blessed. In two separate books [4] Mas'ūdī records that Tansar was a prince who became an

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[1] Cf. H. W. Bailey. *Zoroastrian Problems...* Oxford. 1943.
[2] Cf. Noldeke. *Persische Studien. Weiner Akadem.* Band. CXXVI.
[3] p. 239.
[4] *Murūj...* Baghdad ed. p. 210; and *Al-Tanbīh...* Baghdad ed. p. 87.

ascetic and a Platonist "following the teachings of Socrates and Plato". There is also the treatise attributed to him called *The Epistle of Tansar* [1]. Western scholars have given little credence to this statement of Mas'ūdī [2]. Others have tried to identify him as a person with Kartir [3] whose inscriptions at Ka'be-ye-Zartusht has aroused much interest. Of Ardashīr himself there is a curious treatise at Istanbul entitled *Nuskhat 'Ahd Ardashīr ibn Bābak* [4]. However that may be no doubts can be cast on the fact that during the reign of Shāpūr I, the son of Ardashīr, and apparently by his directions, certain Aristotelian writings were translated and added to the collection known as *Apastak*. The *Fihrist* relates these activities "until all those books were transcribed [5] into Persian [6]". This is confirmed by a lengthy statement in the *Dēnkart* [7] which is the most important of extant sources on Zoroastrian theology, and dates in subject-matter from the late Sāssānian period. Corroborative evidence comes from Barhebraeus [8] and other minor sources, although in the view of an authority on the subject "it is somewhat difficult to believe that Aristotle's philosophy had received a Persian dress so early [9]". With the illustrious rule of Chosroes I (531-578) we are on even firmer ground [10]. There is the testimony of Agathias [11] that the king was able to read Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides and Demosthenes in his own language. And that he had a Syriac physician by the name of Uranius who taught him Greek philosophy. Of the group of philosophers who betook themselves to the court of Chosroes when Justinian closed their school at Athens, Simplicius was the best known to the Persians and Arabs [12]. His works were later translated into Arabic. From Damascius a treatise has survived [13]. And from Priscianus there is a Latin version

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[1]   Ed. Darmsteter. *Journal Asiatique.* 1894; and M. Mīnowī. *Nāmeh-ye Tansar.* Tehran.

[2]   Cf. Zaehner. *Zurvan.* p. 10.

[3]   Cf. M. Sprengling. *Kartir, Founder of Sasanian Zoroastrianism.* A.J.S.L. 1940. pp. 197-228.

[4]   Cf. MS. Collection at Köprülü. No. 1608. Folio 146-156.

[5]   *nasakha* means translation also.

[6]   p. 239.

[7]   *Dēnkart.* 412.3-415.3. English trans. by Zaehner. *op. cit.* pp. 7-9.

[8]   *Tārīkh*...ed. Ṣāleḥānī.

[9]   Bailey. *op. cit.* p. 157.

[10]   Cf. Christensen. *L'Iran sous les Sassanides.*

[11]   Cf. *Patrologia Graeca.* Vol. 88. Col. 1389.

[12]   Cf. *Fihrist.*

[13]   *Dubitationes et Solutiones.* Paris. 1889.

of the discussions which he had with king Chosroes on the subject of the soul and the views of Plato and Aristotle on its nature [1]. Since Priscianus probably knew no other language than Greek, and there is no reason to believe that Chosroes knew much of that tongue, it may be supposed that the discussions were translated into Pahlawī or perhaps Syriac for the benefit of the monarch. Then comes Paulos Persa who on the authority of Barhebraeus [2] translated Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (whether into Syriac or Pahlawī) at royal request. Of him a general compendium on Aristotelian logic has survived in Syriac. This has been published with a Latin translation [3]. In confirmation of all this, the *Fihrist* attests that in Sāssānian times the Iranians had two separate scripts for writing down books on medicine and philosophy [4].

Various Pahlawī texts in which Greek philosophical influence is beyond doubt have been adequately treated [5]. Some have been transcribed and translated in extenso [6]. Others have been edited and translated in whole [7]. There is therefore sufficient material at hand to form some opinion of philosophical terminology in Pahlawī; particularly since extensive glossaries have been added in almost every case.

The first point to notice is the fact that as an Indo-European language Pahlawī suffers from none of the limitations pointed out with regard to Arabic, Syriac and the other Semitic tongues. It enjoys at the same time all the resources which Arabic benefited from in coining its technical terminology. This is not to say that the terminology of the two languages bear any comparison in extension, adequacy, or in the subjects treated. In Pahlawī there is nothing to equal Arabic terms in number, in significance, and in the varieties of thought. It is only to point out the potentialities which in its New Persian form equal those of any other language including Greek. The copula is there lending itself to every variety of ontological statement. Compounds abound in ever increasing numbers, such as

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[1] Ed. Bywater. in *Supplementum Aristotelium.* Vol. I. Part. II. Berlin. 1886.

[2] *Chron. Eccl.* II.97.

[3] Cf. J. P. N. Land. *Anecdoton Syriacorum.* Vol. IV. Brill. 1875.

[4] Cairo. ed. pp. 20-21.

[5] Cf. Bailey. *op. cit.*

[6] Cf. Zaehner. *op. cit.*

[7] Cf. Père de Menasce. *Škand-Gumānīk Vičār.* Text and trans. Fribourg. 1945.

āzāt-kāmīh, yatak-vihērīh, ahrov-dāt, etc., etc. Prefixes in *hū-* and in *dūs-*, corresponding to the Greek *eu-* and *dus-*, together with many others give precision to the thought or act, such as *hūmēnišnīh, hūgōwišnīh, hūkūnišnīh*, or *hūdānākīh* and *dūšdānākīh*. The privative *a-* expresses negation in the easiest of manners, such as *amargīh, abun, abrīn, adānīh*, though New Persian commonly employs other prefixes for that purpose. Suffixes describe process or activity in exactly the same way the *-sis* does in the Greek *poiesis*. An example is *dātastān*. Abstractions are constantly used especially those ending in *-īh, dānākīh, gavākīh, vičīnkārīh*, etc., etc. And the use of the infinitive as a noun, in the way that Greek does, is common. Finally the construction of the sentences with the copula coming often at the end is very similar to that of Greek. Again this is not to say that this form of construction is superior to the Arabic form which in fact is much more compact and terse. But it lends itself more easily when translating a Greek text.

The resources exploited when translating Greek terms into Pahlawī were no different from those of Arabic. New meanings were given to old words such as in the case of *zahak, gōhr*, and *čihr*. Of loan-words *zamān* is particularly intriguing. Transcriptions are in the form of *sokfistak* as sophist, or *filīsofāi* as philosophers. An example of literal renderings is *zamīk-paimāneh* coming from the Greek *geometría* [1]. Of words specially coined for the purpose, competent scholars have specified quite a few.

And yet Pahlawī philosophical terminology, as has come down to us in the various Zoroastrian books, cannot be studied with any degree of accuracy. The translators are not known by name. Nor can it be determined whether the renderings were from Greek directly or by way of Syriac, though the latter is much more probable. Hence the reason why those who have attempted to equate some of these Pahlawī terms with their original Greek equivalents have been forced to use the *a priori* method which we have deprecated in the case of Arabic. The conjectures may be quite correct, but there is no way of verifying them. Because the passages are fragmentary, the terms scattered here and there, and the method of translation appears hap-hazard, no definite judgements can be passed. As a guide they are of no help to those who may wish to follow their example.

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[1] Cf. Bailey. *op. cit.*

Books translated into Syriac and Arabic from the Pahlawi version of Greek texts [1], particularly those on agriculture and astronomy [2] need not detain us here.

[1] Cf. Noldeke. *Beitrage zur Gesch. des Alexandreromans.*

[2] Cf. Nallino. *Tracce di opere greche giunti Agli Arabi,* in *'Ajab-Nāmeh* in honour of E. G. Browne. p. 245 ff.

CHAPTER SEVEN

With the Arab conquest which made Arabic the language of government administration for an extended period of time, and established it permanently as the medium of religious instruction and learned literature, New Persian emerges. This did not mean a complete break with the past. Pahlawī works continued to be written for centuries after among the remaining Zoroastrian community. Dialects and local speech persisting in little pockets of outlying districts preserved their archaic forms almost intact. And what the Iranians designated as *Zabān-i-Darīh* came to occupy an intermediate stage between Sāssānian Pahlawī and the language generally current in the land. The elements of this *Zabān-i-Darīh* which was so openly encouraged under the Sāmānians [1] still await careful study. But the New Persian that followed and which henceforth we shall call simply Persian, emerged with a wholesale admixture of Arabic words and phrases varying only in degree at different epochs and under specific rulers.

The genesis of philosophical vocabulary in this new medium appears far less fortunate when compared to that of Arabic. Aside from what took place in the Sāssānian period in the way of translations from Greek or Syriac into Pahlawī, there is no record of any Greek text (literary or philosophical) directly translated into Persian until modern times [2]. Even the *Diatessaron* as a Christian text was put into Persian from a Syriac version [3]. All that the Iranians possessed were the Arabic renderings of ʿAbbāsid times. To them should be added one or two translations made later exclusively from the Arabic versions [4]. There was no solid basis therefore on which to build up the required terminology—no direct contact (as in the case of Arabic) with the primary sources which of course were Greek. However much Iranians may regret

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[1] Cf. The introduction to *Tarjumeh-ye-Tafsīr-i-Ṭabarī*. ed. H. Yagmāʾīh. p. 5.

[2] Cf. Our translation of the *Poetica* of Aristotle, and the *Persai* of Aeschylus: *Dar Bāreh-ye-Hunar-i-Shiʿr*. London. 1948, and *Irāniān*. Paris. 1955.

[3] Cf. G. Messina. *Un Diatessaron Persiano del secolo XIII tradatto dal siriaco. Biblica.* 1942, 1943.

[4] Cf. The Persian translation of the *De Anima* of Aristotle by Afḍal al-Dīn-i-Kāshānī. ed. Bahār.

it, Persian philosophical language was handicapped from the beginning. It may be said to have started at second hand.

Yet like its mother tongue Persian enjoys all the resources of . Indo-European languages. The capacity to coin compounds gives it a theoretically unlimited field for development. This is important when recalled that in Greek the increase in compounds constituted a distinct feature in the creation of abstract vocabulary. "From Hesiod onwards there is no recognizable fundamental change. There is simply the adaptation of the language to various literary needs, a common factor throughout being the prolific formation of compounds [1]". The same was true in Sanskrit. "In Bhagavadgita ... various potentialities are accentuated by compounds [2]". In Persian there is an added facility for such formations in that a term could be compounded out of a Persian and an Arabic word put together, or of two Persian words combined. For instance *qesmat-pazīr* and *bahreh-pazīr* mean exactly the same and were used as the equivalent of the Greek *diairetós*; except that the first is formed out of an Arabic and a Persian word, whereas in the second they are both Persian. Where the concept is not elementary but a complex thought the separate parts of these compounds have a significant way of expressing the idea.

Together with such developments went an excessive use of synonyms put side by side where one term was Arabic and its equivalent in Persian. This occured chiefly in literary prose and sometimes in the philosophical as well. The peculiarity probably dates from the time when the people of Iran had become in a sense bilingual by submitting to the overwhelming influence of Arabic. Some understood and used the Arabic words. Others still adhered to the Persian equivalents. Consciously or otherwise literary men came to use both set of terms as synonyms putting one beside the other. This seemed one way of making themselves properly understood. Actually the practice persists to this day though the necessity for it has long disappeared.

Among the compounds formed to denote philosophical concepts we may note:

andāzeh-gīrīh   *i'tidāl*   moderation   μετριότης.

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[1] Atkinson. *The Greek Language*. p. 223.

[2] B. Heimann. *The Significance of Prefixes in Sanskrit Philosophical Terminology*. London. 1951.

kār-kard	*'amal*	work	ἔργον.
nā-chīz	*lā-shai'*	non-entity.	
ham-chand	*musāwī*	equal	ἴσον.
nīst-shawandeh	*fāsid*	corruptible	φθαρτός
hast-shawandeh	*kā'in*	liable to be ge-	
		nerated	γενητός

The significance of prefixes in Sanskrit philosophical terminology has been discussed at length [1]. In Persian it is not as highly developed though there is no reason why it should not be so. This method of coining new terms may be pursued with profit by those who undertake such tasks. It will be seen how Avicenna took the initiative along this path. These prefixes when added to the verbal root may be idependent bearers of meaning, or could act as illuminants of the meaning immanent in the verb. They could also be cooperants with the verb in conveying the intended notion. Privation which was expressed in Pahlawī through the addition of the prefix *a-* just as in Greek, takes usually the form *nā-* in Persian. We thus have:

nā-dānīh	*jahl*	ignorance	ἄγνοια
nā-gardandeh	*ghair-fāsid*	incorruptible	ἀφθαρτός
nā-maḥdūd	*ghair-maḥdūd*	unlimited	ἀόριστος.
nā-mutunāhīh	*ghair-mutunāhīh*	infinite	ἄπειρον.

Another common prefix is *ham-* to mean together with, and corresponding to the Greek *sun-* or *sum-*, Sanskrit *sam-* and Latin *con-*. Example:

ham-jinsīh	*mujānisah*	homogeneity	συγγενεία.

Strictly speaking Persian philosophical literature begins with Avicenna. The attempt to produce a treatise in the form and style of his Arabic *al-Najāt* is apparently the first book to be written in Persian on philosophy after the Arab conquest. It was called *Dānish-Nāmeh-ye-'Alā'ī* in honour of the patron at whose request he undertook the work [2]. In fact it is composed in what Iranians designated as *zabān-i-darīh*. As a *tour de force* the work arouses profound admiration. The creation of an as yet non-existent technical terminology could not have been an easy task. He applied himself to it with a zeal and ability which should prove a sufficient

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[1]   B. Heimann. *op. cit.*
[2]   Cf. Tehran edition. Fine MSS. copies in the libraries of Istanbul.

answer to those who cast doubt on his Iranian origins. By this bold act he was flouting the exclusive claims of Arabic in a manner which amounted almost to heresy. Unlike Berūnī who had insisted that Persian was definitely incapable of expressing scientific and phi-' losophical thought adequately (since it lacked the linguistic potentialities for the purpose) [1], he affirmed his full faith in the language of his forebears. The fact that on completion of the work his patron failed to understand the terms, must have made him realize poignantly the sad state to which Persian had fallen. Not that he ever gave up writing in Arabic. His chief works are all in that tongue. Yet by the *Dānish-Nāmeh* and some minor treatises which may not all be authentic, he ably refuted the thesis of his contemporary scholar. What Berūnī said was correct as a statement of fact. Persian in his days was not sufficiently developed to express logical discussions or abstract reasoning. No equivalent terms existed in the field of medicine or mathematics. But to say that nothing could be done about it because of certain linguistic deficiencies was a surprising view from a man of his accomplishments. Consequently the study of philosophical terminology in Persian must begin with the *Dānish-Nāmeh* and needs to be based on a close analysis of its terms, verbal formations and expressions.

The first impression on the reader is the deliberate attempt of the author to reduce the Arabic words to the bare minimum. For that purpose the different methods noted in connection with Arabic are fully employed. Common words are given technical meanings. Loan-words are introduced from various sources. Transcriptions are adopted. And the existing vocabulary is enriched by constant coining of new terms and phrases not met with elsewhere. Here it would be well to stress the fact that Avicenna was seriously handicapped in this work, in the sense that he did not know Greek or Syriac, at least for useful purposes. All he could do was to translate from the Arabic versions which had been made from the Greek, and in some cases from Syriac renderings of the Greek text. Hence what he produced was twice removed from the original. No wonder therefore that he was not always successful. As a literary exercise with the avowed object of replacing the Arabic terms by words derived from Persian roots, his work may be compared to the *Shāh-Nāmeh* of Firdowsī. There is nothing in the *Dānish-Nāmeh*

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[1] Cf. *Kitāb al-Ṣaidanah*. ed. Meyerhof; MS copy at Kurşunluoglu library in Bursa. No. 153.

on logic, metaphysics or the natural sciences which the author had not said far more precisely in his Arabic books. It cannot be doubted that his efforts in this connection were primarily linguistic and literary. But whereas Firdowsī could always fall back on the Pahlawī text of the *Khodai-Nāmeh* or what other annals he may have used for his sources, Avicenna could find no such help except in Arabic. Firdowsī had the possibility of enriching his vocabulary by borrowing freely from Pahlawī writings in prose and perhaps in poetry, or by coining on the model of his predecessors. No such ways were open to Avicenna as far as is known. Finally Firdowsī was in a position to incorporate the introduction of Daqīqī which proved quite useful in the circumstances.

1. The common words to which Avicenna gives a technical meaning in his efforts to produce the necessary terminology for logic, metaphysics or the natural sciences are varied and numerous. They are sometimes in their usual form, at other times in the form of an abstraction, an adjective or an infinitive verb. They could be a single word or a compound. A few of the more felicitous may be tabulated here, remembering always that the Greek equivalents are given on an *a priori* basis.

āgahīh	*ḥiss*	sensation	αἴσθησις.
bāyast	*wājib*	necessary	ἀνάγκη.
barābar	*al-ʿaks, al-mutuqābil*	the opposite	τό ἀντικείμενον.
khāst	*irādah*	will	βούλησις.
gamān	*wahm*	imagination	φαντασία.
afzāyesh	*al-nomow*	augmentation	αὔξησις.
kahesh	*al-nuqṣān*	diminution	μείωσις.
kunesh	*al-fiʿl*	verb	ῥῆμα.
burīnesh	*al-qatʿ*	intersection	ἡ τομή.
gardesh	*al-istiḥālah*	alteration	ἀλλοίωσις.
gerawīdan	*al-taṣdīq*	assent	πίστις.
nīstīh	*al-ʿadam*	privation	στέρησις.
bāz-nemūdan	*al-sharḥ*	explanation	ἡ ἀνατόμή.
bāyastegīh	*al-wujūb*	necessity	τό ἀναγκαῖον.
barābarīh	*taqābul*	contrariety	ἀντίθεσις.
bīrūnīh	*al-ʿaradīy*	accidental	κατά συμβεβηκός
shāyad-buwad	*al-mumkin*	contingent	τό δύνατον.
shinākhtegīh	*al-maʿrifah*	cognition	γνῶσις.

gusastegīh	*al-infiṣāl*	disjunction	διάζευξις.
gushādan	*al-ḥall*	solution	λύσις.
mānandeh	*mānandegīh* *al-mushābehah*	similarity	ὁμοιότης.
harāyenegīh	*al-ḍarūrah*	necessity	τό ἀναγκή.
hamīshegīh	*al-abad*	perpetuity	τό ἀεί.
khirad-i-kār-kun	*al-ʿaql al-ʿamalīy*	practical intelligence.	
khirad-i-tawānā	*al-ʿaql al-faʿ ʿāl*	the active intelligence.	
sukhan-gūyā	*al-nāṭiq*	reasonable	λογιστικός.
kunandegīh	*al-fāʿilīyyah*	process of action	ποίησις.
kinār	*al-ṭaraf*	the extreme	τό ἄκρον.

An illustration of Avicenna's method of work may be gathered from the manner in which he treats the term for speculation. In his rendering of the Aristotelian *Metaphysica* Usṭāth had translated the Greek word thus:

θεωρία   (Metaph. 993 a 30)   *naẓar.*

All the other translators had done the same. Avicenna basing himself on the Arabic (which comes from the verb *naẓara* meaning to see) translated it into Persian as *negaresh*. From it he formed a title to represent the science dealing with speculative problems. We thus have:

negaresh	*naẓar*	speculation	θεωρία.
ʿilm ingāresh	*al-ʿilm al-naẓarīy*	the speculative science	ἡ θεωρητική ἐπιστήμη.

In fact he treated the names of many of the sciences in a similar manner. Ex.

ʿilm-i-tarāzū	*ʿilm al-mīzān*	logic.	
ʿilm-i-barīn	*al-ʿilm al-aʿlā*	metaphysics.	
ʿilm-i-pīshīn	*ʿilm mā qabl al-ṭabīʿah*		ἡ μετά τά φυσικά.
ʿilm-i-tadbīr-i-khāneh	*ʿilm tadbīr al-manzil*	economics.	
ʿilm-i-tadbīr-i-khud	*ʿilm tadbīr al-insān*	ethics.	

ʿilm zīrīn	*ʿilm al-asfal*	natural science	
al-ʿilm al-awsaṭ	*al-ʿilm al-taʿlīmīy*	mathematics.	
ʿilm-i-miyā-negīn	*ʿilm-i-farhang*		

II. Loan-words taken from other than Arabic are not very numerous in Avicenna's Persian writings. But a good example is the term *ākhshīj* to mean the elements and their opposition to one another as such [1]. What the origin of this term is, and from what language it entered into Persian, we are unable to say.

III. Avicenna's transcriptions are taken from the Arabic and have nothing to recommend them. In fact they are apt to deteriorate in the process of transcription. His chief merit lies in the words that he coined, and these take different forms. The most conspicuous are the abstractions hitherto unknown in the language or extremely rare, though in perfect conformity with the linguistic rules of Persian. Examples:

andakīh	*al-aqallīyyah*	littleness	ὀλιγότης, τό ὀλιγόν.
bīshīh	*al-aktharīyyah*	plurality	πληθότης, τό πολύ.
pīshīh	*al-taqaddum*	priority.	
pasīh	*al-taʾakhkhur*	posteriority.	
bāstārīh	*al-taʿādul*	equality.	
behamānīh	*al-taṭābuq*	identity.	
peywastegīh	*al-ittiṣāl*	conjunction	τό συνεχές.
dōʾīh	*al-ithnainīyyah*	duality	τό δυάς.
juzūʾīh	*al-ghairīyyah*	alterity, otherness	ἑτερότης.
cherāʾīh	*al-limaʾīyyah*	the reason why	τό διότι.
chandīh-ye-peywasteh	*al-kam al-muttaṣil*	the continuous quantity	τό ποσόν συνεχές.
chandīh-ye-gusasteh	*al-kam al-munfaṣil*	the discrete quantity	τό ποσόν διωρισμένον.
chegūnegīh	*al-kaifīyyah*	state, modality	ποιότης.
kojāʾīh [2]	*al-ain*	the place	ποῦ.
kodāmīh	*ayyu*	the question 'which' ?	ποιός.

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[1] Cf. *Lughat al-Furs* of Asadī. ed. P. Horne and A. Iqbal each separately.

[2] Cf. the Aristotelian Categories in Persian. Appendix. I.

ke'ĭh	mata	time	ποτέ.
hamegĭh wa pāregĭh	al-kullīy wa al-juz'ĭy	the general and the particular	τό καθόλου, τό καθ' ἕκαστον.

IV. In coining new words Avicenna shows remarkable ability in the use of prefixes. This is particularly helpful in expressing some precise thought or action. Examples:

andar-rasīdan	al-taṣawwur	concept	νόησις.
andar-yāft	al-idrāk	perception	τό νοεῖν, αἰσθάνεσθαι.
bāz-burdan	al-taḥlīl	analysis	διάλυσις.

Suffixes are much less used probably because there are not so many of them. One example which could equally well be counted a compound is:

jāigĭr	al-mutumakkin	occupying a place	κατά τόπον.

Verbal forms employed as nouns are more frequent. Of these we have:

pālāyesh	al-taṭhĭr	purification	κάθαρσις.
tawānesh	al-quwwah	force, faculty	δύναμις.
junbesh	al-ḥarakah	movement	κίνησις.
zāyesh	al-tawallud	procreation.	
shāyad-būdan	al-iḥtimāl, al-imkān	contingency, possibility	
parwaresh	al-tarbiyah	upbringing.	

For an active agency we have:

junbānandeh	al-muḥarrik	the mover	τό κινοῦν.
pazĭrandeh	al-qābil	capable of	τό δεκτικόν.
āmĭzandeh	al-mumzij	capable of mixing.	

Some words are kept in their Pahlawī form, such as:

bavishn	al-ĭjād	coming into being.	
jān	al-rūḥ	spirit	πνεῦμα.

V. The compounds coined by Avicenna are not as numerous as one would like or expect. This may be due to the fact that he was not translating directly from the Greek which would have surely influenced such formations but from Arabic which had none of it. Nor was he thinking out things in Persian. Examples:

tīmār-khurdan	*al-ta'ammul*	contemplation	ἐπισκοπεῖν.
bahreh-pazīr	*mutujazzi'*	divisible	διαιρετός.
peywand-dār	*murakkab*	complex, com-pounded with another.	
jāigāh	*makān*	place	ὁ τόπος.
junbesh-pazīr	*al-qābil lil-ḥarakah*	can be put into motion	τό κινούμενον.
junbesh-dār	*al-mutuḥarrik*	in motion	τό κινεῖσθαι.
cheh-chīzī	*al-māhīyyah*	quiddity, essence	τό τί ἦν εἶναι.

It should not be supposed that Avicenna could lay claim to every-one of these compounds. But he was the first to make them a part of Persian philosophical terminology.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Avicenna's attempt to write philosophy in *zabān-i-darīh* found support from a not very distant source. Soon after him two Ismāʿīlī philosophers produced works along their particular line of thought. But they made a similar and concerted effort to write in *darīh* Persian—perhaps with even greater consistency than Avicenna. They used as few Arabic terms as possible, coining at the same time some of their own. They were not writing for patrons. It could not have been ordered that they should choose that idiom. Nor can we be sure that they were directly influenced by Avicenna's initiative in that field although they were probably familiar with his writings. Nāṣir Khosrow specifically mentions his name in one connection [1]. It might be supposed that Iranians in the eastern provinces of Persia were less learned in Arabic. Yet that was by no means a general rule. Some have claimed that Ismāʿīlīs were more attached to Persian than others. Nevertheless we find some of their leaders writing in Arabic [2]. However that may be, the contributions of these two men should be placed side by side with those of Avicenna in the creation of a distinctly Persian philosophical terminology.

Unfortunately only one book has survived from the pen of Abū Yaʿqūb-i-Sajestānī (fl. 360/971) [3]. The Ismāʿīlī heterodoxy which eventually grew into an Arabian, an Iranian and an Indian branch had its own special contributions to Persian literature. And for reasons more easy to imagine than ascertain most of the Iranian adepts chose to write in as pure a language as any in the land. As a result they left some valuable specimens of a comparatively chaste and remarkably clear prose. Theirs was not the only attempt at this form of writing [4]. Yet none were as consistent. We thus find Sajestānī coining new abstractions or reviving some of the old ones in very much the same fashion as Avicenna. A typical example is *būdegīh* to express the process of being.

Nāṣir Khosrow (b. 394/1004) was the more accomplished man and the greater thinker. Fortunately also more of his works have

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[1] Cf. his *Safar-Nāmeh*.

[2] Cf. Kirmānī. *Rāḥat al-ʿAql.* ed. Ḥusain and Hilmī. Cairo. 1952.

[3] Cf. *Kashf al-Maḥjūb.* ed. Corbin. Tehran. 1949.

[4] Cf. *Nemūne-ye-Sukhan-i-Fārsī.* ed. Bayānī. Tehran. 1317. A.H.

survived. We are consequently in a better position to assess his contributions to terminology. In number and resourcefulness what he coined are second only to those of Avicenna. It is interesting to observe that although he visited Arab lands and wrote a delightful book on his travels among Arabs he never wrote anything in Arabic as far as is known. Furthermore he tried to make his style and language as purely Persian as he could. All that must have been deliberate. Avicenna on the other hand never had direct contact with the Arab world and yet wrote his chief works in that tongue. Of course a distinction needs to be drawn between the ultimate purpose of each. Avicenna was primarily a philosopher with no particular desire to press his religious views on anyone. He could write with detachment and without much concern for the taste of his readers. Nāṣir Khosrow was openly a religious teacher. His interest in philosophy may be said to have been incidental. Consequently in Avicenna the terms are specifically philosophical. In Nāṣir Khosrow they border on the theological, and can therefore be ambivalent. For this reason his terminology has its dangers for those who wish to adopt them. M. Corbin has given us what is so far the best exposition of Nāṣir's thought and language [1]. Yet when he tries to equate them with Greek terms on a purely *a priori* basis he is often far of the mark. There is naturally no question of Nāṣir having known Greek. But he is well acquainted with Greek learning which he read in Arabic, sometimes giving the name of the actual translator. He owes in addition a great deal to Stoic philosophy the Arabic renderings of which have long been lost. Hence the reason why some of his terms are of Stoic origin.

Nāṣir's prose is quite attractive and well worth copying with certain modifications. It never was the style commonly admired in Persia but if modernised it could become a model for authors of philosophical literature. He has many terms in common with Avicenna. Whether he owes these to his predecessor is very difficult to ascertain. His mode of expression is more relaxed and discursive and appears far more engaging than the stiff presentation of Avicenna's *Dānish-Nāmeh*. He is also more argumentative, especially where he tries to refute Rāzī. That gives his *Zād el-Musāferīn* a liveliness and force which is not met with in the tedious repetitions of subsequent commentators.

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[1] Cf. His introduction to *Jāmiᶜ al-Ḥikmatain*.

His personal contributions to terminology are what concern us most here. They are varied and sometimes remarkably to the point. Of course just like Avicenna he has no contact with the original Greek and translates from the Arabic. But even then he shows great understanding. He had obviously thought things for himself. There is no question of following his predecessors blindly. Among his abstractions we find:

ārāstegīh	*al-kamāl*	entelechy	ἐντελεχείᾳ.
āshkārā'īh	*ẓuhūr*	manifestation.	
ū'īh	*huwīyyah*	heness as a mystical term.	
chashandegīh	*ḥiss al-madhāq*	sense of taste	τό γευστόν.

(Avicenna had said *chashāwīh*):

būyā'īh, ḥāssat-i-būyandeh	*ḥiss al-shamm*	sense of smell.	
basāwandeh	*ḥiss al-lams*	sense of touch	ἡ ἀφή.

(Avicenna had said *ḥiss-i-basāwīh*):

kashīdegīh	*al-muddah*	extension of time	διάστασις.
chīzīh	*al-shai'īyyah*	thingness.	
chīstīh	*al-māhīyyah*	quiddity, essence	τό τί ἦν εἶναι.
'ilm-i-sereshtanīh	*al-'ilm al-gharīzīy*	innate knowledge.	
angīzesh		stimulation.	

Among his compounds we have:

farāz-āwardan	*qawwama*	to constitute	διορθοῦν.
farāz-āmadegīh	*taqwīm*	constitution	ἡ διόρθωσις.
kār-kard, kār-kun, kār-pazīr	*al-fi'l, al-fā'il, al-munfa'il*	the process, the active agent, the passive agent.	
nā-chīz-shawandeh	*al-fāsid*	the corruptible	τό φθαρτόν.

Among his use of prefixes we have:

bāz-bastan	*al-iḍāfah*	correlation	ἡ ἀπόδοσις.
bāz-basteh	*al-muḍāf*	correlated.	
bāz-justan	*baḥth, tafaḥḥus*	investigation	τό ζήτεσθαι.
bar-khāstan	*al-fanā'*	annihilation.	

Nāṣir Khosrow is at his best when expressing different aspects of the concept of being for which Arabic had no terms, and also of existence. We thus have a whole series some of which are not met with in Avicenna nor elsewhere as far as we know. Examples:

bāshandeh — bāshānandeh — būdanīhā — būdhā — būdīh — būdeh-shodeh — nā-būdeh-shodeh — būdesh wa nabūdesh — chīzhā-ye-būdeshih.

For creation *ex nihilo* he has *būdesh-i-na-az-chīz*. He has also the more common expression of *āfarīnesh*. We thus find him distinguishing between *āfarīnesh-i-taqdīrih* and *āfarīnesh-i-ibdā'īh* [1]. Not many of these terms were copied by his successors. They fell out of use when Persian philosophers for reasons not easy to explain reverted to the Arabic terminology of the 'Abbāsid age. Attempts to write anything on or related to philosophy in *zabān-i-darīh* found little encouragement. Few if any continued the practice. What has survived from subsequent periods is saturated with Arabic terms and expressions. By the time we reach Nāṣir el-Dīn-i-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) it is observed that he deliberately abandons Avicenna's Persian terms and adopts those he had used in his Arabic books. Nor does he pay any attention to the terminology of Sajestānī or Nāṣir Khosrow. In this manner he re-establishes the authority of the Arabic terms based on the early translations of Baghdad [2]. There were, however, two distinct periods in the life of Ṭūsī. While still an Ismā'īlī he wrote in a fairly pure Persian [3]. He appears to follow the practice of earlier Ismā'īlī authors. And when he became a Shī'ite he abandoned all that and took to Arabic terminology with a definite consistency. His style remained clearly Persian but the terms were those of the *Falāsifah*. As a student and defender of Avicenna he had not much to offer himself. His Arabic commentary on the *Ishārāt* is full of Persianisms yet the terminology is conventional. The style becomes at times highly involved and obscure. Ṭūsī was a prolific author who wrote on a variety of subjects. Theology, philosophy, mathematics and astronomy engage his attention. On all these topics he discourses consummately and instructively without much claim to originality. In spite of recent efforts in Iran to revive his memory through a systematic study of

[1] Cf. *Khān el-Ikhwān*. ed. Khashshāb. Cairo. 1940.
[2] Cf. *Asās el-Iqtibās*. ed. Raḍawī.
[3] Cf. *Taṣawwurāt*. ed. Ivanow. Leiden. 1950.

his works, the Istanbul libraries have a number of treatises still awaiting publication [1].

The language of Afḍal el-Dīn-i-Kāshānī (fl. 6/11 cent.) represents an intermediate stage between the *darīh* idiom of Nāṣir Khosrow and the conventional Arabic terminology of Ṭūsī. Not much is known about this philosophical author and commentator. An increasing number of his books are coming to light [2]. More remain in the libraries of Istanbul [3]; not to mention other repositories of ancient manuscripts. It is believed that like Ṭūsī to whom he was closely related, he was originally an Ismāʿīlī. Whether he likewise renounced his affiliation to this heterodoxy later in life is not definitely known. On the basis of his extant writings Afḍal el-Dīn (better known as Bābā Afḍal) may be considered among the few who wrote philosophy in a mixture of *darīh* and modern Persian. He persists in using terms of Iranian origin and roots in the fashion of Avicenna, Sajestānī and Nāṣir Khosrow but not so rigorously and consistently. In consequence he does not sound so archaic to the modern reader. That is why so eminent a poet like the modern editor of his commentary on the Aristotelian *De Anima* [4] has such high praise for his style. He is not in any sense original in his choice of words. No new terms were coined by him as far as we know. What makes his writings appear more engaging and comprehensible is the fact that he frequently gives the *darīh* expression and its equivalent Arabic term side by side. This is of special value in this discussion. It helps to trace the history of philosophical language in Persian. In fact he is explicit in distinguishing between the *darīh* idiom and the Arabic. In one connection he says *"kaifa . . .* is termed *chūnīh* in the *darīh* language [5]".* This statement puts us in a position to assert that at his time *darīh* was still a distinctly specified genre fully recognised in literary estimations. Furthermore it helps us to form some idea of what constitutes *darīh*, at least as far as philosophical language is concerned. The measure of purity(by which we mean the percentage of Persian words as compared to the Arabic) is not in itself a definite criterion. It can easily

    [1] Cf. Aya Sofya No. 2048; Köprülü. No. 1589.
    [2] Cf. *Muṣannafāt-i-Afḍal el-Dīn-i-Kāshānī.* ed. Minowī and Mehdawī. 2 Vol.
    [3] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 4811; Köprülü. No. 1589. Nuruosmaniye. 4931.
    [4] Cf. *Risāleh-ye-Nafs-i-Arisṭuṭālīs.* ed. Bahār. Isfahan. 1954.
    [5] *Muṣannafāt . . .* Vol. I. p. 219.

vary in different cases without necessarily departing from the original genre. It would perhaps be more correct and convenient to base our judgement on the technical terms concerned. Where they are of pure Persian origin as coined by Avicenna, Nāṣir Khosrow and others, the language may be considered *zabān-i-darīh*; and where the terminology is Arabic as established by the Baghdad translators and the *Falāsifah* who followed them, the language may be taken as modern Persian. To call it *fārsīh* is not quite correct because *fārsīh* is sometimes applied to *darīh* as well.

In his works on logic, psychology and metaphysics Bābā Afḍal repeatedly resorts to the practice of giving the *darīh* and Arabic terms together as equivalents. We thus have:

fesād wa tabāhīh — ra'y-i-sutūdeh wa al-ra'y al-maḥmūd — beham āmadan wa i'tilāf — nāmīh wa fazāyandeh — az quwwathāshān yā az kār-kardeshān — pāyandegīh wa baqā — bālīdan wa nemow — nemow wa fazāyesh.

Although his modern editors have produced good editions of his chief philosophical works, he awaits a competent scholar ready to make a thorough study of him. By giving him his due in both the literary and philosophical fields he might grow in stature. We believe he will come to occupy a more important position than he is generally given nowadays. His writings abound in happy phrases. The fact that he was rationally inclined is testified by such statements as: *"Har quwwatī ke be-khirad yāfteh shawad adab wa farhang khānand* [1]*".*

If Suhrawardī (d. 578/1191) drew freely on the religion of ancient Iran in propounding his Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, his style was no less influenced by the language of that country. Yet he adopted Arabic terminology in almost all of his philosophical works. His vocabulary abounds in abstractions which are the direct result of Persian, but he does not attempt to write in *darīh*. This is because his chief works on logic and metaphysics are in Arabic and there was no occasion for him to use the *darīh* terms coined by his predecessors. He perhaps much more than Avicenna is a Persian writing in Arabic. If his philosophy never took root on genuine Arab soil his language was just as responsible for that as his thought. Aside from uncommon abstractions he employs adjectival forms rarely if ever met with in classical Arabic. We thus have: *"Al-jawhariyyah*

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[1]   *ibid.* p. 95.

kamālīyyat qawām al-māhiyyah wa hiya i'tibārīyyah". And again *"al-ṣurat al-idrākīyyah"*.

Curiously enough he was anxious to develop a logic of his own to be known as Ishrāqī logic. Not that he rejected Aristotelian and Stoic logic, but he suggested various modifications and additions. For these he had special terms which we have not seen elsewhere and are presumably of his coining. As for example *al-qaḍīyyat al-battātah* and *al-qaḍiyyat al-muḥīṭah*. In his discussion of syllogisms he repeatedly speaks of the Ishrāqī principles (*qā'idat al-Ishrāqīyyīn*) as distinct from the Aristotelian. In one section he tries to prove that the Peripetetic views on conversion (*al-'aks*) are false.

The special terminology of Suhrawardī (i.e. what differed from those of Avicenna) had hardly an echo in the Arab world. But they were copied by the Ishrāqīs who followed him in supporting this distinctly Iranian trend in Islamic thought. Not least among them is Shahrzūrī whose works await publication and study. The Istanbul libraries have more than one manuscript of his *Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā'* [1], of his *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ* [2], of the *Al-Shajarat al-Ilāhīyyah* [3], and of the *Kitāb al-Rumūz wa al-Amthāl* [4].

The allegorical tales of Suhrawardī [5] stand in a class apart. They are in a fairly pure Persian, but their terminology belongs to the literature of mysticism which does not concern us here.

Although learning and scholarship managed to exercise influence, originality of thought and expression suffered a severe setback from Suhrawardī onwards. A number of minor logicians and philosophers continued to appear here and there in Iran. These either wrote exclusively or chiefly in Arabic. There was Athīr el-Dīn el-Abharī (d. 663/1264); then 'Aḍad el-Dīn el-Ījī (d. 756/1355); then Quṭb el-Dīn el-Shīrāzī (d. 766/1365); then Sa'd el-Dīn el-Taftāzānī (d. 791/1389); then Seyyid Sharīf el-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413). Their works are well represented in the manuscript libraries of Istanbul. Some have been repeatedly published [6]. Perhaps the most interesting among them as far as this study is concerned was 'Umar ibn Sahlān el-Sāwī who as a devoted disciple of Avicenna rated him far

[1] Cf. Yeni Cami. No. 908; Ragip Paşa. No. 990.

[2] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 2128; Üniversite. No. 3360.

[3] Cf. Esat Efendi. No. 1926; Üniversite. No. 2824. Sultan Ahmet III. 3223.

[4] Cf. Veliyuddin. No. 2182, 3233.

[5] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 1863, 4821. Ragip Paşa. No. 1480.

[6] Cf. Brockelmann. *G.A.L.*

above everybody else. In a special treatise apparently as yet unedited [1] he attacks Abū el-Barakāt in the strongest terms for failing to understand Avicenna properly. Sahlān el-Sāwī wrote on logic and metaphysics in both Arabic and Persian. He has also a continuation of the history of the philosophers first begun by the Sajistānī of Baghdad and later completed by Beihaqī [2]. Although the manuscripts are not specific on that point [3], the authorship of this continuation of the history may be confidently attributed to Sahlān el-Sāwī. Some of his Arabic works and especially the *al-Baṣā'ir* [4] were published long ago. Now his Persian treatises on logic are being carefully edited [5]. As the list at the end of Dr. Dānish-Pajūh's edition shows [6], Sāwī adopted the Arabic terminology of Avicenna rather than the *darīh* terms of his *Dānish-Nāmeh*. This was because by that time Arabic had reasserted its supremacy for various reasons. Yet his style is remarkably clear. The sentences are short and precise. Occasionally he has happy terms of Iranian origin but they are not his own. They are obviously derived from his predecessors.

In the field of ethics the quest after terms of Iranian origin is far less rewarding. The different works on the subject stemmed from three separate sources. First came the *pand-nāmeh* of which there were various specimens in Pahlawī literature, and which we find so ably reflected in the *Jāvīdān Khirad* [7] of Miskawaih. Then they had the Arabic translations of Aristotelian ethics supplemented by Stoic, Neoplatonic and Peripatetic treatises. And third were manuals of Muslim religious teachings. The last two seem to have imposed their Arabic terminology in a manner that left little scope for any Persian terms which may have come by way of the *pand-nāmeh*. Consequently almost all Persian works on ethics abound in Arabic terms. Occasionally we find departures from the general rule but they are not consistently maintained. Books like the *Kīmīā-ye-Saʿādat* [8] of Ghazālī, the *Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī* [9] of Ṭūsī,

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[1] Cf. *Nahaj el-Taqaddus*. Revan Köşkü. No. 2042.
[2] Cf. ed. of Muḥammad Shafīʿ and Kurd ʿAlī separately.
[3] Cf. Köprülü. No. 902; Haci Beşir Ağa. No. 494.
[4] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 2483; Lâleli. No. 2560.
[5] *Tabṣareh*. ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānish-Pajūh. Tehran. 1337. A.H.
[6] Cf. *ibid.*
[7] Cf. Aya Sofya No. 1747 and other copies; ed. Badawi.
[8] ed. J. Humā'īh.
[9] Cf. Fatih. No. 5412 and other copies; various editions.

and the subsequent renditions of Dawwānī[1] almost invariably employ Arabic terms whether philosophical or of religious provenance. The libraries of Istanbul contain numerous Persian treatises on ethics[2] and morals yet the terminology is practically the same.

Linguistically a little more interesting are mathematical, astronomical and alchemical works. In these the terminology is generally Arabic but not without stray contributions from Persian. In a treatise on Indian arithmetic[3] we find a few useful terms and expressions which could easily be revived to-day. The mathematical manuals of people like Ṭūsī[4] are predominantly Arabic in terminology because they are based on Greek mathematics in the form in which they were translated in 'Abbāsid times[5] as well as Arabic books on the subject written by Iranians. These are believed to contain new and original materials as in the mathematical tractates of 'Umar Khayyām but there was obviously no attempt to write mathematics in the *darīh* idiom if that indeed were possible.

On astronomy a prize work has apparently escaped us. In a manuscript collection at Nuruosmaniye library[6] there is an interesting treatise on the subject. In the introduction we find it stated that "this is a book which Māhānkard translated. He who translated the astronomical books of Zoroaster in the days of Abū Muslim the possessor of rule. He said I translated this book from among the books of Zoroaster . . . and I did not come across any . . . containing the philosophical sciences . . . For when Alexander conquered the kingdom of Darius the king, he had them all translated into the Greek language. Then he burnt the original copies which were kept in the treasure-houses of Darius, and killed , everyone whom he thought might be keeping away any of them. Except that some books were saved through the protection of those who safeguarded them. And he who could escaped from Alexander by running away to the islands of the seas and the mountain tops. Then when they returned to their homes after the death of Alexander they put into writing those parts that they had memorized. What they wrote down from memory was fragmentary.

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[1] numerous MSS. at Istanbul.
[2] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 258, 1747, 2704, 2830, 4807; Köprülü. No. 1589.
[3] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 3336.
[4] Cf. *Jāmi' el-Ḥisāb.* Aya Sofya. No. 2728; also Aya Sofya 2754.
[5] Cf. Aya Sofya No. 4830, 4832 contain a number of as yet unedited mathematical translations.
[6] No. 2800.

Much of it had passed away and little had remained. So Māhānkard translated what still survived by his time—when the rule of the Persians fell to the Arabs. And the translations which he made from these was from the language of the *dīn-dabīreh* to the language of Persian *darīh* (*al-lughat al-fārisisīyyah al-darīyyah*). Then later Saʿīd ibn Khurāsān-khurreh translated them into the Arabic language in order that this science should not fall into dessuetude and its outlines should not be wiped away . . . Māhānkard translated it for Māhūyeh ibn Māhānāhīd the Marzbān . . . When Sunbād the Ispahbud saw that the language of the Persians had lost its usage and the language of the Arabs had outstripped other languages . . . he wished that this mystery [i.e. of astronomy] should be exposed in the Arabic language in order that its knowledge may be rendered more easy . . . and these two books used to be handled by the treasure-keepers and read in the *dīn-nāmeh* [1]".

Various historical facts may be deduced from this passage. What concerns us is the further evidence that Persian *darīh* was a specific idiom known as such to Iranians and Arabs alike. And that there were books on astronomy in that idiom containing presumably its own *darīh* terminology. Of this, however, little seems to have survived for in the Arabic rendering of Khurāsān-khurreh there are few terms of Persian origin. The more commonly used are *al-nemūdār* which in plural becomes *al-nemūdārāt*; then *al-hilāj* and *al-kadkhodā* which in an adjectival form become *al-hilājīyyah* and *al-kadkhodāʾīyyah*. One category of stars are designated as *al-kawākeb al-biyābānīyyah*. This may refer to the planets which the translators of Baghdad had rendered into *al-mutuḥaiyyerah*. And *al-rūzāhang* is given as the name of the largest of the fixed stars. In the *majmūʿah* wherein this treatise is found the first is in Persian and also on astronomy yet the terminology is almost invariably in Arabic. The fourth is a curious Arabic treatise entitled *Kitāb al-Darajāt al-Maʿrūfah be Banī Mūsa ibn Shākir*. Whether it was executed by a member of this famous family of ʿAbbāsid Baghdad or simply translated at their command is not clear. It purports to be *manqūlan min ḥukamāʾ al-Hind wa kutubihim*. The contents could be more correctly described as astrological; and were copied at a much earlier date than the rest of the volume. The paper and script are older and seem to have been accidentally bound up with

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[1] the MS. dated 658. A.H. copied in the town of Sīwās.

the other treatises in one single tome. The introduction to astronomy commonly called *Madkhal Kūshyār* [1] by a man whose name betrays an Iranian origin [2] is in Arabic though it employs the Persian astronomical terms mentioned above. And if Bērūnī feels compelled to resort to Persian in certain parts of his *Qānūn al-Masʿūdī* [3] it is because the astronomical terms had been already established. In the *Kitāb al-Tafhīm fī al-Nujūm* [4] the tables are in his mother-tongue. He was only following the general practice. Otherwise he insisted that Persian was linguistically incapable of developing a scientific language of its own [5]. There is, however, a Persian translation of the *Kitāb al-Tafhīm* well worthy of publication [6].

Of Persian works on alchemy there is a representative collection in the library of Haci Beşir Ağa [7]. Here we have a number of treatises by Tankalūshāh-i-Bābulī referred to in the *Fihrist*, and by various others. Though the contents are somewhat intriguing the terminology is generally in Arabic and of no great novelty. The subject is treated in prose as well as in poetry.

Scientific and medical books in Persian also deserve some attention although this study is not directly concerned with them. Of the voluminous compilation of Dioscorides on plants there had been more than one Arabic translation. The libraries of Istanbul contain a number of manuscript copies of the early translation executed in ʿAbbāsid Baghdad [8]. Among them is a copy of particular interest to us [9]. Aside from the fact that it is beautifully written with some remarkable hand-painted illustrations, it is immediately followed by a Persian version of the book. The copy of the Arabic translation is dated 866 A.H. and the Persian rendering is said to have been made in 876 A.H. i.e. one year later. The terminology is worthy of note. While Arabic terms predominate Greek and Syriac names are frequently introduced. The translator admits that he knew neither of these two languages and that he

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[1] Cf. Aya Sofya No. 4840; Revan Köşkü. No. 1708; Esat Ef. No. 2004; Haci Selim Ağa. Uskudar. No. 741.

[2] Abū al-Ḥasan Kūshyār ibn Labbān ibn Yāshahrī al-Jabalī.

[3] Cf. Yusuf Aga. Qonya Museum. No. 110.

[4] Cf. Sultan Ahmet. III. No. 3477, 3478.

[5] Cf. *Kitāb al-Ṣaidalah*. Kursunluoglu. Bursa. No. 153.

[6] Cf. Nuruosmaniye. No. 2780.

[7] No. 649. Süleymaniye Library.

[8] Cf. Aya Sofya Nos. 3702-3704; Sultan Ahmet. Nos. 2127, 2147.

[9] Sultan Ahmet. No. 2147.

met with many difficulties in his work. He obviously relied on the Arabic rendering, but seems to have attempted some acquaintance with either the original Greek text or with a Syriac version of it. Furthermore he does make a serious and consistent effort to use as many terms of Iranian origin as possible. He happens to find some happy equivalents for the Arabic terms and plant-names. This, however, could hardly justify considering the work as a whole in the *darīh* idiom. Having chosen terminology as a criterion it might be more correct to call it a good and rather chaste specimen of New Persian.

Persian books on medicine are numerous. Perhaps the most interesting from the purely linguistic point of view is the *Dhakhīreh-ye-Khārazmshāhī* (written in 504/1110) by Ismāᶜīl al-Jurjānī. In copies of this work also the libraries of Istanbul are quite rich [1]. The introduction to this encyclopeadia of medical science leaves little doubt that the author was making a deliberate attempt to v:rite in the *darīh* idiom. Modelled on the *Qānūn* of Avicenna, and with frequent quotations from him, Rāzī, Ibn Hindū and various others, he clearly states that "it was written in Pārsīh in order that by the blessings of his rule [i.e. of his patron Quṭb el-Dīn-i-Khārazmshāh] the usefulness of this book may be extended to everyone". This clearly indicates that in his time at least there were men in the medical profession who were not sufficiently conversant with Arabic. The book is followed by a *Qarabādin* and a *Tatimmeh-ye-Dhakhīreh*. It is further added that "although this service came to be rendered in *Pārsīh* there are [in it] Arabic terms which are well-known, and the meaning of which most people understand, and which in Arabic it is more easy to express. Such a term was recorded in Arabic so as to avoid a laboured style, and in order that it should be more fluent to the tongue . . . The majority of the terms, however, have been stated in *Pārsīh* so that nothing should remain undisclosed". In this context and on the basis of the work as a whole the designation *Pārsīh* can be justifiably equated with the *darīh* idiom. In fact it may well be supposed that the author had a personal preference for it with an inner desire to help its propagation. He at the same time found it convenient. The language is fairly pure and therefore of linguistic value. Since he frequently gives both the Arabic term with its Persian equivalent, useful comparisons

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[1] Cf. Fatih. No. 3557; Sultan Ahmet No. 1963 and many others.

can be made. We have not gone through the entire work, but judging from those parts which we have read it is doubtful that the author contributed any terms of his own. He cannot be credited with any, though he shows a marked preference for the *darīh* forms. He speaks of the "*gowhar-i-tan, cheh-chīzīh, che-gūnegīh, narīh wa mādegīh, gūneh, nā-sāzandeh, nā-sāzandegīh, tabāh-sha-wandeh, jāygāh, kūshandeh, peywandegīh, yek-sān wa mutushābih*". Although he uses both *māddeh* and *māyeh*, he prefers the latter which is historically the earlier form. He says "*īn chahār māyeh-rā be tāzī arkān gūyand wa 'anāṣur*". We also find archaisms such as *zafān* for *zabān*. Of these a few may be due to the influence of some special dialect.

Another medical book in the library of Aya Sofya can claim a place in the history of Persian technical terminology. There are two books on anatomy lying there. The first [1] is in ordinary New Persian and not of great linguistic significance. The second [2] is a unique manuscript which deserves careful study. Its existence was announced to the learned world a few years ago. Although the title is simply given as *The Book of Anatomy* [3] it appears to be a compendium of Chinese medicine translated into Persian. Chinese terms appear in abundance. The method of their transcription into Persian should be of added interest to specialists. The terminology, however, is mainly in Arabic yet in some cases the *darīh* is preferred. Since a careful edition of this work is being definitely planned we need not go into further details. The introduction to the book is particularly instructive. It throws light on the cultural relations between China and Iran.

In literary and historical works attention is naturally directed to the vocabulary. Generally speaking there is no technical terminology involved. We have in this connection come across what seems to be another unique manuscript this time lying in the library of Topkapi-sarayi [4]. It is a translation of the *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* in what is specifically stated to be *darīh* Persian. It is different from the version of Abū al-Ma'ālī Naṣr al-Allah ibn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd executed at the order of Bahrām Shāh of Ghaznah [5] in the 12th. century; or

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[1] *Kitāb al-Tashrīḥ.* Aya Sofya. No. 3598.

[2] Aya Sofya. No. 3596.

[3] *Kitāb al-Tashrīḥ.*

[4] Yeniler No. 4774.

[5] Of this book there are numerous MS. copies at Istanbul.

the much later and far less faithful rendering of Ḥusain Wāʿiẓ-i-Kāshefī in the 16th. century under the title of *Anwār-i-Suheilī* [1]. As far as we know this little volume has escaped the attention of scholars so far. The translator gives his name as Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd Allah al-Bukhārī and the work was undertaken at the request of Atābak Abū al-Muẓaffar Ghāzī ibn Zangī ibn Aqsunqar, the Seljuk prince of Damascus [2]. Since this ruler came to power when his father ʿImād al-Dīn Zangī ibn Aqsunqar was killed in 541/1146 A.D. and he himself died in 544/1149 A.D. [3], the translation must have been completed sometime between these two dates. The princes were among the Atābaks of Mawṣil whose sway extended over Damascus and Aleppo. The manuscript is dated 644. A.H. i.e. almost exactly a hundred years after the completion of the work. Little is known about the translator himself but he claims to have written other books as well [4]. In the introduction he explains the circumstances in which the work was undertaken. "The translator . . . looked into the state of this book which had been rendered into the language of Pārs from the language of the Greeks; and to the beginning of which the story of Burzūyeh, the physician, was added. And since it had been interpreted from the language of Pārs which is an obscure language into the Arabic tongue which is the most accomplished of languages . . . the sovereign ordered me to translate it into the *darīh* tongue. I also added an introduction to it [5]". From the above remarks it is gathered that to the translator the original text was believed to be Greek and not Indian, though he later describes the manner in which it was brought from India to Iran. Furthermore reference is made to the language of Pārs which in this context means Pahlawī. He admits that that had become *ghāmiḍ* i.e. obscure and difficult to understand. This describes the state of Pahlawī in his days, as well as the esteem in which Arabic was held presumably because of its religious associations. Finally we have yet another evidence of the existence of *darīh* as a specific idiom, and of its propagation at the court of a Seljuk ruler in Damascus. Hence the geographical limits of *darīh*

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[1] there is more than one edition of this book.

[2] Cf. Folio 15.

[3] Cf. E. de Zambaur. *Manuel de Genealogie et de Chronologie pour l'Histoire de l'Islam.* pp. 226-227.

[4] Cf. Folio 9b.

[5] Folio 13b.

extended beyond the strict boundaries of Iran, whether to the East or the West. It was appreciated by kings and courtiers who never claimed an Iranian origin.

This rendering of the *Kalīlah wa Dimnah* might be edited in all its archaisms and peculiar orthography [1]. Once the work is completed it can be profitably compared with the better-known and highly valued rendering of Naṣr Allah ibn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd of which there are some beautifully illustrated copies at Istanbul [2]. Should a list of its special vocabulary be drawn up as expected, we shall be in a position to determine what constitutes a *darīh* text as .distinct from the ordinary New Persian which is the language of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd's version. Even a hasty glance can disclose phrases couched in pure Persian worthy to be revived amidst the confusion and uncertainty which are such marked features of literary Persian to-day. And when compared to the pompous verbosity of *Anwār-i-Suheilī* we are made painfully aware of the sad decline in taste.

In Qur'anic exegesis we have the translation of Ṭabarī's well-known work. Of this the first volume has been edited under the title of *Tarjumeh-ye-Tafsīr-i-Ṭabarī* [3]. The introduction to this valuable specimen of early Persian prose specifies that it was a joint undertaking embarked upon in compliance with the wish of the Sāmānian prince Manṣūr ibn Nūḥ. The names of the translators are given [4]. It may be supposed that they represent the leading literary figures of their part of the country and epoch. What is important to note here is the fact that it is expressly stated to be in the *darīh* idiom [5]. There is a consistent attempt to use as few Arabic words as possible, though it is by no means in pure Persian. We thus have a genuine example of *darīh* prose emanating from Transoxiana for our consideration.

The translation of Ṭabarī's monumental history, on the other hand, executed on the orders of the same Sāmānian prince Manṣūr ibn Nūḥ by Abū 'Alī al-Bal'amī, is not specifically stated to be in *darīh*. The work ends with the plain remark that "this book was compiled by Abū Ja'far . . . al-Ṭabarī in Arabic, and was translated

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[1]   by the Librarian of Topkapi-sarayi.
[2]   Cf. Revan Kosku No. 1023 and other copies at Topkapi; Huseyin Çelebi. Bursa. No. 768; Manisa Library. No. 2748.
[3]   ed. Ḥabīb Yaghmā'ī. Teheran. 1339. A.H.
[4]   Cf. *ibid*. p. 6.
[5]   Cf. *ibid*. p. 5.

into *Pārsīh* by Abū ʿAlī ... ʿAbd Allāh al-Balʿamī, the vizier of Abū Ṣāliḥ Manṣūr ibn Nūḥ ... al-Sāmānī [1]". Hence the translation of this history of which there are excellent manuscripts in the libraries of Istanbul [2] is said to be in the *Pārsīh* style and language. Here again *Pārsīh* must be equated with *darīh*. This should not be considered a general rule. The two terms are not synonymous in every case. There seems, however, little doubt that in their effort to revive Iranian life and letters the Sāmānians chose the *darīh* idiom and openly encouraged its propagation. They must have had good reasons for this deliberate act of choice. None was better than the fact that it was the nearest and most faithful to the spirit and letter of the original tongue of the Iranians. To that may be added the constant fear that Arabic should eventually eliminate Persian completely as a medium of serious literature.

Having cast a rapid glance at Persian technical terminology and a corresponding literary and historical vocabulary, we return to philosophical literature. This is in order to assess a series of treatises attributed to Avicenna and written not in the *darīh* idiom like his *Dānish-Nāmeh* but in ordinary New Persian. These writings as found in the Istanbul libraries [3] pose a definite problem. Are they to be accepted as authentic works ? And if so does that mean that he wrote in both *darīh* and New Persian what he chose to translate from his chief Arabic books ? They contain little that is new. In fact they are mostly paraphrases from the *Shifā* with elaborations meant to clarify and explain different points. It is hard to believe that Avicenna deemed it advisable or convenient to write in both idioms. There was no special reason for that. He had already established his position as the leading philosopher of the time by his numerous Arabic works. At the request of the ruler of Isphahān he had produced a rendering of the *Najāt* in *darīh* Persian. This was also the chosen idiom of the Sāmānians in Transoxiana. For whom then did he wish to write in New Persian ? Such considerations incline us to the belief that the abovementioned treatises were never written by himself. They are the work of students and disciples falsely attributed to the master in order to gain authority and acceptance. There have indeed been many such cases. And

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[1] Cf. MS. Aya Sofya. No. 3054.

[2] Cf. Aya Sofya. Nos. 3049-3054. For copies at Topkapi-sarayi Cf. F. E. Karatay. *Topkapi... Farsca Yazmalar Katalogu.* Istanbul. 1961.

[3] Cf. Aya Sofya. Nos. 3629, 4829; Fatih. No. 5426.

because there was nothing in them that was contrary to the teachings of Avicenna, they could easily pass as his own. Only occasionally do we find the name of the translator specified [1].

Side by side with these miscellaneous treatises bearing the name of Avicenna are a host of others written by minor authors without any claim to originality [2]. The point to stress in this connection is that they are all in New Persian, employing the established Arabic terminology with hardly any alterations. All attempts to write in *darīh* appear to be permanently discarded. This is best exemplified in the writings of Dawwānī of which there are numerous manuscripts in Istanbul [3]. Literary historians may be tempted to explain the reasons which brought about the total eclipse of *darīh*. For our purpose it is sufficient to take note of this unexpected development which must have disappointed the enthusiasts at the court of the Sāmānian dynasty. But neither they nor their patrons lived to witness this important change in style and language.

Reference should be made in this connection to yet another work found in the Aya Sofya library [4]. This is a voluminous compilation entitled *Kitāb Aghrāḍ al-Siāsah fī 'Ilm al-Riāsah*. Although the title is in Arabic the book itself is in a pleasant style of New Persian. The author gives his name as Muḥammad ibn 'Alī . . . al-Ẓahīr, al-Kātib al-Samarqandī; and states that he undertook the work at the request of his patron Abū al-Muẓaffar Qulij Ṭumghāj. The manuscript which may well be unique is unfortunately incomplete. It is, however, quite old and fairly legible at the same time. Whoever the author or his patron may have been, the compilation contains useful and interesting materials which are well worth study and publication. The language is not in *darīh* though there is frequent use of terms derived from pure Persian roots.

Mullā Ṣadrā was by common consent Persia's outstanding philosopher in modern times. Yet he chose to write most of his books in Arabic. In these he employs the already traditional terminology of the Translators and the *Falāsifah*. What distinguishes his writings from those of his predecessors is the excessive use of abstractions some of which are not met with elsewhere. As in the case of Avicenna this was due to the direct influence of Persian.

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[1] Cf. Topkapi-sarayi. Sultan Ahmet. III. No. 3063.

[2] Cf. Aya Sofya. No. 4811; Fatih. No. 5297; Ragip Paşa. No. 1734.

[3] Cf. Ragip Paşa. No. 1478.

[4] No. 2844.

APPENDIX ONE

1. The different equivalents coined for the copula:

τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 1019 a 4)	الهوّية (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 998 b 23)	الكينونة (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 993 b 31)	الايسيّة (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 1042 b 28)	الأنّية (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι καί μή εἶναι	(Metaph. 1006 a 4)	الاثبات والنفى (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 991 a 2)	الموجود (نظيف)
τό εἶναι	(D. An. 412 b 8)	أنّه (اسحق)
τό ἔστι	(Metaph. 1042 b 25)	الأيس (اسطاث)
τό μή εἶναι	(Metaph. 1043 a 1)	لا أنّية (اسطاث)
τό μή εἶναι	(Metaph. 1010 a 17)	أنّه ليس (اسطاث)
τό ὄν	(Metaph. 1005 a 13)	الهوّية (اسطاث)
τῶν ὄντων	(Metaph. 994 a 2)	الاكوان (اسطاث)
ᾗ ὄν	(Metaph. 1003 a 30)	بالكنه (اسطاث)
μή ὄν	(Metaph. 1027 b 29)	الذى ليس هو (اسطاث)
τό μή ὄν	(Metaph. 1004 b 28)	الذى ليس بهويّة (اسطاث)
τό ὄν	(Top. 121 a 21)	الموجود (دمشقى)

2. Different renderings of the Aristotelian *Categories*:

The Greek: οὐσία — ποσόν — ποιόν — πρός τι — ποῦ — ποτέ — κεῖσθαι — ἔχειν — ποιεῖν — πάσχειν.

The Latin: *substantia — quantum — quale — ad aliquid — ubi — quando — poni — habere — facere — pati.*

The earliest rendering into Arabic by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [1]: العين – عدد
– الصنعة – المضاف – الاين – متى – النصبة – الجدة – الفعل – المفعول .

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[1]   According to the MS. of the St. Joseph University. Beirut.

The rendering of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain in his translation of the treatise: جوهر – كَمْ – كيف – اضافة – اين – متى – موضوع – ان يكون له – يفعل – ينفعل .

The rendering of Dimashqī in his translation of the *Topica* (103 b 20). ماهو الشيىء – الكَمْ – الكيف – المضاف – اين – متى – النصبة – له – يفعل – ينفعل .

The list of categories according to Kindī [1]: الجوهر – كيّة – كيفيّة – اضافة –
اين – متى – فاعل – منفعل – له – وضع اى نصبة الشيىء .

The list as given in the *Epistles* of the Brethren [2]: الجوهر – الكَمْ – الكيف –
– المضاف – الاين – متى – النصبة (الوضع) – الملكة – يفعل – ينفعل .

The list as given by Avicenna [3]: – الجوهر – الكَمْ – الكيف – الاضافة – الاين –
متى – الوضع – الملك – الفعل – الانفعال .

The list in Persian as given by Avicenna [4]: – جوهر – چندى – چگونگى –
اضافت – كجائى – كيىْ – نهاد – داشت – كنش – بكنيدن .

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[1] *Rasā'il* ... p. 266.
[2] Vol. I. p. 323.
[3] *Najāt*. p. 80.
[4] *Dānish-nāmeh*.

APPENDIX TWO

A review in some detail of a few of the more important terms of logic and philosophy. This shows the manner in which they were tentatively chosen, then gradually approved and accepted by other translators. In the final stage they were established through their usage by the *Falāsifah*, resulting in an almost universal adoption by successors.

1. ADAB

This happy term which is not of Qur'anic origin appears to have found its way into philosophical language at an early date. Among the translators we have:

παιδεῖα	(Rhet. 1365 b 34)	الادب (مجهول)
ἀπαιδευσία	(Metaph. 1006 a 6)	قلّة ادب (اسطاث)
ἀπαίδευτοι	(Metaph. 1043 b 24)	على غير طريقة الادب (اسطاث)
πεπαιδεῦσθαι	(Metaph. 995 a 12)	ان يتأدب (اسحق)
φρόνησις	(Top. 116 b 28)	الادب (دمشقى)
φρόνιμός	(Top. 116 a 12)	الرجل الاديب (دمشقى)

Among the early *kātibs* who actually may have been the first to introduce it into the language, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [1] uses: – ادب – المؤبون

الادب يجلو العقل – جلّ الادب بالمنطق :[2] Ibn al-Muqaffa' says التأديب.

Among the *Falāsifah* the word is hardly ever used by Kindi. But Fārābī states [3]: التأديب هو طريق and again [4]: الذى يورث العقل هو الادب اجاد الفضائل ألخلقيّة والصناعات العلميّة. In the *Rasā'il* of the Brethren of Sincerity [5] it is remarked that تقوّى باارياضيّات فكرها وتنير ... الانفس الجزئيّة بالآداب خواطرها. Subsequent to these authors, and in the works of Avicenna particularly *adab* becomes an established term of philosophy. A parallel development brought about its use in literature

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[1] Cf. *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā'*. ed. Kurd 'Alī. pp. 173-210; 218-226.
[2] Cf. *Kalīlah wa Dimnah*. ed Ṭāhā Ḥusain and A. 'Azzām. Cairo. 1941.
[3] Cf. *Talkhīṣ Nawāmīs Aflāṭūn*. ed. Gabrieli. p. 19.
[4] Cf. *Taḥṣīl al-Sa'ādah*. ed. Hyderabad. p. 29.
[5] Vol. 3. p. 28.

until it came to represent belles-lettres in general, together with various other connotations [1]. To-day its meanings are varied as they are numerous.

In Persian it first had the sense of learning. In the *Qābūs-Nāmeh* [2], written when Iran was still bilingual, دانش وادب are used as synonyms. Later it came to mean education and culture in the broadest sense. Bābā Afḍal asserts [3] that: هر قوّتی که بخرد یافته شود ،
ادب وفرهنگ خوانند .

2. AL-IRĀDAH

This is a Qur'anic word which was given a specific connotation in philosophical language that it did not possess in the original. The Translators used it for the following Greek equivalent:

ἡ βούλησις	(Top. 146 b 6)	الارادة (دمشقى)
ἡ βούλησις	(Top. 126 a 13)	مشيئة („) ( )
ἡ βούλησις	(D. An. 414 b 2)	الارادة (اسحق)
to note ἡ βούλησις	(D. An. 433 a 23)	الروّية (اسحق)

It already appears in the sense of will-power in the writings of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd [4] and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [5]. The Translators who were generally much indebted to these two authors may have copied this special meaning of the word from them, though there is no direct evidence to that effect.

Among the *Falāsifah* we find Kindī defining it thus [6]: الارادة قوّة يقصد بها الشيىء دون الشيىء، Fārābī enlarges upon that statement [7]: الارادة . . . نزوع الى ما ادرك و عن ما ادرك ، امّا بالحسّ و امّا بالتخيّل و امّا بالقوّة الناطقة. Avicenna goes further [8]: . . . : الارادات كلّها كائنة بعد ما لم تكن. Averroes is vague when saying [9]: تحدث بحدوث علل هى الموجبات و الدواعى. but likes to specify [10] that الارادة هى شوق الفاعل الى الفعل الفلاسفة ايس ينفون

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[1] Cf. *Adab* in Encyclop. of Islam. New Edition.
[2] ed. Levy. p. 21.
[3] Cf. *Muṣannafāt*.... ed. Mīnowī. p. 95.
[4] Cf. *Rasāʾil al-Bulaghāʾ*.
[5] *Kalīlah*... p. 178.
[6] *Rasāʾil*... ed. Abū Rīdah. Vol. I. p. 168.
[7] *Madīnat al-Fāḍilah*.
[8] *Al-Najāt*. p. 300.
[9] *Tahāfot*... p. 9.
[10] *ibid*. p. 438.

الارادة عن البارى . . . و لايثبتون له الارادة البشريّة Suhrawardī [1] distinguishes
between: الارادة الكلّية . . . الارادة الجزئيّة Mullā Ṣadrā [2] tells of the differ-
ences in opinion when viewed as a religio-philosophical problem.

وقع الخلاف . . . فى معنى الارادة . . . فالاشاعرة فسرّوا . . . بانها صفة مخصّصة . . .

و هى مغايرة للعلم والقدرة . . . المعتزلة . . . فسرّوا الارادة باعتقاد النفع والكراهة . . .
Jīlī (Chapt. 18) and Tahānawī (I. p. 552 ff.) give detailed ex-
planations.

In an adjectival form there is the case of:

ἑκούσις   (Nich. Eth. IX. 9)   ارادّى (مجهول)

and then:

βουλητόν   (Metaph. 1072 a 28)   المراد (متّى)

Avicenna gives the Persian equivalent [3] as خواست and Nāṣir
Khosrow [4] follows him saying: ارادت . . . اعنى خواست.

3. ANA, ANĪY, ANĪYYAH, ANĀ'IYYAH, ANĀNĪYYAH

These are a set of mystic terms which have been often confused
with philosophical terminology somewhat similar in orthography
though entirely different in sense.

For the first, Sarrāj says [5]: انا لايقول الّا اﷲ and Suhrawardī
adds [6]: انا . . . شيىء، ادرك ذاته. It stands for the distinctive self, the
ego, 'le moi'.

The second connotes a state pertaining to self. It is mostly if not
exclusively used by Ḥallāj. In one place he remarks [7]: لا توّق عنى ان
كنت انّى. In another [8] it is stated انظر تخلّق اسم انا فى مرتبة انّى and Mullā
Ṣadrā quotes [9] his well-known verse

بـيـنى وبينـك انّى ينـازعـنى   فارفع بلطفك انّى من البين

[1] Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. ed. H. Corbin. p. 47.
[2] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah.
[3] Cf. Dānish-Nāmeh.
[4] Khān el-Ukhwān. p. 180.
[5] Kitāb al-Lumaʿ. p. 131.
[6] Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq. p. 116.
[7] Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn. ed. Massignon. p. 18.
[8] Al-Insān āl-Kāmil... ed. Badawi.
[9] Al-Asfār al-Arbaʿah.

The third is an abstraction from the pronoun which could be rendered Iness, *l'egoité*. Again Sarrāj asserts [2] that الأنيّة and Jīlī [1] gives further explanations.

The Persian equivalent as given by Nāṣir Khosrow [3] was *mani*, on the analogy of the Arabic term.

The fourth is only a different form of the abstraction, frequently used by Suhrawardī as in the case of [4] مثال الانائيّة and again [5] مدرك

لانائيّته Basṭāmī says [6] فنظرت بهويّته الى انائيّي فزالت.

The fifth is yet another variant of the abstraction commonly found in Ibn al-ʿArabī and other mystics [7]. Basṭāmī invoking the Deity [8] asks اسألك ان تمحوانائيّي. In modern secular literature it has the sense of egoism, selfishness.

4. ANNA, ANNĪY, ANNĪYYAH

These are philosophical terms completely different from the mystical. Because in orthography the *shaddah* is frequently left out, scholars are sometimes led astray.

The Translators used the first term for two specific purposes which should not be confused. One was as the equivalent of the Greek *to hoti* thus:

τό ὅτι (Metaph. 1027 b 32) أنّه (اسطاك)

τό ὅτι ὁ συλλογισμός (A. Post. 78 b 7) قياس أنّه (متّى)

The second example stands for what Kant called the "assertorische [9]"; and Ross has explained in like manner [10].

The other use of the term *anna* was to represent the copula which the Arabic language does not have. It was one of the numerous attempts to find an equivalent for that purpose. We thus have:

τό εἶναι (D. An. 412 b 8) أنّة (اسحق)

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[1] *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ.* p. 131.
[2] *Al-Insān al-Kāmil.* Chapt. 27.
[3] *Jāmiʿ al-Ḥekmatain.* p. 99.
[4] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.* p. III.
[5] *ibid.* p. 403.
[6] *Shaṭaḥāt al-Ṣūfiyyah.* ed. Badawi.
[7] *Al-Insān al-Kāmil.* ed. Badawi.
[8] *Shaṭaḥāt...* ed. Badawi.
[9] Cf. Lalande. *Vocabulaire Philosophique.*
[10] Cf. *Prior and Post. Analytics.* ed. Sir David Ross. p. 75.

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In logic the assertoric came to be known as برهان أنّ among the *Falāsifah* [1]. This was rendered into Persian by Avicenna [2] برهان هستى. In metaphysics it connoted the concept of being for which they had no word. And Avicenna says [3]: الصفة الاولى لواجب الوجود انّه أنّ و موجود.

There has been some disagreement regarding the vocalisation of this term. Following Lane [4] and Nicholson [5], we read *anna*.

The adjectival form *annīy* is not of frequent occurance. As it had obviously no Greek equivalent, its coining could not be attributed to the Translators. Yet in the Arabic version of the *Liber de Causis* [6] we find: أنّ بنوع الأنيّة فى العقل Jurjānī says [7] برهان أنّ and Mullā Ṣadrā has [8]: دليلٌ أنـّيـاً.

By far the most common in philosophical writings is the term *annīyyah* to express in the form of an abstraction the concept of being. It also connotes the thatness of a thing in contrast to its whatness (*māhīyyah*) and whyness (*limmīyyah*). Not of Qur'anic origin, it is met with in the Arabic versions of the Translators. And of these Usṭāth appears to be the first to adopt it. Actually he was presumably the person who coined it, either independently or in association with Kindī who although did not know Greek polished up the renderings of some of the Translators. Again this was used as the equivalent of more than one Greek term. Hence the necessity of making the proper distinctions which scholars have not always observed. Thus we have:

τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 1042 b 28)	الأنيّة (اسطاث)
τό μή εἶναι	(Metaph. 1043 a 1)	لا أنيّة (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(D. An. 424 a 25)	أنيّة (اسحق)
τό εἶναι	(Top. 135 a 11)	„ (دمشقى)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 1075 b 5)	„ (متى)

[1] Cf. Fārābī. *Taḥṣīl al-Saʿādah*; Avicenna. *Ishārāt.* p. 84.
[2] Cf. *Dānish-Nāmeh.*
[3] *Najāt.* p. 251.
[4] *Arabic Dictionary.*
[5] *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ...* p. 131.
[6] ed. Bardenhewer. p. 83.
[7] *Taʿrīfāt.* p. 45.
[8] *Al-Asfār...*

then:

τό ὅτι	(D. An. 413 a 13)	أنيّة (اسحق)
τόδε τι	(D. An. 410 a 14)	„ الشيى، (اسحق)
τόδε τι	(Metaph. 1070 a 11)	الذى اليه أنيّة (متّى)

and then:

τό τί ἐστιν	(D. An. 402 a 17)	أنيّة الشيى، (متّى)

and finally:

τό τί ἦν εἶναι	(Metaph. 1024 b 29)	الأنيّة (اسطاث)
τό τί ἦν εἶναι	(Metaph. 1038 b 17)	ما هو بالأنيّة (اسطاث)
τό τί ἦν εἶναι	(D. An. 412 b 11)	الأنيّة (اسحق)
τό τί ἦν εἶναι	(Top. 133 a 1)	„ (دمشقى)

and also:

τό εἶναι σημαίνει καὶ	(Metaph. 1017 a 31)	الهوّية تدلّ على أنيّة الشيى،
τό ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές		و حقيقته (اسطاث)

From the above illustrations it is seen that as the equivalent of a number of Greek terms, *anniyyah* has more than one connotation in Arabic philosophical texts.

a. In the sense of the concept of being in abstraction, we have
in the so-called *Theology* of Aristotle [1]: أنيّات المعرفة دليل على أنيّة الغاية.

b. To mean the state of being which, unable to express in
Arabic, they described as existing, Ghazālī says [2]: الأنيّة ... عبارة
and Jurjānī [4]: الأنيّة ... كون الشيى، موجوداً and Averroes [3]: عن الوجود
الأنيّة تحقّق الوجود العينّى.

c. In the sense of a separate entity independent in itself, there
is in the above-mentioned *Theology* [5]: انيّات خفيّة لانها ... الاشياء العقليّة
Kindī الانيّات العقليّة ... الانيّات الحسّية and again [6]: مبتدعة من الانيّة الاولى

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[1] ed. Badawi. p. 2.
[2] *Maqāṣid* ... p. 105.
[3] *Tahāfot* ... ed. Bouyges. p. 302.
[4] *Taʿrīfāt*. p. 39.
[5] ed. Badawi.
[6] *ibid*.

says [1]: فبدأ الأنّيّات كلّها أنّه حيّة ... هو الأنّيّة الحق ... الله Suhrawardī has [2]:

and Mullā Ṣadrā [3]: الأنّيّة الوجوديّة and again [4]: الأنّيّة الآليّة.

d. To mean essence and individuality, Avicenna says [5]: أنّته

إنّ للنفس أنّيّة and Rāzī has [6]: الشخصيّة تتحصّل من كيفيّة و كميّة و غير ذلك و ذاتاً ما. To stress that the whole thing is a purely conceptual notion, Averroes states [7]: الأنّيّة فى الحقيقة ... هى بمعنى ذهنى. In Persian, Avicenna translating from the Arabic, and unaware that *annīyyah* represented the idea of being and not existence, says [8]:

هستى ... أنّيت خوانند بتازى.

5. AYSA, AYSĪYYAH—LAYSA, LAYSĪYYAH

These two set of terms were produced in yet another attempt to find some equivalent for the copula. Not of Qur'anic origin, the affirmative form and its abstraction are rarely met with in Arabic literature. The *Lisān al-'Arab* assures us that *aysa* had long become obsolete, though it quotes al-Khalīl to the effect that at one time the Arabs used it in conversation.

Its first appearance in philosophical literature occurs in the Arabic version of the *Metaphysica* by Usṭāth. Whether he took it from the Syriac, or revived its usage in Arabic on the suggestion of Kindī who betrays an extraordinary fondness for it, is not easy to determine. Thus:

ἔστιν	(Metaph. 1043 b 25)	الايس (اسطاث)
ἔστιν	(Metaph. 1042 b 26)	ايس (اسطاث)
τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 993 b 31)	ايسيّة (اسطاث)
also τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 993 b 31)	وجود (اسحق)

by Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain who does not seem to have approved of *aysīyyah*. For the negative *laysa* which apparently is a compound of *lā* and *aysa* we have:

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[1] *Rasā'il*... p. 215.
[2] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. p. 404.
[3] *Al-Asfār*...
[4] *Rasā'il*... p. 432.
[5] *Shifā*.
[6] *Rasā'il*.. ed. Kraus. p. 24.
[7] *Tahāfot*... p. 302.
[8] *Dānish-Nāmeh*.

μή εἶναι	(Metaph. 1010 a 17)	انه ليس (اسطاث)
μή ὄν	(Metaph. 1027 b 29)	الذى ليس هو (اسطاث)
μή ὄν	(A. Pr. 49 a 24)	من جهة انه ليس (تذارى)

In the different renderings of Greek texts we have seen no use of the abstraction *laysīyyah*.

The translators who followed Usṭāth do not seem to have approved of the above-mentioned terms. *Aysa* and *aysīyyah* are almost completely dropped out. Nor did they use *laysīyyah*. Not so the *Falāsifah*. Kindī shows a passionate attachment to them, forming verbs out of them not to be found elsewhere. Thus[1]:

الله . . . ايس ابداً . . . and again[2]: الفعل الحقّى الاول تأيس الايسـات عن ليس المؤيس الكل عن ليس Fārābī neglects their use; but they are found occasionally in the *Rasāʾil* of the Brethren. In the *Shifā*[3] of Avicenna there is the distinction between تقابل الايس و الليس and again التأيس المطلق. He also has *aysīyyah* and *laysīyyah* in the same work. Averroes employs them in like manner[4].

Among literary men Tawḥīdī introduces both abstractions in his writings[5], either because of approval or in imitation of the philosophers. One complication is the unexpected appearance of *laysīyyah* in works of Islamic mysticism. Sarrāj[6] quotes Abū Yazīd (presumably al-Basṭāmī) to have claimed . . . اشرفت على ميدان الليسيّة

Some scholars have maintained that early translators and philosophers borrowed *laysīyyah,* together with a number of other terms, from the mystics. We find absolutely no justification for the claim. There is no reason to believe that Usṭāth was familiar with mystical literature. Nor was Kindī well disposed towards such writings[7].

6. TAJRUBAH

This is another example from the series of non-Qurʾanic terms which found their way into philosophical language. How it originated remains obscure. Among the Translators we have:

[1] *Rasāʾil* p. 182.
[2] *ibid.* p. 215.
[3] Paris MS. Folio. 68.
[4] *Tafsīr ma baʿd al-Ṭabīʿah.* ed. Bouyges. p. 1060.
[5] *Al-Imtāʿ*... ed. A. Amin. Vol. I. p. 123.
[6] *Kitāb al-Lumaʿ.* p. 387.
[7] Suyūṭī in *Al-Muzhir* (I. p. 301) refers to a book by Ibn Khālūyah entitled *Kitāb Laysa.* For the etymology of the word Cf. Cohen. *Le Système verbal Semitique*... pp. 85-88.

| ἡ ἐμπειρία | (A. Post. 100 a 4) | التجربة (مَتّى) |
| ἡ ἐμπειρία | (A. Pr. 46 a 19) | „ (تذارى) |

The word had been already in use in the works of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Kātib [1] and Ibn al-Muqaffa' [2]. The credit may go to them, though it is not certain. Among the *Falāsifah*, it is hardly used by Kindī. Fārābī defines it thus [3]: التجربة . . . تأمل جزئيّات الشيىء، و الحكم على . . . كليّاته *Mujarrabāt* becomes a specific term of logic to denote empirical data. Avicenna says [4]: المجرّبات . . . قضايا واحكام تتبع مشاهدات هى امور اوقع التصديق بها الحسّ بشركة من القياس and again [5]: مَناتتكرر . . . In Persian he has exactly the same Arabic term [6]. But the Lexicon of Asadī of Ṭūs has an interesting equivalent. It says [7]: اروند. This is corroborated by a verse from the *Shāh-nāmeh* of Firdawsī:

باروند چشم خردرا بدوخت.

7. JAWHAR, DHĀT, 'AIN

These three terms need to be reviewed together because their Greek equivalents have been often confused. *Jawhar* is not of Qur'anic origin. *Dhāt* as the feminine of *dhū*, and *'ain*, though of Qur'anic origin, are not used in the same sense in philosophical terminology. For *jawhar* we have:

ἡ οὐσία	(Metaph. 1028 b 33)	جوهر (اسطاث)
ἡ οὐσία	(Metaph. 987 a 18)	„ (نظيف)
ἡ οὐσία	(Categ. 1 a 3)	„ (امحق)
ἡ οὐσία	(A. Post. 73 a 35)	„ (مَتّى)

The word is believed to come from Pahlawi *gohr* [8], and derived from the root *gav* which means to grow. This interpretation, how-ever, has been challenged [9]. In any case it already had the sense of substance in Pahlawi represented by modern Persian *gowhar*. Kraus thought that the scholars of Gundīshāpūr were the first to choose

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[1] Cf. *Rasā'il* . . . .
[2] *Kalīlah* . . . pp. 10, 192.
[3] *Nawāmis* . . . p. 3.
[4] *Ishārāt*. p. 56.
[5] *Najāt*. p. 61.
[6] *Dānish-nāmeh*.
[7] Cf. *Lughat al-Furs*.
[8] Cf. Sir Harold Bailey. *Zoroastrian Problems* . . . pp. 89-90.
[9] Cf. Zaehner. B.S.O.A.S. Vol. XVII. Part. 2. p. 232 ff.

and introduce it into Arabic [1]. But he produced no authority to support the view. Actually this may not be true. As far as the records go, its use as the literal equivalent of *ousia* began with Usṭāth but we find the word already in the works of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [2], who had no apparent connection with Gundīshāpūr. Then comes

Ibn al-Muqaffa' saying [3]: ان ثمرة الشجرة المرة لو طليت بالعسل لم تنقلب عن جوهرها

Admittedly in his enumeration of the Aristotelian categories he gives *'ain* as the equivalent of *ousia* [4]. But he also uses *jawhar* in the very same work. Among the *Falāsifah* it is found in Kindī, and extends to all the rest. It soon, however, developed different connotations. Ghazālī [5] remarks that "the philosophers mean one thing by *jawhar*, and the Ṣūfīs something else, and the *mutukalle-mūn* still another thing". This has not been noted by all modern scholars. Tahānawī [6] discusses the distinctive meanings in greater detail. The *Epistles* of the Brethren contain a classification of the different kinds of *jawhar* which is not found elsewhere [7].

For primary and secondary substances we have:

| ἡ πρώτη οὐσία | (Metaph. 1005 a 35) | الجوهر الاول (اسطاث) |
| αἱ δεύτεραί οὐσίαι | (Categ. 2 b 30) | جواهر ثوان (اصغى) |

For the adjectival form *jawhariy*, we have seen no textual render-ings to show the Greek equivalent. But for the abstraction to denote substantiality there is:

| οὐσία | (Metaph. 1002 a 4) | الجوهريّة (اسطاث) |

The actual Greek substantive from *ousia* does not appear to be of Attic provenance. There is *ousiótes* from the corpus of Hermetic writings [8]. And *ousiódes* in the works of Proclus [9]. In Arabic *jawha-riyyah* was immediately adopted by philosophers and literary men alike. Although it may be found in Kindī, we have seen it from Fārābī onwards. Among the *litterateurs* it is in Jāḥiẓ [10] and Tawḥīdī [11].

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[1] Cf. *Riv. d. Stud. Orientali.* Vol. XIV. 1933.
[2] Cf. *Rasā'il....*
[3] *Kalīlah...* p. 95.
[4] Cf. Appendix I Part. II.
[5] *Al-Risālat al-Ladunnīyyah.* p. 15.
[6] Lexicon. Vol. I. p. 203 ff.
[7] Cf. Vol. I. p. 326.
[8] Cf. Lexicon. Liddell and Scott.
[9] *ibid.*
[10] *Kitāb al-Ḥaiwān..* Vol. I. p. 4.
[11] *Al-Imtā'...* Vol. I. p. 123.

For the verb *tajawhur*, no Greek equivalent has been noted in the translated texts. It corresponds to *ousiasthai* which again seems to date from Hellenistic literature [1].

The term *dhāt* was sometimes used as the equivalent of *ousía* also. Hence:

ἡ οὐσία	(A. Pr. 46 a 36)	الذات (نذارى)
ἡ οὐσία	(Top. 146 b 2)	„ (دمشقى)

But in most cases and as a general rule it stood for *tó hotó*. Thus.

τό καθ' αὐτό	(Metaph. 1022 a 25)	الذى بذاته (اسطاث)
τό αὐτό	(A. Pr. 24 b 22)	ذات (نذارى)
καθ' αὐτό	(D. An. 406 a 5)	بالذات (احق)

On the evidence of Suyūṭī [2] *dhāt* was first used by the Mutakallemīn, particularly in its adjectival form *dhātīy* [3]. Among the *Falāsifah* its usage begins with Kindī and extends all along the line. To draw the distinction between the two terms, Avicenna says [4]:

الذاتّى ثلاثة اقسام جنس [5] Ghazālī explains كل ذات لم يكن فى موضوع فهو جوهر

التفريق [6]: Ibn Taimīyyah, on the other hand, rules that و نوع و فصل

.بين الذاتّى والعَرَضىّ باطل

The term *'ain* shares with *dhāt* in being the equivalent of *tó hotó*. Thus:

ὁ αὐτός	(Categ. 1 a 6)	عين (احق)
τά αὐτά	(Categ. 1 b 21)	اعيان (احق)

But we also have

τά πράγματα	(Top. 110 a 16)	الاعيان (دمشقى)

As the term gained usage among philosophers, Ṣūfīs and theologians in the non-Qur'anic sense of a specific entity, it is difficult to tell how and when it first originated. In any case it is not usually the equivalent of *ousía* as some scholars have thought. Kindī has used it [7]. Fārābī defines it thus [8]: العين هو الذى لا يمكن ان يقع به

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[1] Cf. Liddell and Scott.
[2] *Al-Muzhir*. Vol. I. pp. 320-321.
[3] Cf. *Jīlī*. Chapt. I.
[4] *Najāt*.
[5] *Maqāṣid...* p. 19.
[6] *Kitāb al-Radd...* p. 62.
[7] Cf. *Rasā'il...* p. 217.
[8] *Al-Qiyās al-Ṣaghīr...* p. 247.

تشابه بين اثنين اصلاً. In the *Epistles* of the Brethren [1] it is stated that:

الشيء، امّا عين موجودة و [2]: Avicenna asserts الاشياء . . . صور و اعيان غريّات

امّا صورة موجودة فى الوهم و العقل and Suhrawardī distinguishes between [3]:

وجود عينّى . . . و ذهنّى :Mullā Ṣadrā [4] speaks of الاعتبارات العينـيّة و الذهنيّة

Of the abstsraction *'ainīyyah*, Fārābī [5] says: هويّة الشيء، وعينيّته و وحدته

وتشخصّه و خصوصيّته و وجوده المنفرد له كل واحد *Ta'ayyun* is used in the sense

of specification. Jurjānī [6] defines it: التعيّن ما به امتياز الشيء عن غيره

and Tahānawī [7] adds: التعيّن هو التشخصّ In Persian it is usually
found in the plural form *ta'ayyunāt*. The adjectival form *mu'ayyan*

is of common occurance. Avicenna [8] says: . . . مبادى او معينّات.

Further illustrations can be cited to establish the fact that
'ain means a specific entity or thing in its actuality. The views of
Furlani [9], Kraus [10], and Nallino [11] need to be modified in connection
with its relation to *dhāt* and *jawhar*. The fact that Ibn al-Muqaffa'
has given *'ain* in his list of the categories does not mean that he
considered it the exact equivalent of *ousia*. In the selfsame

work [12] he says: فالعين اسم كل جوهر مسمّى Furthermore it should be
noted that in his list of the *Categories* [13] Dimashqī gives his rendering
of *ousia* as: عين الشيء، Suyūṭī [14] asserts that: حقيقته . . . . ما هو الشيء،
and again [15] العين نفس الشيء،.

8. ḤADS

This is a rather interesting term of non-Qur'anic origin. In a

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[1] *Rasā'il* . . . Vol. I. p. 316.
[2] *Najāt*. p. II.
[3] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. p. 17.
[4] *Al-Asfār* . . .
[5] *Ta'līqāt*. p. 21.
[6] *Ta'rīfāt*.
[7] Lexicon. Vol. 2. p. 1075.
[8] *Najāt*. p. 282.
[9] Cf. *Rend. d. R. Academ. Naz. d. Lincei* . . . Vol. 2. 1926.
[10] *Riv. d. Stud. Orient.* 1933.
[11] *ibid.* Vol. 14. pp. 133-134.
[12] Cf. MS. St. Joseph University.
[13] Cf. Appendix I, Part. 2.
[14] *Al-Muzhir*. Vol. I. p. 388.
[15] *Ibid.* p. 459.

translation of Abū Bishr Matta who was among the later trans-
lators, it is found thus:

ἡ δ' ἀγχινοία ἐστιν   (A. Post. 89 b 11)   امّا الذكاء فهو حسن حدس ما
εὐστοχία τις

The earliest use of it that we have seen is by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ[1]:

الحدس حركة الى اصابة الحدّ الاوسط ... :Avicenna defines it [2] as الظنّ و الحدس

and again [3], الحدس قوّة الحدس فعل للذهن ... و الذكاء Suhrawardī speaks of [4]:

الحدسيّات على قا عدة الاشراق.

9. ḤAQQ

From this good Qurʾanic term meaning the truth, and in the
form of al-Ḥaqq denoting the Deity as the ultimate Truth, a whole
series of terms were coined which served the purpose in theological,
mystical and philosophical literature. The process illustrates the
ability of the Arabic language to produce words with a variety of
connotations in strict conformity with the established paradigms.
We thus have *ḥaqq, ḥaqqīy, ḥaqqīyyah, ḥaqīqah, ḥaqīqīy, ḥaqīqat
al-ḥaqāʾiq, taḥqīq, muḥaqqiq, istiḥqāq*, and various others.

For ḥaqq we have:

ἀλήθεια	(Metaph. 993 a 30)	حقّ (اسطاث)
τό ἀληθης	(Rhet. 1335 a 17)	„ (مجهول)
τό ἀληθης	(Top. 150 b 35)	„ (دمشقى)

The terms *ḥaqq, ḥaqqīy*, and *ḥaqqīyyah* are frequently met with in
the writings of Kindī, Fārābī and Avicenna. No examples therefore
need be given.

For ḥaqīqah, and *ḥaqīqīy* there is:

ἡ ἀλήθεια	(Metaph. 993 b 31)	الحقيقة (اسطاث)
ἡ ἀλήθεια	(A. Pr. 46 a 9)	„ (تذارى)
κατά τήν ἀληθειαν	(Metaph. 1006 b 9)	بالحقيقة (اسطاث)
κατά ἀλήθειαν	(A. Pr. 46 a 8)	الحقيقى (تذارى)

then we have:

τό θεωρεῖν	(A. Post. 79 a 23)	تحقيقًا (متى)

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[1] *Kalīlah*... p. 48.
[2] *Najāt*. p. 87.
[3] *ibid*. p. 167.
[4] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*... p. 41.

| οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι | (Metaph. 990 b 15) | المحقّقون (نظيف) |
| ἀξίως | (Metaph. 993 a 31) | بقدر ما يستّحق (اسحق) |

In definition Fārābī says [1]: حقيقة الشيى، هو الوجود الذى يخصّه . Suhra-
wardī adds [2]: الحقيقة اعتبار ذهنّى . And Mullā Ṣadrā describes the Deity
as [3]: حقيقة الحقائق و مذوّت الذوات و مجوهر الجواهر .

10. ḤĀL

For this sense of time with relation to the agent, there is:

| πότε | (Categ. 3 a 15) | حال (اسحق) |
| πότε | (Top. 108 b 12) | „ (دمشقى) |

Jurjānī [4] defines it as: الحال . . . نهاية الماضى و بداية المستقبل .

To mean a state and disposition, we have:

ἡ διάθεσις	(Metaph. 1019 b 5)	حال (اسطاث)
ἡ διάθεσις	(Categ. 6 a 30)	„ (اسحق)
τρόπος	(Top. 114 a 32)	„ (دمشقى)

Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [5] had said: ان حال الامور على اربعة اوجه . . . Fārābī [6]
has it in that sense. And so does Avicenna [7].

In the sense of reduction there is:

| ἀπαγωγή | (A. Pr. 29 b 5) | الاحالة (تذارى) |
| ἄνευ τῆς ἀπαγωγῆς | (A Pr. 28 b 20) | من غير رفع الكلام الى الاحالة |

The exact expression had appeared in Ibn al-Muqaffa' [8] who speaks
of: رفع الكلام الى الاحالة . The form iḥālah is also found in 'Abd al-
Ḥamīd [9]. Kindī has al-iḥālāt [10].

In the sense of alteration we have:

ἡ αλλοιώσις	(Metaph. 989 a 27)	الاستحالة (نظيف)
ἡ αλλοιώσις	(Categ. 15 a 15)	„ (اسحق)
ἡ αλλοιώσις	(Top. 121 a 31)	„ (دمشقى)

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[1] *Madīnat al-Fāḍilah*. p. II.
[2] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. p. 17.
[3] *Al-Asfār . . .*
[4] *Taʿrīfāt*. p. 85.
[5] Cf. MS. of St. Joseph University.
[6] *Madīnat al-Fāḍilah*.
[7] *Najāt*.
[8] *op. cit.*
[9] Cf. *Rasāʾil . . . .*
[10] Cf. *Rasāʾil . . .*

Again Ibn al-Muqaffa' [1] had said before them: فالتحوّل كاستحالة الشيىء.
This is followed by all the *Falāsifah*. Then there is as well:

μεταβολή	(Metaph. 991 a 11)	الاستحالة (نظيف)

In the sense of substitution which is Qur'anic in form, there is:

ἡ μετάληψις	(A. Pr. 45 b 17)	تحويل (تذارى)

11. IDRĀK

This non-Qur'anic term meaning perception or apprehension has a very wide use in the Arabic language. How and when it originated remains obscure. It is already found in the writings of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [2] and Ibn al-Muqaffa' [3]. But when we come to the Translators we find that in the form of *idrāk*, and with the sense of perception or mental apprehension, its use appears to have begun with the school of Ḥunain and his son Isḥāq. Usṭāth who belonged to an earlier group does not have it in that form nor with that sense. Thus Isḥāq translates:

τό νοεῖν	(D. An. 402 b 13)	ادراك

when before him Usṭāth had translated

νοεῖν	(Metaph. 994 b 23)	تفهّم

The only uses we have seen in the renderings of Usṭāth of words from that root are the following:

λαβεῖν	(Metaph. 1011 a 14)	درك
εὐπορία	(Metaph. 995 a 29)	درك

In Isḥāq on the other hand it has a very wide use:

ἡ νόησις	(D. An. 407 a 32)	الادراك بالعقل
αἰσθάνεσθαι	(D. An. 425 b 13)	ادراك
αἴσθησις	(D. An. 425 b 15)	الادراك
ὅρασις	(D. An. 428 a 7)	الادراك بالبصر

The term was immediately adopted by the *Falāsifah* from Kindī onwards. Avicenna defines it thus [4]: ادراك الشيىء ... ان تكون حقيقته

قسّموا الادراك ... الى اربعة ... الاحساس ... Tahānawī states [5]: متمثّلة عند المدرك
. التخيّل ... التوهّم ... التعقّل ...

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[1] *op. cit.*
[2] Cf. *Rasā'il...*
[3] Cf. *Al-Adab al-Kabīr.*
[4] *Ishārāt.*
[5] Lexicon. Vol. I. p. 307.

This was taken from the Stoic division [1] into: αἴσθησις, φαντασία, πρόληψις, νόησις and is yet another proof of the influence of Stoicism on the *Falāsifah*. A happy phrase from Fārābī [2] remarks that: يقال لنا احياء ... اذا كنا ندرك احسن المدركات باحسن ادراك

The Persian equivalent which Avicenna resourcefully introduced into philosophical terminology was *andaryāft* [3]. It was a splendid choice gladly accepted by Nāṣir Khosrow [4] and Sajistānī [5].

12. AL-DHIHN

This non-Qur'anic term has a number of connotations in the language, and therefore rather difficult to put into English. The Translators used it thus:

| ἡ διάνοια | (P. Herm. 16 b 20) | الذهن (احمق) |
| διανοητική | (A. Post. 71 a 1) | ذهني (متى) |

It may be observed that it does not appear among early renderings. We have not seen it in the versions of Usṭāth. It does occur in the translation of the so-called *Theology* of Aristotle by Ibn Nāʿimah with the help of Kindī [6]. It seems to date from the school of Ḥunain. In literary works ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd [7] and Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [8] had both used it already. Among the *Falāsifah* it begins with Kindī [9] and extends to all the others. Avicenna speaks of [10]: الفرض الذهني. Suhrawardī distinguishes [11] between: الذهني ... و العيني and Mullā Ṣadra [12] has: الوجود الذهني والظلي.

13. AL-SALB

This term of logic is not Qur'anic in form or sense. Yet it was adopted from the beginning to denote negation. The fact, however,

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[1] Cf. von Arnim. *Stoic. Vet. Fragmenta.*
[2] *Madīnat al-Fāḍilah.* p. 12.
[3] Cf. *Dānish-nāmeh.*
[4] Cf. *Jāmiʿ al-Ḥikmatain.* p. 251.
[5] *Kashf al-Maḥjūb.* p. 17.
[6] ed. Badawi. p. 11.
[7] Cf. *Rasāʾil...*
[8] Cf. *Al-Adab al-Kabīr.*
[9] Cf. *Rasāʾil...*
[10] *Ishārāt.* p. 37.
[11] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.* p. 128.
[12] *Al-Asfār...*

that it stands for more than one Greek equivalent is sometimes overlooked. We have:

ἡ ἀπόφασις	(Metaph. 1004 a 14)	السالب (اسطاث)
ἡ καθόλου ἀπόφασις	(P. Herm. 24 a 5)	السلب الكلّي (اسحق)
τά ἀποφατικά	(A. Pr. 25 b 4)	السالبات (تذارى)

But there is also:

τά στερητικά	(A. Pr. 63 a 9)	السالبات (تذارى)
τό στερητικόν καθόλου	(A. Pr. 42 b 34)	الكلّي السالب (تذارى)
τό στερητικόν τό κατά μέρος	(A. Pr. 42 b 38)	الجزئّي السالب (تذارى)

It is already found in Ibn al-Muqaffa's work on logic [1]. Among the *Falāsifah* it is used from Kindī onwards. Ibn al-Muqaffa' speaks of:

القضايا الموجبة ... السالبة .

14. SHAKL

This was a good Qur'anic term chosen to denote the figures of a syllogism. It is already found in the renderings of Usṭāth. Thus:

ἡ σχῆμα	(Metaph. 999 a 9)	شكل (اسطاث)

But Isḥāq who came after him seems doubtful about its usage; and we see:

ἡ σχῆμα	(D. An. 425 a 18)	الشكل وهو الاشكيم (اسحق)
σχήματος	(D. An. 414 b 21)	الاشاكيم (اسحق)
σχῆμα	(D. An. 412 b 7)	طبعة (اسحق)

But *ishkīm* which was only a transcription soon dropped out. *Shakl* was adopted by all *Falāsifah*, becoming the established term of logic. We have:

τό πρῶτον σχῆμα	(A. Pr. 63 b 5)	الشكل الاول (تذارى)
τό δεύτερον σχῆμα	(A. Pr. 26 b 36)	الثاني (,,)
τό μέσον σχῆμα	(A. Pr. 44 b 35)	الوسط (,,)
τό τρίτον σχῆμα	(A. Pr. 28 a 12)	الثالث (,,)
τό ἔσχατον σχῆμα	(A. Pr. 63 b 5)	الاخير (,,)

Shakl was also used in the ordinary sense of form. Thus:

μορφή	(Categ. 10 a 12)	الشكل و الخلقة (اسحق)
μορφή	(Metaph. 999 b 16)	شكل (اسطاث)

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[1] MS. St. Joseph University.

though there is also

μορφή   (Metaph. 1042 a 29)   السنخ (اسطاث)

The abstraction *shaklīyyah* we have seen only from Avicenna

onwards. He says: [1] الشكلية ... من المعانى المقومة المهيّة Mullā Ṣadrā has
al-mutushakkelīyyah [2].

15. ṢADR, ṢUDŪR, MUṢĀDERAH

The first of these is a Qur'anic term adopted to mean a preamble
in rhetorics. We have:

τό προοίμιον	(Rhet.)	الصدر (مجهول)
τό προοίμιον	(Categ. 14 b 2)	„ (اصحق)

and Avicenna says [3]: للاقاويل الخطابية صدر و اقتصاص وخاتمة .

When Fārābī took up the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation the
derivative *ṣudūr* came into usage to connote emanation and pro-
cession. He probably took the word from one of the translations,
though no text is available in that connection. It corresponds
presumably to ἡ πρόοδος of Proclus [4]. Through Avicenna and all
the others who followed Fārābī it became an established term of
Islamic metaphysics. Mullā Ṣadrā coined some curious formations

from the root *ṣadara*. He has in his works [5]: الواحد المصدرى – اول الصوادر

. – المصدرية – الترتيب الصدورى

As a term of logic we have:

τό αἴτημα	(A. Post. 76 b 32)	المصادرة (متى)
τά αἰτήματά	(A. Post. 86 a 34)	المصادرات (متى)

Avicenna says [6]: المسلمات على الوجه الثانى تسمى مصادرات . Then for *Petitio*
principii there is المصادرة على المطلوب الاول . This is the equivalent of
the Greek τό ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι. Avicenna defines it thus [7]:

المصادرة على المطلوب الاول هو ان يجعل المطلوب نفسه مقدمة فى قياس يراد به انتاجه

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[1] *Al-Shifā.*
[2] Cf. *Al-Asfār...*
[3] Cf. *Al-Shifā.*
[4] Cf. *Elements of Theology.* p. 34.
[5] Cf. *Al-Asfār...*
[6] *Ishārāt.* p. 83.
[7] *Najāt.* p. 56.

16. ṬABʿ, ṬABĪʿIY, ṬABĪʿAH

The term *ṭabʿ* which is non-Qurʾanic in form and sense, seems to have been introduced into philosophical language from an early date. We have:

ἡ φύσις	(Metaph. 1054 a 10)	طبع (اسطاث)
ἡ φύσις	(Metaph. 992 a 31)	,, (نظيف)
ἡ φύσις	(A. Pr. 70 b 10)	,, (تذارى)

In his list of definitions [1] Avicenna says: الطبع ... كأنّها اعمّ من الطبيعة
In the form of *ṭibāʿ*, we have:

ἡ φύσις	(D. An. 402 a 7)	الطباع (اسحق)
φύσει	(D. An. 406 a 23)	طباعيّة (اسحق)
εὐφυεῖς	(D. An. 421 a 24)	ذكاء الطباع (اسحق)

This occurs in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [2] thus: خُلق و طباع.

And among the *Falāsifah* we see it from Kindi [3] onwards. In Avicenna [4] it is frequently in the form of *inṭibāʿ*. Mullā Ṣadrā using it in the sense of impressionistic, says [5]: التصوّر و التصديق ... نوعان من:
العلم الا نطباعىّ.

In the common form of *ṭabīʿah*, there is:

ἡ φύσις	(Metaph. 1014 b 16)	الطبيعة (اسطاث)
ἡ φύσις	(Top. 100 b 30)	,, (دمشقى)
πεφυκός	(A. Pr. 32 b 6)	مطبوع (تذارى)

We have first seen this term in a quotation from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [6], though there is no proof that it originated with him. Among the *Falāsifah* Kindi says [7]: الطبيعة ... اول قوى النفس.

All his successors use it. There is a definition in the *Epistles* of the Brethren [8]; and another in Jurjānī [9].

For *ṭabīʿiy* to mean natural, we have:

| φυσικός | (Metaph. 995 a 16) | طبيعى (اسطاث) |

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[1] *Risālat al-Ḥudūd*. p. 59.
[2] *Kalīlah*... p. 130.
[3] *Rasāʾil*... p. 89.
[4] Cf. *Najāt*.
[5] *Al-Asfār*...
[6] Cf. Miskawaih. *Al-Ḥikmat al-Khālidah*. p. 312.
[7] *Rasāʾil*... p. 165.
[8] *Rasāʾil*... Vol. 2. p. 112.
[9] *Taʿrīfāt*. p. 145.

ἡ φυσική   (Metaph. 995 a 19)   العلم الطبيعى (اسحق)

For *ṭabīʿiyyūn* to denote the early natural philosophers of Greece, we have:

οἱ φυσικοί   (Metaph. 1075 b 27)   اصحاب الكلام الطبيعى (متّى)

οἱ φυσικοί   (Metaph. 1071 b 27)   المتكلّمون فى الطبيعيات (متّى)

φυσιολογοί   (Metaph. 990 a 3)   طبيعيـيـن (نظيف)

Rāzī speaks [1] of الفلاسفة الطبيعيّون and Averroes [2]: فلسفة الطبيعيّـين.

Although Avicenna [3] and all the Persian philosophers who followed him did not attempt to change *ṭabʿ* into a word of pure Persian root, Asadī [4] gives the equivalent as *kiā*, or *kiānā* which are both obsolete. Tahānawī gives the Persian as *sirisht* which is still in common use. In Middle Persian, or Pahlawī they had *chihr*, and the adjectival form was *chihrīk* [5]. This appears far more suitable. We have attempted to revive its usage in our Persian rendering of the *Poetics* of Aristotle [6].

17. ʿARAḌ, ʿARAḌIYYAH

This term is Qurʾanic in form but not in sense. It appears at an early date in the writings of theologians and philosophers alike to denote accident. In which circles it first originated, is not easy to determine. Among the Translators we have:

τό συμβεβηκός   (Metaph. 1025 a 14)   العَرض (اسطاث)

συμβαίνω   (A. Pr. 48 a 10)   عرض (تذارى)

κατά συμβεβηκός   (Categ. 5 b 1)   بالعَرض (اسحق)

τά συμβεβηκότα   (Metaph. 997 a 22)   الاعراض (اسطاث)

τά συμβεβηκότα   (Metaph. 989 b 3)   الموارض (نظيف)

τά συμπτωμάτα   (Categ. 9 b 19)   عوارض (اسحق)

πάθη   (D. An. 402 a 9)   اعراض (اسحق)

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[1] *Rasāʾil*.... p. 37.
[2] *Tafsīr ma baʿd al-Ṭabīʿah*. p. 63.
[3] Cf. *Dānish-nāmeh*.
[4] Cf. *Lughat al-Furs*.
[5] Cf. Bailey. *Zoroastrian Problems*...
[6] Cf. *Dar Bārī-ye-Hunar Shiʿir*. London. 1948.

It already appears in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿs treatise on logic [1] where he says مفارق و غير مفارق الاعراض فن. Among the *Falāsifah* we find it from Kindī [2] onwards. Avicenna has a definition of it [3]. The theologians, however, explained accident in a different way from the philosophers [4]. The two parties did not agree as to what constitutes accident. That led to controversy; and a good deal of confusion among modern scholars.

As the contrary of *jawhar*, the accidental was termed *ʿaraḍiy*. There is also:

ὅσα συμβέβηκε   (D. An. 402 a 8)   الاشياء العارضة (اسحق)

Kindī uses *ʿaraḍiy* frequently [5]. Avicenna says [6]: مِمَّا . . . العرضيّ.

.ليس بذاتٍ. And Ghazālī [7] divides it into: عرضيّ لازم و عرضيّ مفارق.

The abstraction *ʿaraḍiyyah* we have not seen in anyone before Avicenna [8]. Suhrawardī [9] speaks of *al-jawhariyyah* and *al-ʿaraḍiyyah*. Arab purists never appreciated such formations. *Iʿtirāḍ* in the sense of objection is very common in Avicenna and Averroes. In the version of Aristotle's *Rhetorica* by an as yet unknown translator, we have:

ἡ εἰρωνεία   (Rhet.   )   التعريض

Then comes the form *ʿāriḍ* to mean certain affections.

πάθος   (Soph. 173 b 6)   عوارض (ناعمة)
πάθη   (Top. 125 b 23)   عوارض (دمشقى)

Avicenna defines *ʿāriḍ* in his logic. Jurjānī [10] gives the different varieties of it. Mullā Ṣadrā with his penchant for abstractions speaks [11] of المعروضيّة . . . العارضيّة.

18. ʿAQL

This term and its numerous derivatives pose some interesting

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[1] Cf. MS. St. Joseph University.
[2] *Rasāʾil...* p. 104.
[3] Cf. *Ishārāt.* p. 17; *Najāt.* p. 200.
[4] Cf. Tahānawī. Lexicon. Vol. II. p. 986 ff.; Ghazālī. *Miʿyār...* p. 171.
[5] *Rasāʾil...* p. 104.
[6] *Najāt.* p. 7.
[7] *Miʿyār...* p. 55.
[8] Cf. *Al-Shifā.*
[9] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.*
[10] *Taʿrīfāt.* p. 164.
[11] *Al-Asfār...*

problems. If we accept the statement of Ibn Taimīyyah [1], in the sense of intellect as a specific entity, it is not of Qur'anic origin. He says: فالعقل فى لغة الرسول وإصحابه وامّته عَرَض مـن الاعراض يكـون مصدر عَقَل يعقل عقـلًا . . . و العقل فى لغة فلاسفة اليونان قائم بنفسه .

Not all theologians subscribed to such views. Balkhī [2] remarks that . . . قيل سمّى عقلًا لانّه عقال للمرء من التخطّى الى ما خَطَر عليه .

Among the Translators we have:

ἡ φρόνησις	(Metaph. 1009 b 13)	العقل (اسطاث)
διάνοια	(Metaph. 1049 a 5)	„ („)
ὁ νοῦς	(Metaph. 993 b 11)	„ (اسحق)
θεωρέω	(Categ. 5 b 28)	عـَقـَل („)

Hence the Greek equivalent is not always the same—an important point. Then comes

ἡ διάνοια	(Metaph. 1074 b 36)	التعقّل (متّى)
νόησις	(Metaph. 1074 b 20)	„ („)
τό νοεῖσθαι	(Metaph. 1074 b 37)	الانفقال (متى)

Then comes:

νοητόν	(Metaph. 999 b 2)	المفقول (اسطاث)
τό διανοητόν	(Metaph. 1021 a 30)	„ („)
τό νοούμενον	(Metaph. 1074 b 30)	„ („)
τό νόημα	(Metaph. 990 b 25)	„ (نظيف)
τά νοητά	(Top. 125 a 31)	معقولات (دمشقى)
τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ	(D. An. 433 a 16)	العقل الفـّعال (اسحاق)

From the statement of Ibn Taimīyyah it is evident that 'aql meant one thing to the theologians and another thing to the Falāsifah. But in which camp did the term as such originate? As a term of theology and mysticism, Massignon has dated it before 'Allāf and Naẓẓām [3]. And there is an extant treatise by al-Muḥā-

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[1] *Kitāb al-Radd ʿala al-Manṭiqīyyīn.* p. 276.

[2] *Al-Badʾ wa al-Tārīkh.* p. 24.

[3] Cf. *Essai sur les Origines du Lexique Technique de la Mystique...* 2nd. ed. Paris. 1954.

كتاب مائيّـة العقل و معناه واختلاف الناس فيه [1]: entitled (d. 243/857) sibī
However that may be, we take the view that the Translators took
the term from Arabic secular literature. And they in turn passed it
on to the *Falāsifah*. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd [2] makes frequent use of it,
occasionally referring to *ahl al-ʿaql*. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [3] has that
expression also. He uses the word *ʿaql* still more in his writings. In
the sense of rationalists Ibn Taimīyyah [4] has *al-ʿaqlīyyin* which is
more expressive. Thus the term had already been established when
Kindī and the other philosophers embarked on their works. Yet it
was soon realised that there was more than one connotation to it.
And in his treatise *On Definitions* Avicenna points out [5] that:

العقل اسم مشترك لمعانى عدّة . . . Perhaps the earliest echo of the Aristote-
lian concept that the seat of the intelligence is the heart may be
found in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿs statement that [6]: سليقة العقل مكنونة فى مغرزها

قيل محلّه الرأس وقيل محلّه القلب . Jurjānī adds [7]: من القلب . Nor did they
agree as to the nature of the intellect. Kindī believed that [8]
العقل جوهر بسيط مدرك للاشياء بحقائقها . This was in accordance with the
so-called *Theology* ot Aristotle which states that [9]: الفاعل الاول اول
العقل وهو فعله فعل But the *Epistles* of the Brethren [10] maintained that

العقل الانسانى فليس هو شيئاً سوى النفس الانسانيّة التى صارت علّامة بالفعل . . .
and Averroes [12] has العقل اعتقاد بان الشيىء كذا . . . and Avicenna says [11]
العقل ليس هو شيئاً اكثر من ادراك نظام الاشياء . . . . و ترتيبها .

The adjectival form *ʿaqlīy* is very common beginning with Kindī.
But the abstraction *al-ʿaqlīyyah* we have seen only in Avicenna,
Ghazālī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Arab purists do not seem to have approved
of it. Averroes scrupulously avoids it. The form *ʿāqil* goes back to
Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [13], and perhaps even earlier. Among the Translators
we have:

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[1] Cf. MS. Carullah. No. 1101. The different interpretations of the term
ʿaql are given in a treatise found at Atif Efendi Library. No. 2045.

[2] Cf. *Rasāʾil*...

[3] Cf. *Al-Adab al-Kabīr*.

[4] *Kitāb al-Radd*...

[5] *Risālat al-Ḥudūd*.

[6] *Al-Adab al-Kabīr*.

[7] *Taʿrīfāt.* p. 157.

[8] *Rasāʾil*... p. 165.

[9] ed. Badawi.

[10] Vol. I. p. 350.

[11] *Najāt.* p. 87.

[12] *Tahāfot*... p. 339.   [13] *Kalīlah*... p. 162.

ὁ φρόνιμος   (Metaph. 1025 a 8)   العاقل (اسطاث)

Fārābī [1] has *al-mutu'aqqil*. Avicenna speaks of *al-'āqilīyyah* and *al-ma'qūlīyyah* [2]. In that he was followed by Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā. For the verb denoting intellection the term *ta'aqqul* was used beginning with Fārābī [3].

The Persian equivalent of *'aql* is *khirad* which comes from the Pahlawi *khrat*. In Middle Persian they also had *vīr* and *vārom*. Avicenna gives *khirad* in the *Dānish-nāmeh*. And so it is in the *Qābūs-nāmeh*. Nāṣir Khosrow apparently preferred the Arab *'aql*. This may have been because *khirad* was a rather vague term and at times could mean wisdom and thus become the equivalent of the Greek *sophía*. No such hesitation would be justified to-day. The Latins translated it in different ways. Gundisalvo renders *'aql* as *intellectus*. Gerard of Cremona puts it *ratio*.

19. 'ILLAH

This is another non-Qur'anic word the origins of which is not easy to determine. It is already found in Ibn al-Muqaffa' [4]. who says: لكلّ سبب علّة و لكل علّة مجرى .

Among the Translators we have:

αἴτιον	(Metaph. 1013 a 24)	العـلّـة (اسطاث)
αἴτιον	(Soph. 165 a 4)	سبب (ناعمة ، زرعة ، مجى)
and to note αἴτιον	(A. Post. 95 b 19)	الكلمة (متّى)

All the philosophers adopted it beginning with Kindī. *Sabab* was much less used. It came to acquire a slightly different connotation.

Suhrawardī [5] has the adjectival form in this fashion: الوجود الواجبى و العلّى . The abstraction to denote causality or causation is already found in Fārābī [6] who speaks of العلّيّة و المعلوليّة .

For the passive form meaning the caused, or the effect we have:

αἰτιατά	(A. Post. 76 a 21)	معلولات (متّى)

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[1] Cf. *Risālat al-'Aql*.
[2] Cf. *Kitāb al-Inṣāf*.
[3] *Risālat al-'Aql*.
[4] *Kalīlah*...
[5] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. p. 13.
[6] *Ta'līqāt*. p. 17.

Again Suhrawardī [1] has the adjectival *al-ma'lūlīy*. And Avicenna has the abstraction in the shape of *al-ma'lūlīyyah*.

In Persian Avicenna uses the Arabic term without attempting to produce a Persian equivalent. The Pahlawī word was *vahān* with the abstraction *vahankārīh*. But these have not survived in modern Persian.

20. MA'NA

This is another word of non-Qur'anic origin which apparently entered the language at an early date. It is already found in 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [2] and Ibn al-Muqaffa' [3]. It is presumed that the Translators took it from them, using it thus:

σημαίνει	(Metaph. 1054 a 13)	معنى (اسطاث)
λόγος	(D. An. 426 a 28)	„ (اسحق)
τά νοήματα	(D. An. 432 a 12)	المعانى (اسحق)
τά πραγμάτα	(P. Herm. 17 a 39)	„ („)
θεώρημα	(Top. 104 b 1)	معنى (دمشقى)

The philosophers all used it from Kindī onwards. Avicenna defined it thus [4] المعنى ... الشيىء الذى تدركه النفس من المحسوس من غير ان يدركه الحس

المعانى هى الصور الذهنيّة ... وضع بازائها الالفاظ and Jurjānī [5] الظاهر اولاً Horten [6] has discussed the term in an article without giving the Greek equivalents.

21. HAYŪLA, MĀDDAH, 'UNṢUR, ṬĪNAH

All these four terms were used as equivalents of the Greek *hýle*. The first was merely a transcription which entered Arabic and Persian by way of the translators, either directly or through Syriac. Ex.

πρώτη ὕλη	(Metaph. 1015 a 7)	هيول الاولى (اسطاث)
ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευατῶν	(Metaph. 1013 b 18)	„ المصنوعات (اسطاث)
ἡ ὕλη	(Top. 139 b 33)	الهيول (دمشقى)

The term is employed by the *Falāsifah* from Kindī onwards. Khawārizmī [7] explains that: الهيول يسمّى المادّة و العنصر و الطينة.

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[1] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.* p. 13.
[2] Cf. *Rasā'il...*
[3] *Al-Adab al-Kabīr.*
[4] *Najāt.* p. 162.
[5] *Ta'rīfāt.* p. 235.
[6] Cf. *Z.D.M.G.* 1910. pp. 391-396.   [7] *Mafātīḥ al-'Ulūm.* p. 136.

For the adjectival form there is:

σώματα τήν ὕλην   (Metaph. 989 a 21)   الاجسام الهيولانيّة (نظيف)

The abstraction *al-hayūlīyyah*, or *al-hayūlānīyyah* may be found in Fārābī, Averroes and all the rest. Even Tawḥīdī [1] has it in his literary works.

The term *māddah* is not of Qur'anic origin. Furthermore it does not appear in the translations of the *Organon*. But in the fragments of the *Metaphysica* which should be rightly attributed to Abū Bishr Matta we have

ὕλη   (Metaph. 1069 b 14)   المادّة

ὕλη   (Metaph. 1069 b 24)   „

Avicenna suggests [2] that it is an Arabicised form of the Persian word *māyeh*. It is already found in the writings of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd [3] and must therefore have entered the language at an early date. Ibn Nā'imah uses it in his rendering of the so-called *Theology* of Aristotle [4]. Among the philosophers we have seen it from Fārābī onwards.

It should be noted, however, that it means one thing in metaphysics and another thing in logic. As a metaphysical expression it stands for matter, or that which exists potentially. Avicenna speaks

of المادة الواجبة ... المادّة المتنعة ... المادّة المكنة in the *Najāt*. In logic when Avicenna speaks of *mawād al-qaḍāyā* he means the modalities

of judgement. Tahānawī explains [5] that المادّة ... كيفيّة النسبة بين المحمول و . الموضوع

'Unṣur is also of non-Qur'anic origin. Among the translators we have:

ὕλη   (Metaph. 1019 a 9)   العنصر (اسطاث)

πρώτη ὕλη   (Metaph. 1049 a 25)   „ الاول (اسطاث)

τά στοιχεῖα   (D. An. 423 b 29)   العناصر (اسحق)

The philosophers used it from Kindī onwards. In the writings of the Brethren [6] we have عنصر العناصر و منصرها . For the adjectival form there is

οὐσία ὑλική   (Metaph. 1049 a 36)   جوهر عنصرى (اسطاث)

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[1] *Al-Imtā'...* Vol. p. 123.
[2] Cf. *Dānish-nāmeh*.
[3] Cf. *Rasā'il...*
[4] ed. Badawī.
[5] *Lexicon*. Vol. 2. p. 1327.
[6] *Risālat al-Jāmi'ah*. II. p. 9.

Ibn Khaldūn [1] speaks of *al-kā'ināt al-'unṣuriyyah*, and of *al-'unṣuriyyāt*.

Ṭīnah is not a very frequent term, but it already exists in Ibn al-Muqaffa' [2]. Among the Translators we have:

ὕλη (D. An. 403 b 18) طينة (اسحق)

Some attempt has been made [3] to enumerate the authors who have used it without knowing that Ibn al-Muqaffa' had done so before

them. Kindī [4] says: العنصر طينة كل طينة and al-Balkhī [5] adds: قد يسمّى الجوهر

الطينة و المادّة والهيولى و الجزء و العنصر وإلا سطقس Strictly of course this is not correct. *Jawhar* whether as essence or substance is different from matter.

22. MĀHĪYYAH

This term is one of those rare compound words introduced into the Arabic language perhaps by the Translators first. Adopted and established by *Falāsifah* and theologians alike, it became current among authors of speculative writing. Its origin as the equivalent of the Aristotelian *tó ti en einai* and the Stoic *tó ti en* has led to disagreements. Mlle Goichon assumed that it was a compound of *mā* and *hīa* [6]. This was challenged by the reviewer of her *Lexicon* [7] who was inclined to believe that it came from the Syriac. In a later work [8] Mlle Goichon quoted Tahānawī in support of her view, though she seemed at a loss to explain why the second part of the word was in the feminine form *hīya*. To note the tentative manner in which the term was first introduced, and the forms it subsequently took, we have to return to the Translators. Thus:

a. Passages giving the masculin form:

τό τί ἐστιν (Metaph. 1026 a 4) ما هو (اسطاث)

κατά τό τί (Metaph. 1069 b 9) فى باب ما هو (متّى)

τό τί ἐστι (D. An. 402 a 13) ما هو (اسحق)

[1] *Al-muqaddamah.*
[2] MS. St. Joseph University.
[3] Cf. S. Pines. *Beitrage zur islamischen Atomenlehre.* p. 39.
[4] *Rasā'il...* p. 166.
[5] *Al-Bad' wa al-Tārīkh.* p. 39.
[6] *Lexique....* p. 386.
[7] Cf. *Rev. d. Et. Islamiques.* 1938. pp. 291-295.
[8] *Vocabulaire...* p. 33.

τό τί ἐστι (Top. 132 a 11) ما الشيء. (دمشقى)

τό τί ἐστι (A. Post. 90 a 34) ما هو الشيء. (متى)

b. Again in the masculin form though in the sense of essence:

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 1075 a 2) الما هو بالانية (اسطاث)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 1074 a 35) ما هو بالانية (متى)

c. To show that the Arabic equivalent is not always *māhiyyah*.

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Top. 133 a 1) الانية (دمشقى)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Top. 133 a 10) „ („)

d. For the feminine form as the equivalent of the same Greek term:

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 1016 a 33) الدّالة على ماهى (اسطاث)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (A. Post. 89 a 32) الماهية (متى)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Top. 132 a 4) ماهية الشيء. (دمشقى)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Top. 101 b 22) الدّال على ما هو الشيء.(دمشقى)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (A. Post. 91 b 11) ما هى والوجود لها (متى)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 993 a 18) ما الشيء. الذى هو وبه ما هو(نظيف)

It should be noted here that the same translator renders the Greek term in different fashions, thus showing that as an equivalent *māhiyyah* had not yet been universally accepted.

e. As the equivalent of the Greek:

τό τί ἐστιν (D. An. 402 b 26) ماهية (احق)

τό τί ἐστιν (A. Pr. 46 a 36) ماهية الشيء. (تذارى)

τό τί ἐστιν (Soph. 168 b 16) ماهية (زرعة)

τό τί ἐστιν (Metaph. 988 a 10) ماهية الشيء. (نظيف)

But an interesting variant is

τό τί ἦν εἶναι (Metaph. 994 b 17) كينونة الشيء. (اسطاث)

and Isḥāq renders the identical passage as فيما يسئل عنه بما هو.

The above citations permit us to draw certain distinctions. The form *māhiyyah* does not appear in Ustāth's rendering of the *Metaphysica*. Nor is it to be found in Isḥāq's translation of certain parts

of that work. But we do find it in Isḥāq's version of the *De Anima*. After that it is almost regularly used in the translations of Abū Bishr Matta, Dimashqī, Tazārī, and Ibn Zurʿah. And Naẓīf who was one of the latest has

τό τί ἐστιν   (Metaph. 988 a 10)   ماهيّة الشيىء (نظيف)

Hence only gradually did the term come into existence; and the credit must go to the later translators. Linguistically it does not owe anything to Syriac. But the manner in which it was coined was very similar in the sense that both the Syriac and the Arabic terms are literal translations of the Greek. Two different forms of the Syriac have survived. In the translation of the *Categories*[1] we have *haw mā d'iṭauhi*. In the rendering of the *De Interpretatione*[2] there is the form *māniyāyāuṭa*. In that the Arabic is a compound word, we have

the testimony of Ibn Taimīyyah who says[3]: الماهيّة مأخوذة من قولهم ما

هو ... . يقال ماهيّة و مائيّة وهى اسماء مولّدة . But this gives two different forms: *māhiyyah* and *māʾiyyah*. Are they exactly synonymous; and do they stand as the equivalent of the same Greek term? Again we have to go to the texts. We have:

τί τό ὄν   (Metaph. 1028 b 4)   مائيّة الهويّة (اسطاث)

τό τί ἦν εἶναι   (D. An. 430 b 28)   مائيّة (اسحق)

τό τί ἐστι   (D. An. 402 b 17)   („)   „

It is also to be found in Ibn Nāʿimah's version of the so-called *Theology*. Taking Usṭāth's work as the determining factor, it may be deduced, though by no means conclusively, that *māʾiyyah* was the earlier form. Perhaps because this could also mean liquidity, it was considered unsuitable by some of the translators.

Kindī uses both forms interchangeably and as exact equivalents[4]. On the other hand Ibn Nāʿimah (who was closely associated with him in producing a version of the so-called *Theology*) does not use the form *māʾiyyah* in his rendering of the *Sophistics*[5]. According to

the *Fihrist* there was a treatise by Kindī entitled. فى مائيّة العقل Yet in none of Fārābī's works which we have consulted have we

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[1] Cf. Kh. Georr. *Les Catégories*...
[2] ed. Hoffman. 1886.
[3] *Kitāb al-Radd*... p. 65.
[4] Cf. *Rasāʾil*...
[5] ed. C. Haddad. *Thèse*. Sorbonne. 1952.

seen that form. Rāzī had a treatise called [1]: فى مائيّة اللّذة In Avicenna and particularly in his *Shifā*, the two forms appear without any appreciable difference of connotation. But in his commentary on the *Theology* he says: فيكون ماهيّة مائيّة ماهيّة Al-Muḥāsabī, among the early mystics, is attributed with a treatise entitled مائيّة العقل و معناه which is still extant. And in his *Tahāfot* this form is used by Ghazālī.

In Persian both forms are used from Avicenna onwards without any specific attempt at differentiation. The exception, however, is Sajistānī [2] who says: ماهيت بود چون هستى چيزها و مائيت بود چون چيزى چيزها. It may therefore be concluded that *mā'iyyah* was the early form which we like to believe originated with Ustāth in association with Kindī. What Ḥunain thought of it we do not know. It is not found in his works. But his son Isḥāq used it in his early versions as in the case of the *De Anima*; then later changed to *māhīyyah*. For differentiation in sense and connotation there is no textual justification.

23. AL-MIRĀ'

This is another term non-Qur'anic in form or sense. Among the Translators we have:

ἀμφιβολία	(Soph. 166 a 6)	مراء (يحيى ، زرعة)
ἡ σοφιστική	(Soph. 169 b 19)	المراء (يحيى)
ἡ ἐριστική	(Soph. 172 a 2)	„ (ناعمة ، زرعة)
ἐριστικός	(Soph. 165 a 39)	مرائىّ – مارى (ناعمة ، يحيى)
ἀμφίβολος	(Soph. 175 a 37)	مرائىّ (يحيى ، زرعة)

Both *al-mirā'* and *al-mumāriy* are found in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ [3]; and it is probable that the Translators took the words from him. We have not seen them in Kindī whose logical works have not survived. It becomes common from Fārābī onwards down to Averroes who in his commentary on the *Rhetorica* speaks of المراء و المغالطة .

As a syllogism there is

σοφιστικός	(Soph. 171 b 8)	القياس المرائىّ والسوفسطائى (يحيى)

Jurjānī [4] says المراء طعن فى كلام الغير .

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[1] Cf. *Rasā'il*...
[2] Cf. *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*. p. 17.
[3] Cf. *Al-Adab al-Kabīr*.
[4] *Taʿrīfāt*. p. 221.

In the sense of grammar we have

γραμματικός	(Metaph. 1026 b 17)	النحوىّ (اسطاث)
ἡ γραμματική	(Categ. 11 a 29)	النحو (احمق)

As a term of logic to mean the mode of a proposition, we have:

ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 993 b 17)	نحو (اسطاث)
ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 993 b 17)	مثال (احمق)
ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 990 a 8)	نحو (نظيف)
ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 995 a 14)	حيلة (اسطاث)
ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 1013 b 29)	الوجه („) (
ὁ τρόπος	(Metaph. 1022 b 15)	نوع („) (
ὁ τρόπος	(Rhet. 1366 a 31)	نحو (مجهول)
ὁ τρόπος	(Soph. 168 a 20)	ضرب (ناعمة)
ὁ τρόπος	(Categ. 4 a 29)	الجهة (احمق)
ὁ τρόπος	(A. Pr. 32 b 5)	ضرب (تذارى)
ὁ τρόπος	(A. Post. 71 b 10)	طريق (متى)
ὁ τρόπος	(A. Post. 85 a 10)	ضرب („)

These examples show the different Arabic terms used as equivalents for the same Greek word. But the more common and correct which gained acceptance among the *Falāsifah* are *naḥw*, *ḍarb*, *jihat*, and *wajh*. These are all found in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. They are not only in his literary works like the *Kalīlah*, *al-Adab al-Kabīr*, and *al-Adab al-Ṣaghīr*. But what is far more important is that they are to be seen in his rendering of those parts of the Aristotelian *Organon* (as found in the manuscript of the St. Joseph University) which we believe suggested to the Translators many of the terms which they later employed. There may be no conclusive proofs available. There is, however, great likelihood.

In the absence of the logical works of Kindī, the above terms are found in Fārābī onwards. Avicenna [1] says: ... الجهات ثلاثة : واجب

و ممكن ... و ممتنع and he calls the modal proposition القضيّة الموجهّة .

25. AL-HUWA HŪ, AL-HUWĪYYAH

These are two different terms coined from the pronoun *huwa*. They are to be found in theological and mystical writings on the one hand, and in philosophical works on the other. It is difficult to

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[1] *Najāt*. p. 17.

determine in which camp they originated first. But what needs to be stressed is that they had entirely different connotations for each group.

For the *Falāsifah* the first term meant identity. Among the Translators we have:

τό ταὐτό	(Metaph. 1054 a 31)	الهوهو (اسطاث)
τό αὐτό	(Metaph. 1029 b 22)	هوهو (") ( )
αἱ αὐταί	(Metaph. 1054 b 2)	هى هى (") ( )
μή ταὐτό	(Metaph. 1054 b 21)	لا هوهو (") ( )
ταὐτόν	(Metaph. 991 a 5)	هى هى (نظيف)

It is also seen in Ibn Nā'imah's rendering of the so-called *Theology*. We have not seen it in Kindī, though he had polished up the Arabic version of Ibn Nā'imah. Fārābī says [1] الهوهو معناه الوحدة و الوجود. Avicenna says in the *Shifā*: الفير . . . مقابل الهوهو and in the *Najāt* [2] الهوهو اتحاد بين اثنين. The same is repeated by Suhrawardī [3] and Averroes [4]. And in his passion for abstractions, Mullā Ṣadrā [5] comes with الهوهوية . . . الاتحاد. The mystical usage of the term may be noted in Ḥallāj [6] and in the book of Sarrāj [7], though in both cases the editors appear to confuse the mystical with the philosophical sense.

Tahānawī says [8] . . . الهوهو . . . لفظ مركّب then goes on to discuss what the mystics understood by it. In philosophical texts it meant the identity of a thing.

The term *huwīyyah* was coined as the equivalent of the Greek copula to express the concept of being, to denote an entity in itself, and to connote ipseity. Among the Translators we have:

τό εἶναι	(Metaph. 1019 a 4)	الهوية (اسطاث)
τό ὄν	(Metaph. 994 a 28)	" (") ( )
τό ὄν	(Metaph. 994 a 28)	ما هو موجود (اسحق)
τό μή ὄν	(Metaph. 994 a 28))	الذى ليس بهوية (اسطاث)

[1] *Ta'līqāt.* p. 21.
[2] p. 224.
[3] *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.* p. 27.
[4] *Tafsīr ma ba'd al-Ṭabī'ah.* p. 1403.
[5] *Al-Asfār...*
[6] *Kitāb al-Ṭawāsīn.* ed. Massignon. pp. 102, 129.
[7] *Kitāb al-Luma'.* ed. Nicolson. p. 295.
[8] *Lexicon.* Vol. 2. p. 1340.

τό μή ὄν	(Metaph. 994 a 28)	ما هو معدوم (اسحق)
ὄν καί οὐκ ὄν	(Metaph. 1008 a 9)	هويّة و لاهويّة (اسطاث)
οὐσία τῶν ὄντων	(Metaph. 996 a 7)	جواهر الهويّات („)
πρῶτον ὄν	(Metaph. 1028 a 14)	الهويّة الاولى („)
τό εἶναι σημαίνει καί τό ἔστιν ὅτι ἀληθές	(Metaph. 1017 a 31)	الهويّة تدّل على انيّة الشيىء و حقيقته (اسطاث)
τῶν ὄντων	(Metaph. 987 b 8)	الموجودات (نظيف)
τό ὄν	(Top. 121 a 21)	الموجود (دمشقى)

From the above illustrations it is seen that whereas Ustāth consistently uses *huwīyyah*, others like Ishāq, Dimashqī and Nazīf translated the same passage or others with a totally different terminology. We are inclined to believe that *huwīyyah* was first coined by Ustāth with the approval of and perhaps at the suggestion of Kindī. It is not found in Ibn al-Muqqafa's rendering of parts of the Aristotelian *Organon*. Nor in any of his literary works. 'Abd al-Hamīd does not have it. Ustāth appears to be the first translator to use it. But we know that his Arabic was not strong enough to encourage him to coin new words. Furthermore *huwīyyah* is found in Ibn Nā'imah's version of the so-called *Theology*. It has been definitely stated that Kindī had a hand in polishing up the language of that translation. In the Arabic rendering of what came to be

known in the West as *Liber de Causis* there is [1] الهويّات الاول العقليّات

و الهويّات الثوانى الحسّيات and many other uses of that term. But what makes us believe that Kindī may have actually suggested *huwīyyah* is that he uses it frequently, then goes on to form a verb out of it,

thus [2] توحّدها هو تهويّها Although all the *Falāsifah* who succeeded him fully accepted the term in spite of the fact that later translators tended to change it for another, as far as we know none of them used the verbal form of it. Fārābī [3], the *Epistles* of Brethren [4], Avicenna [5], Suhrawardī [6] all have it. Averroes says [7]:

. . . اصناف الهويّات ثلاثة .

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[1] ed. Bardenhewer. p. 89.
[2] *Rasā'il*. . . p. 142.
[3] *Madīnat al-Fāḍilah*. p. 15.
[4] Vol. 2. p. 250.

[5] *Najāt*. p. 244.
[6] *op. cit.* p. 7.
[7] *Tafsīr ma ba'd al-Ṭabī'ah*. p. 1401.

Like *al-huwa hū*, the term *huwīyyah* has a mystical sense entirely different from the philosophical. It can be seen in Jīlī [1], in Sarrāj [2], in Ibn al-'Arabī [3]. Basṭāmī states [4]: ارانی هویته نظرت هویته الل انانیتی . It connotes He-ness in contrast to I-ness. This is corroborated by the Persian rendering of Nāṣir Khosrow [5] as اوئی (اوی). Again Mullā Ṣadrā indulges his passion for abstractions by speaking [6] of هویته و طیبته . Jāmī does the same.

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[1] p. 26.
[2] *op. cit.* p. 81.
[3] *Fuṣūṣ...* p. 172.
[4] *Shaṭaḥāt...*
[5] *Khān al-Ukhuwān.* p. 130.
[6] *Al-Asfār...*